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IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY CURVES
Joshua M. Silverstein*
ABSTRACT
This article sets forth the first comprehensive defense of mandatory curves.
It begins with a case study of one law school. That institution lacked formal
grade normalization policies during the period of the case study. As a result,
the school suffered from dramatic grade disparities. This article contains a
list and statistical analysis of the most significant disparities. The statistical
analysis supports the conclusion that the grade disparities were caused by
differences in teacher grading philosophy, and not by student merit or any
other factor. Next, this article presents several arguments in favor of man-
datory curves. The most crucial is that grade variances that flow from dif-
ferences in professor grading philosophy are grossly unfair to students. A
second important defense of forced curves is that grade disparities distort
the process of course selection, inducing students to register for classes
based on the grading practices of the professor rather than on substantive
concerns, such as topical importance, career relevancy, and skill develop-
ment. The article then responds to the eight most significant and common
objections to mandatory curves. Several of these objections are deeply prob-
lematic, such as the contention that curves prevent professors from award-
ing students the grades they deserve. Others have some merit, such as the
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argument that mandatory curves encourage excessive competition among
students. But the latter set of criticisms ultimately does not undercut the case
for curves, principally because mandatory curves are the lesser evil. For
example, the competition objection fails because the significant grade dis-
parities that frequently result in the absence of a curve probably cause more
competition than mandatory curves do. And even if forced curves do in-
crease competition, the unfairness of grade disparities flowing from differ-
ences in professor grading philosophy is the more pressing concern. Fi-
nally, the article ends with a discussion of some issues regarding the struc-
ture and scope of mandatory curves, including the applicability of curves to
smaller classes, seminars, and clinics.
I. INTRODUCTION
]I. A GRADE NORMALIZATION TAXONOMY
Ill. GRADING DISPARITIES AT THE WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF
LAW
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MANDATORY CURVES
A. Substantial Grade Disparities Are Unfair to Students
B. Substantial Grade Disparities Distort the Process of Course
Selection by Students
C. Other Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Curves
V. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY CURVES
A. Objection One: "Mandatory Curves Prevent Teachers from
Giving Students the Grades They Deserve"
B. Objection Two: "Grade Disparities Do Not Justify
Mandatory Curves Because Many Disparities Are Between
Courses That Are 'Apples' and 'Oranges"'
C. Objection Three: "Mandatory Curves Prevent the Best
Teachers from Awarding Grades That Reflect Their
Superior Teaching"
D. Objection Four: "Mandatory Curves Infringe on Academic
Freedom"
E. Objection Five: "Mandatory Curves Are Incompatible with
Criterion-Referenced Grading"
1. Response One: Criterion Referencing is
Substantially Compatible with a Mandatory Curve
2. Response Two: Criterion Referencing is Neither
Practical Nor Ideal at an Institutional Level
F. Objection Six: "Mandatory Curves Induce Excessive
Competition Among Students"
G. Objection Seven: "Mandatory Curves Induce Excessive
Apathy in Law Students"
H. Objection Eight: "Recommended Curves and Informal Grade
Normalization Practices Are Superior to Mandatory Curves"
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I. A Final Note on the Objections
VI. THE STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF MANDATORY CURVES
A. Structural Features of Mandatory Curves
1. Structuring Curves Around Mean GPA
2. Altered Standards for Smaller Courses
B. The Scope of Mandatory Curves
1. Mandatory Curves Should Apply to Smaller Courses
2. Mandatory Curves Should Apply to Seminars, Clinics
and Skills Courses
VII. CONCLUSION
APPENDIX 1 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL GRADE DISPARITIES AT
THE WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW USING THE
WELCH T-TEST
APPENDIX 2 THE MANDATORY CURVE PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW
"[A]wards should be 'according to merit'; for all men agree that
what is just in distribution must be according to merit."'
"We teach that justice matters; let us do our best when it is our
turn to hand down the decisions."2
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to set forth a comprehensive defense of
mandatory curves. A mandatory (or forced) curve is the best method for
preventing substantial grade disparities among professors. The grading prac-
tices at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School
of Law, illustrate the problems that can develop in the absence of such a
policy. Until the fall of 2011, that school had no formal guidelines regarding
grade normalization.3 As a result, there were dramatic variations in grading
for many years. Professors teaching the same course sometimes differed by
an entire grade point (e.g., 3.5 vs. 2.5 on a 4.0 scale).4 Such variances are
unfair to the students because they flow from differences in faculty grading
philosophy. Grades determine academic honors, placement prospects, and
career paths. It is unjust for the allocation of these benefits to depend on
teacher grading philosophy rather than on student merit.
1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V. § 3(A), 1 (WD. Ross trans.), available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt.
2. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Making the Grade: Some Principles of Comparative Grading, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 583, 618 (2002).
3. See UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LrrrLE ROCK, WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW
ACADEMIC RuLES (Nov. 9, 2009) (hereinafter "UALR BOWEN LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC RULES"), at
11-12, available at http://ualr.edulaw/files/2011/06/SCAN1891_000.pdf.
4. See infra Part Ill.
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Grade disparities also distort the process of course selection by stu-
dents. Again, the William H. Bowen School of Law ("Bowen Law School"
or "Bowen") is illustrative. Students there placed substantial weight on the
professor's grading history in deciding whether to register for a course.5
Indeed, students sometimes referred to the registration process as the "grade
selection process" rather than the "course selection process."
While a majority of law schools have adopted a mandatory curve,6
there is still substantial resistance to such policies. This resistance is driven
principally by a series of flawed objections to forced curves. Some of the
criticisms are deeply problematic, such as the contentions that mandatory
curves prevent professors from awarding students the grades they deserve
and that curves infringe on academic freedom. Others have some validity,
such as the argument that curves encourage excessive competition among
students. But the criticisms with merit do not undercut the case for manda-
tory curves, primarily because forced curves are the lesser evil. For exam-
ple, the competition objection fails because the significant grade disparities
that frequently result in the absence of a curve probably cause more compe-
tition than curves do. And even if mandatory curves induce slightly more
competition than grade disparities, the fairness that results from properly-
designed curves makes them well worth this cost.
Other critics of mandatory curves do not challenge such policies in full.
Rather, they assert that forced curves should not apply to a subset of
courses, namely smaller classes, seminars, and clinics. I accept that manda-
tory curves cannot be applied in precisely the same way to both small and
large courses. Additional mechanisms are necessary to ensure that a curve's
operation in small classes maximizes fairness. But once those mechanisms
are adopted, mandatory curves ought to govern in small classes. In addition,
there is no reason to treat seminars and clinics differently from other
courses, unless a particular seminar or clinic falls below the size thresholds
that warrant the use of size-related mechanisms.
This article demonstrates that mandatory curves are a crucial element
of fair grading. All law schools should thus have a forced curve.
Part II of the article sets forth a brief taxonomy of grade normalization.
Part I discusses the grade disparities that Bowen Law School experienced
in the absence of a forced curve. Part IV presents the primary justifications
for mandatory curves. Part V responds to the eight most significant and
common objections to forced curves. Part VI addresses several issues re-
garding the structure and scope of mandatory curves, including the applica-
bility of curves to smaller classes, seminars, and clinics.
5. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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The article also includes three appendices. Appendix 1 contains statis-
tical analysis of the grade disparities at the Bowen Law School listed in Part
III. Appendix 2 sets forth the mandatory curve I recommended to the faculty
at Bowen. The faculty adopted the curve in the spring of 2011 with only a
few, relatively minor changes. The curve took effect in the fall of 2011. Fi-
nally, Appendix 3 (available only online) contains a more comprehensive
list of the grading disparities at Bowen.
II. A GRADE NORMALIZATION TAXONOMY
In this article, the term "grade normalization" refers to any policy or
practice designed to standardize grades among professors, whether formal or
informal, mandatory or recommended, rigid or flexible.7 Formal grade nor-
malization principally involves setting course means, medians, or distribu-
tions.8 Informal grade normalization includes practices such as circulating
grade distribution reports among the faculty and encouraging professors of
comparable classes to consult about grades. Grade normalization is manda-
tory if the grading policies must be followed-as with a required mean or
required consultation among professors who teach the same course. And
normalization is recommended if professors have discretion over whether to
follow the applicable standards-as with a suggested mean or suggested
consultation practices. In this piece, the terms "mandatory curve" and
"forced curve" refer to any grade normalization policy requiring a class
mean, median, or grade distribution. 9
7. The terms "grade normalization" and "mandatory curve" have disparate uses in the literature
and among law schools. See Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 415, 417 n.6 (1994) (explaining that the word "curve" may be "[c]onstrued narrowly to
refer to the distribution of grades among students rather than a class mean or median," but that a number
of law schools responding to a survey about grading practices interpreted the word to include "[c]lass
means and medians, as well as distributional schemes"). For examples of differing usages, see Richard A.
Epstein, Grade Normalization, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 710 (1970-71) ("Grade normalization is respon-
sive to both criticisms, every bit as much as mandatory curves, because it both sets the median and limits
the spread of the curve."); Jay M. Feinman, Law School Grading, 65 UMKC L. REV. 647, 652 (1997)
("Grade normalization is the process of transforming individual professors' grades to a common curve...
. Normalization makes use of an approved distribution of grades; the distribution can be strict or flexi-
ble."); Deborah Waire Post, Power and the Morality of Grading-A Case Study and a Few Critical
Thoughts on Grade Normalization, 65 UMKC L. REV. 777, 778 (1997) ("The subject of this symposium
issue is grade normalization, one example of which is the 'strict statistical curve."').
8. For examples of other types of formal normalization relying upon a statistical methodology, see
Paul T. Wangerin, Calculating Rank-in-Class Numbers: The Impact of Grading Differences Among Law
School Teachers, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 98, 101-103, 117 (2001); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Relative
Rank: A Remedy for Subjective Absolute Grades, 29 CONN. L. REV. 445, 447-50 (1996); VALEN E.
JOHNSON, GRADE INFLATION: A CRISIS IN EDUCATION 209-24, 245 (2003).
9. At present, law schools use many different types of grade normalization, including a wide
variety of mandatory curves. For comprehensive surveys of law school grading practices, see Andy
Mroch, Law School Grading Curves 95 (2005), available at
http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/AttachmentO5-14.pdf; Robert C. Downs & Nancy Levit, If it Can't be
Lake Woebegone ... A Nationwide Survey of Law School Grading and Grade Normalization Practices,
20121
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The central purpose of a mandatory curve is the prevention of grade
disparities that result from different grading philosophies among the faculty
rather than from student merit.'" The most important type of grade disparity
is a variation in mean (or average) GPA across courses. As used in this arti-
cle, the term "grading philosophy" has two elements-"substantive expecta-
tions" and "grading style." Faculty differ in substantive expectations when
they disagree over what constitutes excellent, satisfactory, and unsatisfac-
tory work, or when they disagree about what constitutes superior and infe-
rior work. For example, Professor X may consider a Contracts final written
by a first-year student to be "excellent" only if the student shows a very high
level of mastery. On the other hand, Professor Y labels a Contracts test "ex-
cellent" if the student demonstrates a more basic understanding of the sub-
ject.
Of course, the phrase "substantive expectations" could be used to de-
scribe other aspects of assessment, such as whether to administer a closed-
book or open-book test, whether to use multiple choice or essay questions,
which legal skills deserve emphasis (e.g., extracting rules from legal texts,
applying the rules to new circumstances, and conveying the application in
writing), or which substantive topics to teach and test on. But that is not how
I am employing the term here. In this piece, "substantive expectations" re-
fers strictly to differences in the degree of expectation, not the constituent
parts. For example, Professors X and Y may both teach and test on the same
skills and subjects, and they might even give the same weight to the skills
and subjects covered in the exam. But Professor X demands mastery of the
various skills and subjects for a test to be considered "excellent," whereas
Professor Y only requires basic competency. That is what I mean by differ-
ent "substantive expectations."
Teachers differ in grading style when they disagree over purely formal
grading matters-such as whether most "excellent" or "superior" papers
should receive As, or only a few. For example, Professor J might believe
65 UMKC L. REV. 819 (1997); id. at 837-40 (summarizing the types of grade normalization in use);
Kaufman, supra note 7; id. at 417-21 (summarizing the forms of grade normalization in use). See also
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 162-84 (2007) (hereinafter
CARNEGIE) (discussing law school assessment generally); ROY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 235-63 (2007) (hereinafter BEST
PRACTICES) (same); Daniel Keating, Ten Myths About Law School Grading, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 171
(1998) (discussing a variety of grading issues).
10. See Post, supra note 7, at 786 (explaining that grade normalization "is about 'fair competi-
tion'--it is about preventing grade differences that are "not attributable to differences in students, but to
differences in instructors"); see also ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW FACULTY OF LAW
STATEMENT ON GRADE NORMALIZATION, available at
http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/current/handbookexams/normalization.stj ("Grade
normalization ... is intended to ensure fair and just grading of students based upon their academic per-
formance regardless of the particular course taken, the section to which assigned, the degree of difficulty
of the examination, and the identity of the professor teaching the course.") (emphasis added).
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that all excellent exams deserve an A, while Professor K thinks that A
grades should be a rare occurrence, awarded only to truly outstanding pa-
pers.
In sum, "grading philosophy" consists of two types of grading stan-
dards-standards that set the degree of substantive expectation and stan-
dards that set the formal labels applicable to each level of achievement.
1I. GRADING DISPARITIES AT THE WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW
The Bowen Law School suffered from grade disparities based on pro-
fessor grading philosophy for many years. This subpart contains a chart list-
ing a selection of the most significant disparities from the fall 2006 semester
through the spring 2010 semester." I have included these disparities in order
to illustrate the problems that can develop when an institution lacks binding
grade normalization procedures. Some past law review articles have offered
individual examples of grade disparities, made general statements regarding
grade variations at a given school, or presented the disparities in statistical
form. 2 For this piece, I felt it critical to present a more comprehensive list in
unadjusted form. I want the reader to see, in concrete terms, what dramatic
grade variances look like.
In the chart set forth below, the grade disparities are broken down into
the following seven categories:
1. First-Year Courses-Disparities in Sections of the Same Course
2. Upper-Level Courses-Disparities in Sections of the Same Course
3. First-Year Courses-Disparities Across Courses
4. Upper-Level Courses-Disparities Across Bar Courses
5. Upper-Level Courses-Disparities Across Electives
6. Upper-Level Courses-Disparities Across Seminars 3
7. Miscellaneous Additional Disparities
The grade point averages listed for each course are mean grade point
averages. The number of students in each class is set forth in parentheses.
An asterisk (*) denotes a required course. A caret (A) denotes a composite
grade point average derived from two sections of the course taught by the
same professor. A significantly more comprehensive list of grading dispari-
ties at my law school is contained in Appendix 3 (available online).' 4
11. There were also significant disparities from the fall 2003 semester through the spring 2006
semester and during the 2010-2011 school year. But I felt that inclusion of these other disparities would
unnecessarily lengthen this article without appreciably strengthening my argument.
12. See infra note 17.
13. As at many law schools, Bowen uses the term "seminar" to refer to smaller courses in which
the final grade is determined principally by a major writing project rather than a final exam.
14. See Appendix 3: A Broad Sampling of Grading Disparities at the William H. Bowen School of
Law, available at http://jurisophia.org/in-defense-of-mandatory-curves-appendix-3-a-b. The list con-
2012]
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1. First-Year Courses - Variances In Sections of the Same Course
Spring 2010: Legal Writing 11*15 (27) = 3.361
VS.
Legal Writing II*A (28) = 3.101; Legal Writing II* (29) = 3.034
VS.
Legal Writing II*M (33) = 2.768
VS.
Legal Writing II* ^ (34) = 2.206
Fall 2009: Legal Writing 1* (29) = 3.440 vs. Legal Writing 1* (32) = 2.859
Fall 2009: Legal Writing 1* (29) = 3.440 vs. Legal Writing I*A (34) = 2.772
Spring 2009: Contracts 11* (59) = 3.134 vs. Contracts II* (91) = 2.750
Spring 2009: Legal Writing II* (30) = 3.629 vs. Legal Writing II* (30) = 2.908
Spring 2009: Legal Writing 11* (30) = 3.629 vs. Legal Writing II*^ (32) = 2.754
Fall 2008: Torts* (92) = 3.269 (20 As) vs. Torts* (60) = 2.625 (2 As)
Fall 2008: Contracts 1* (92) = 3.128 (19 As) vs. Contracts 1* (60) = 2.825 (4 As)
Fall 2007: Contracts I (D) = 3.160 vs. Contracts I (N) = 2.839
Fall 2007: Legal Writing 1* (30) = 3.442 vs. Legal Writing I* ^ (31) = 2.751
Spring 2007: Criminal Law* (84) = 3.176 vs. Criminal Law* (42) = 2.845
Spring 2007: Legal Writing II* (19) = 3.276 vs. Legal Writing II* A (41) = 2.801
Fall 2006: Legal Writing I*A (43) = 3.162 vs. Legal Writing 1* (20) = 2.684
2. Upper-Level Courses - Variances in Sections of the Same Course
Spring 2010: Legal Profession* (33) = 3.273 vs. Legal Profession* (41) = 2.701
Fall 2009: Const. Law* (57) = 3.482 (20 As) vs. Const. Law* (86) = 2.781 (2 As)
Fall 2007: Evidence* (25) = 3.580 vs. Evidence* (57) = 3.035
Spring 2007: Business Assocs. (40) 3.219 vs. Business Assocs. (16) = 2.875
Spring 2007: Legal Profession* (19) = 3.342 vs. Legal Profession* (71) = 3.007
Fall 2006: Evidence (16) = 3.422 vs. Evidence (76) = 2.572
3. First-Year Courses - Variances Across Courses
Spring 2010: Contracts II*A (56) = 3.222 vs. Civ. Pro. 11* (94) = 2.774
Fall 2009: Torts*A (160) = 3.1955 vs. Property I*A (100) = 2.544
Fall 2008: Torts* (92) = 3.269 vs. Civil Procedure 1* (92) = 2.717
Fall 2007: Contracts * (96) = 3.160 vs. Torts (59) = 2.636
Spring 2007: Criminal Law* (84) = 3.176 vs. Property II* (82) = 2.759
4. Upper-Level Courses - Variances Across Bar Courses
tained in Part HI has sixty distinct grade disparities among pairs of courses. The list in Appendix 3 has
543 such variances for the same period of time (fall 2006 through spring 2010), though about eighteen of
these are not significant.
15. At the Bowen Law School, the legal writing course is actually called "Reasoning, Writing, and
Advocacy," or "RWA." See http://ualr.edu/law/academics/curriculum/course-descriptions/.
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Spring 2010: Secured Transactions (56) = 3.442 vs. Decedents' Estates (63) = 2.968
Fall 2009: Secured Transactions (45) = 3.611 vs. Commercial Paper (40) = 2.944
Spring 2009: Secured Transactions (55) = 3.421 vs. Commercial Paper (52) = 2.860
Spring 2009: Secured Transactions (55) = 3.421 vs. Business Assocs. (66) = 2.742
Fall 2008: Secured Transactions (40) = 3.488 vs. Commercial Paper (33) = 2.727
Fall 2008: Conflicts of Law (20) = 3.463 vs. Evidence* (35) = 2.764
Spring 2008: Business Associations (87) = 3.338 v. Sales (17) = 2.471
Fall 2007: Sales (12) = 3.625 vs. Commercial Paper (66) = 2.845
Fall 2007: Evidence* (25) = 3.580 vs. Business Associations (18) = 2.917
Spring 2007: Secured Transactions (28) = 3.436 vs. Family Law (34) = 2.868
Fall 2006: Conflicts of Law (32) = 3.227 vs. Bus. Assoc. (48) = 2.729
5. Upper-Level Courses - Variances Across Electives
Spring 2010: Law Office Management (15) = 4.000 vs. Admin. Law (17) = 2.941
Spring 2010: Public Health Law (10) = 4.000 vs. Estate Planning (10) = 2.900
Fall 2009: Disability Law (20) = 3.632 vs. Poverty Law (38) = 3.000
Spring 2009: Real Estate Trans. (60) = 3.429 vs. Oil & Gas Law (35) = 2.707
Fall 2008: Advanced Torts Media Law (27) = 3.852 vs. Jurisprudence (28) = 3.259
Spring 2008: Real Estate Trans. (32) = 3.758 vs. Construction Law (11) = 3.023
Fall 2007: Local Government Law (28) = 3.759 vs. Health Law (21) = 2.583
Fall 2007: Administrative Law (49) = 3.597 vs. Juvenile Law (32) = 2.570
Spring 2007: Land Use (23) = 3.727 vs. Intro. To Int'l. Law (39) = 2.974
Spring 2007: Gov. Reg. of Business (39) = 3.667 vs. Fed. Income Tax (28) = 2.889
Fall 2006: Bankruptcy Law (21) = 3.475 vs. Federal Income Tax (36) = 2.951
Fall 2006: Intellectual Property (28) = 3.438 vs. White Collar Crime (65) = 2.906
6. Upper-Level Courses - Variances Across Seminars
Spring 2010: 4th Amend. (18) = 4.000 vs. Family Mediation (16) = 3.367
Fall 2009: Mediation (12) = 3.917 vs. Capital Punishment (16) = 3.266
Spring 2009: Race & Crim. Justice (16) = 3.953 vs. Animal Law (19) = 3.197
Spring 2008: Mediation (12) = 3.932 vs. Bioethics (16) = 3.469
Fall 2006: Capital Punishment (16) = 3.797 vs. Law & Soc. Science (9) = 3.306
7. Miscellaneous Additional Variances
Spring 2010: All I-L Night Courses = 3.075 vs. All 1-L Day Courses = 2.890
Fall 2009: All 1-L Night Courses = 3.162 vs. All 1-L Day Courses = 2.984
Fall 2009: All 2-L/3-L Night Courses = 3.303 vs. All 2-L/3-L Day Courses = 3.096
Spring 2009: All 1-L Night Courses = 3.115 vs. All 1-L Day Courses = 2.893
Fall 2008: All 1-L Day Courses = 3.078 vs. All 1-L Night Courses = 2.847
Disparities such as these (and most of the others listed in Appendix 3)
generally cannot be explained by differences in student achievement or abil-
ity. Of course, some of the grade variances listed above might reflect genu-
ine performance differences, particularly where smaller, elective classes are
2012]
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involved. But there is only a minute statistical likelihood that any significant
number of these courses varied in performance by as much as the grades
suggest.16 Accordingly, the variations most likely flow from differences in
faculty grading philosophy. Appendix 1 contains statistical analysis that
supports this conclusion.
Crucially, I am not suggesting that any member of the faculty at my
law school-or any other institution with similar variances'T-is acting in
bad faith. To the contrary, I firmly maintain that all of my colleagues at the
Bowen Law School are grading in good faith. However, as the grade dis-
parities show, my colleagues have dramatically different conceptions of
16. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 829 & n.32 (explaining that, if there are two classes of
students at a law school, each with sixty students, the students were randomly assigned to one class or the
other, and one professor assigned grades with a mean of 2.2 and the other with a mean of 2.8, then
"something is drastically wrong" because "such a large difference in grading means would be accounted
for by chance"-i.e., by chance distribution of the superior students to one class-less than five percent
of the time); see also CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA GRADING POLICY, available at
http://www.law.edu/res/docs/academic/announcements/lawannouncementsbook.pdf ("Where the creden-
tials of entering students have been balanced across sections, as in the first year, or where there is a
sufficiently large sample of students in a class, there is no empirical basis to justify widely divergent
medians, averages [i.e., means], or distributions of grades among those sections and classes. The law
school, therefore prescribes mean/median ranges for its courses."); Wangerin, supra note 8, at 112 (con-
cluding that grade disparities at one law school that are comparable to those at Bowen "seem[] conclu-
sively to demonstrate that dramatic differences in the definitions of letter grades exist within a single part
of the university and even within different sections of the very same course").
17. See, e.g., Wangerin, supra note 8, at 108 (discussing the results of a study of grading at one law
school) ("Teachers [at the law school] gave wildly different grades, sometimes even within different
sections of the same class. Further, teachers in this single [law] school did this year after year after year,
for eight successive years."); id. at 110 (providing an example where the mean GPAs in two sections of
the same course were 3.2 and 1.91); id. at 111-12 (setting forth comprehensive data on the grade dispari-
ties in tables 3 and 6); Post, supra note 7, at 796 & nn.74, 75 (discussing problematic grade variances at
Touro College's Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center); id. at 802 (same). Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at
825 ("Prior to our faculty's adoption of the grade normalization plan at UMKC, grades, at least in the
first year and required courses, varied dramatically depending upon which professor taught a particular
course. In the first year, for example, we had variations from a high mean of 2.89 (close to a B average)
to a low mean of 2.28 (essentially a C+ average) in different sections of the same course in the same
semester."); Epstein, supra note 7, at 708 (noting that, prior to the implementation of grade normalization
at USC, "it was not uncommon in a given subject for one section of the first year class to have a median
grade four (or even more) points higher than the median for the other section," despite the fact that
"every effort was made at the outset to equalize the strength of the sections"). Unjustified grade dispari-
ties have been a problem in legal education for at least 80 years. See John L. Grant, The Single Standard
in Grading, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1929) (a study of grading practices at Columbia Law School). And
they are also an issue in undergraduate education. See SHOUPING HU, BEYOND GRADE INFLATION:
GRADING PROBLEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 12-13 (ASHE Higher Education Report, Vol. 30, No. 6,
2005) (observing that adjunct and untenured faculty award higher grades than other teachers and that
grades in certain departments tend to be much higher or lower than average); id. at 38-39 (summarizing
studies of grade disparities across college departments); Talia Bar & Asaf Zussman, Partisan Grading,
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, on file with the
author and available at http://pluto.huji.ac.il/-azussman/partisan__grading.pdf) (in this study of grading
practices at a particular university, the authors concluded that "student grades are linked to the political
orientation of professors: relative to their Democratic colleagues, Republican professors are associated
with a less egalitarian distribution of grades and with lower grades awarded to Black students relative to
Whites."); infra note 67 (discussing studies that demonstrate that different university departments apply
varying grading standards).
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what constitutes "earning" an A, B, or C grade. That is where the problem
lies. A mandatory curve will remedy the situation because it will largely
eliminate the impact of my colleagues' divergent grading standards. As Pro-
fessors Downs and Levit explain: "[G]rade normalization policies should
not be thought of as punishment for bad faculty behavior but as a normative
structure to help systematize irregularities in what is now an excessively
subjective process."' 8
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MANDATORY CURVES
There are two principal reasons that law schools should use mandatory
curves to eliminate grade disparities. First, grade disparities based on faculty
grading philosophy rather than student merit are unfair. Second, such dis-
parities incentivize students to select courses based on the grading practices
of the professor, rather than on substantive grounds. Part IV explains these
points more fully and sets forth some additional arguments in favor of man-
datory curves.
A. Substantial Grade Disparities Are Unfair to Students
Significant grade disparities are unfair to students because they corrupt
the process of reward distribution in law school. It is undisputed that grades
are critically important. 9 They determine scholastic honors, placement
prospects, and career paths.20 Indeed, a recent study concluded that grades
are even more important than the prestige or reputation of the law school
18. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 822. Of course, one might suggest that there is some type of
misconduct involved in certain circumstances, a form of negligence perhaps rather than bad faith. Cf.
Post, supra note 7, 800 (observing that debates about grade normalization are not pleasant for faculties
because "there is implicit in the entire proceeding
an understanding that the behavior of some of the faculty has made" grade normalization necessary").
19. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 819 ("It is undeniable that grades matter .... "); Stake, supra
note 2, at 585 ("We can argue about the degree to which grades matter, but few doubt that grades do
matter."); BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 235 ("Grades are important in law school.").
20. Douglas A. Henderson, Uncivil Procedure: Ranking Law Students Among Their Peers, 27 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 399, 405-06 (1994) ("Without question, grades are universally perceived to deter-
mine the direction of legal careers no matter the specialty or the setting.") ("Other research demonstrates
the important effect of grades later in life, not just in school."); Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The
Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 78 (2002) ("Grades and
class rank are significant gatekeepers to the reward system during and after law school-law review
membership, research or teaching-assistant positions, internships, and jobs."); Barbara Glesner Fines,
Competition and the Curve, 65 UMKC L. REV. 879, 883 n.19 (1997) ("For example, Dean's list, Latin
honors, Law Review membership, probation & dismissal are all often based on grades or rank."); id. at
886 ("Financial aid may be based on maintaining or achieving a particular grade average."); Downs &
Levit, supra note 9, at 819 ("In addition, grades often are important in the determination of which stu-
dents receive scholarships or other forms of financial aid."); Stake, supra note 2, at 584-86 (detailing
various ways in which grades matter).
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
one attends.2 Thus, it is critical that grades reflect academic merit.2 Allow-
ing faculty to award widely divergent marks based on their individual grad-
ing philosophies unfairly substitutes grading approach for merit. Put more
generally, grade disparities caused by differences in teacher grading phi-
losophy violate the norms of distributive justice. The purpose of mandatory
curves is to ensure that law school rewards are distributed according to stu-
dent merit.
23
The unfairness of grade variations is most pronounced in required,
multi-sectioned courses-the courses that constitute the bulk of the first-
year curriculum at virtually every law school. Students generally do not
choose who their instructors will be in such classes. Those assigned to sec-
tions with "easier" graders have a crucial advantage over students assigned
to courses with "tougher" graders, an advantage that has no relationship to
academic merit. Given the importance of first-year grades,24 providing any
group of students with such an advantage is especially unfair. To quote my
colleague, Professor Terrence Cain, under the system previously in opera-
tion at the Bowen Law School, students received higher grades not because
of superior performance, but "based on accident of birth"-i.e., merely be-
cause they were assigned to courses with easier graders. Professor Jeffrey
Stake makes the same point: "It is plainly unfair for some students to suffer
lower grades because of a throw of the dice, and especially so because first
year grades are the most important.
25
21. Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret of My Success: How Status, Prestige and School
Performance Shape Legal Careers 2 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1640058 ("The consistent theme we find throughout
this analysis is that performance in law school-as measured by law school grades-is the most impor-
tant predictor of career success. It is decisively more important than law school 'eliteness."').
22. See Post, supra note 7, at 790 ("Grading is not justified if it produces either false positives or
false negatives in judging the quality of a student.") (citing Randall R. Curren, Coercion and Ethics of
Grading and Testing, 45 EDUC. THEORY 425, 436 (1995)).
23. See Fines, supra note 20, at 892 (observing that grade normalization policies are "grounded in
a distributive justice rationale-given that faculty differ significantly in their grading practices, and given
that the rewards and punishments allotted to students may be profoundly affected by the chance of their
assignment to particular professors, normalization policies are required to achieve equity"); see also
Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 825 ("'A grading system cannot be fair and effective ... unless all
faculty abide by the same general standards."') (quoting one school's response to a survey conducted by
the authors).
24. See Wangerin, supra note 8, at 104 ("First-year grades in law school play a tremendously
important role in the lives of individual law students, probably a much more important role than a single
year of grades in any other part of the university."); id. at 104 n.4 (noting that law review eligibility,
moot court eligibility, research assistant positions with law professors, summer association positions with
law firms, and scholarship eligibility are all frequently dependent on first-year grades and class rank);
Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 328 (1982) ("The
incentive and reward mechanism of law school turns almost entirely on first-year performance."); BEST
PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 235 ("Grades are important in law school, particularly for first year stu-
dents.").
25. Stake, supra note 2, at 588; accord Feinman, supra note 7, at 652 ("Normalization is used to
prevent the inequity that otherwise would result from random section assignment."); Steve H. Nickles,
Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK L. REv. 411, 457 (1977) ("Whether a student
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Matters are only slightly better with respect to electives. Students fre-
quently have little choice over who their instructor will be in bar courses,
other doctrinal classes, seminars, and clinics. At smaller law schools, many
courses are taught by only one member of the faculty. And even when a
class is taught by two (or more), scheduling issues often prevent students
from taking courses taught by the professor of their choosing. For example,
some classes fill relatively early in the registration process, students in night
programs cannot take off work to enroll in day courses, and professors are
often unavailable to teach a given class. Therefore, the awarding of grades
based on "accident of birth" is a problem across the entire curriculum.
To bring some concreteness to this analysis, consider grade disparities
through the lens of class rank. Class rank is critically significant in the legal
job market,2 6 and schools frequently use rank in determining academic re-
wards such as law review membership and graduation honors. Indeed, class
rank is generally more important to students than absolute GPA.27 Ranking
students is inappropriate, however, when professors grade using different
metrics. Professors who give disproportionately low grades injure their own
students in the rankings, and those who award disproportionately high
grades harm the class ranks of students in other courses.28 As explained by
Professor Deborah Post, "without some standard for grading that makes the
grades of the different faculty members comparable, ranking makes no
sense. It is like comparing apples to oranges. 2 9
remains in school, makes the law review, or receives any of the rewards associated with 'good' grades
depends to a large degree upon the grades he receives in his first year of law work; and his first year
grades depend to some extent, due to varying standards among teachers[,] upon the accident of manda-
tory course section assignments."); Fines, supra note 20, at 892 ("Indeed, it is unfair if a student's chance
of being chosen for Law Review or for an interview with the elite corporate firm is based on the chance
of being assigned to one particular professor rather than on merit."); Keating, supra note 9, at 185.
26. Henderson, supra note 20, at 405 ("Empirical research confirms that employers do use class
rank to select students: the firms studied consistently used ranking as the key indicator of law school
success."); see also Fines, supra note 20, at 886 (observing that most prestigious employers screen appli-
cations using class rank).
27. Keating, supra note 9, at 185.
28. Id. at 188; see also id. at 185 ("Therefore, when one teacher gives more total grade-wealth than
other teachers, the effect is the same as if that generous teacher were deducting points from other teach-
ers' students."); Fines, supra note 20, at 892 ("Both hard graders and easy graders distort the competitive
process."); JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 222-23 (noting that when a professor awards all As, he "has tacitly
ranked his students higher than all students who elected not to take his class," with the effect being "the
elevation of his students' GPAs relative to the GPAs of all students who chose not to take his class").
29. Post, supra note 7, at 809; accord Stake, supra note 2, at 589 ("Variation in the average grade
also results in unfairness and inefficiency when grades are combined. The students taking courses in
which the teacher awards lower grades are less likely to qualify for honors, more likely to end up with a
low class rank, and more likely to flunk out of law school entirely. In short, 'the reliability and validity of
GPA as a criterion of academic success are attenuated because the GPA is not comparable for students
who take courses with severe grading standards and students who take courses with lenient standards."')
(quoting Stricker et al., Adjusting College Grade-Point Average Criteria for Variations in Grading
Standards: A Comparison of Methods, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178, 178 (1994)); Wangerin, supra note
8, at 113 (explaining that traditional class rank calculations "are corrupted by the different definitions
that individual teachers give to the same letter grades); Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 446 ("The
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The impact of disparate grading practices on class rank is not small.
Taking courses from professors who use more generous scales can signifi-
cantly alter a student's class standing. 30 To illustrate, consider the situation
of a student ranked just outside the top half of the class at the end of the first
year at the Bowen Law School. For the 2009-2010 school year, that would
be the student ranked 104th out of 198. This student had a GPA of 3.01. 31
Suppose we elevate a single C+ earned by this student in a three-credit
course to a B-. This would raise the student's GPA to 3.06,32 improving the
student's rank to 92nd out of 198."3 That is a move of twelve places from a
single, very small change.
Now, suppose we place this student in two three-credit courses with
professors whose class GPAs averaged 0.5 higher than those of the profes-
sors teaching the other sections of the same subject, something that hap-
pened in the fall of 2008 at my school.34 Suppose further that, as a result,
this student received a B- instead of a C+ and a B instead of a C+ in the two
courses. That would raise the student's GPA from 3.01 to 3.135. 3' And that
elevates the student's class rank from 104th to 75th out of 198.36 The student
has gone from outside the top half of the class to the top 38%.3 7 This could
easily be the difference between receiving multiple job offers and receiving
none. Indeed, according to Professor Paul Wangerin, "anecdotal evidence
suggests that very, very small differences in first-year rank-in-class numbers
can have extremely profound consequences for individual students.... [A]
single rank difference for individual students at the end of the first year of
problem is not in the subjectivity of grades but in the aggregation of incomparable ones [into class
rank]."); ST. JOHN'S FACULTY OF LAW STATEMENT ON GRADE NORMALIZATION, supra note 10 ("Grade
normalization... is essential if students are to be fairly ranked and law school averages capable of being
compared.").
30. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 707 n.2 ("For example, it is often the case that changes in grade
average measured in fractions of a point can alter considerably a student's rank in class."); Georgakopou-
los, supra note 8, at 454 ("I stress that even a slight difference in grading standards will affect a raw
ranking.").
31. The document containing this information is on file with the author.
32. This GPA is reached by using the following calculation: 3.01 x 30 credits in the first year
curriculum = 90.3 GPA points. Raising a grade from C+ (worth 2.5) to a B- (worth 3.0) in a three credit
course is equivalent to 1.5 additional GPA points (0.5 x 3 = 1.5). 90.3 + 1.5 = 91.8. 91.8/30 = 3.06
GPA.
33. See supra note 31.
34. The class GPAs in Torts and Contracts I for one section (the day division) were 3.269 and
3.128, respectively. In the other section (the night division), the GPAs were 2.625 (Torts) and 2.825
(Contracts I). This comes to an average difference of 0.4735. (3.269 - 2.625 = .644; 3.128 - 2.825 =
.303; .644 + .303 = .947; .947/2 = .4735.) This data is taken from the chart in Part HI, supra.
35. Working from the figures in footnote 32, supra, raising a grade from C+ (worth 2.5) to a B
(worth 3.25) in a three-credit course is equivalent to 2.25 GPA points (.75 x 3 = 2.25). 91.8 + 2.25 =
94.05. 94.05/30 = 3.135.
36. See supra note 31.
37. Note that the Bowen Law School has both day and night divisions and that the night division
students take fewer than thirty credits. As a result, these examples actually understate the impact when
professors in the two first-year sections vary substantially in their grading practices.
[Vol. 34
IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY CURVES
law school can mean-literally--everything, in the lives of these
students."38
Of course, the impact of higher or lower grades is greater when a stu-
dent is ranked in the middle of the class, at the center of the bell curve, than
when the student is an outlier, near the top or bottom of the class. Nonethe-
less, small changes in class rank--e.g., moving into the top third or top ten
percent-can elevate a student from also ran to serious candidate for many
types of jobs, including judicial clerkships and associate positions at top-
paying law firms.39
Professor Paul Wangerin's study of one law school illustrates that my
hypotheticals are firmly based in reality. Among the students who started at
that school in 1994,
[t]he rank discrepancies for individual students [at the end of the
first year] are astonishing. Several students in the group of 198
were ranked 40 or more places away from the places where they
would have been ranked had grades been standardized among the
various teachers.... [And some] students with the same raw rank
would have been ranked almost 50 places apart had statistically
standardized grades rather than raw grades been used.4"
Professor Wangerin studied a total of eight entering classes. As he ex-
plains, "[i]n connection with every single entering group studied, I found
dramatic rank discrepancies for large numbers of students."41
Individual faculty members should not have this type of control on the
distribution of rewards at a law school.42 And this is particularly so in a
tightening job market.43 Professors who award disproportionately high or
low grades are imposing a substantial injustice on students.
One possible response to my analysis is that perhaps the "accidents of
birth" will balance out as the students progress through school. If the as-
signment of students to courses taught by high and low graders is essentially
38. Wangerin, supra note 8, at 104.
39. See also Epstein, supra note 7, at 708 ("Moreover, in years where all the low (or, to take the
other view, high) grading instructors were concentrated in one section, most of the top positions in the
class were occupied by students from only one section.").
40. Wangerin, supra note 8, at 114.
41. Id. For a comparable study in the undergraduate context, see JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 209-17;
id. at 195 ("Effects of these grading disparities on student assessment are severe. For many Duke stu-
dents, the grading policies used by their instructors were nearly as important to determining their GPA
and class rank as was their academic performance.").
42. See Fines, supra note 20, at 892 ("While we are perfectly willing to allow individual faculty
members the freedom and power to teach and assess according to whatever approach they please (assum-
ing minimal competence), we are unwilling to grant individual faculty the ability to control the external
distribution of rewards.").
43. See id. ("Particularly in those schools where labor market and academic rewards are especially
limited, one member of the faculty should not have disproportionate control over the currency that grades
represent.").
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random, then the disproportionately good and bad grades received by each
student might cancel out by the time the student graduates.' The problem
with this argument is that grades and class rank earned in the first year are
the principal method for gaining access to the reward distribution system in
law school. 45 As such, any balancing out over time provides small consola-
tion to the students who receive low grades at the start of their legal educa-
tion. Furthermore, Professor Wangerin's study powerfully demonstrates that
any balancing almost certainly does not occur by the end of the first year.
Professor Wangerin concluded that grade disparities at the law school that
was the subject of his study positively or negatively impacted 166 out of
1350 students at the critical class rank thresholds of (i) first in the class, (ii)
the law review membership cutoff, (iii) the scholarship cutoff, and (iv) the
good standing cutoff. In other words, at the end of the first year, these 166
students were pushed into or out of one of the four relevant categories be-
cause of the different grading philosophies of the faculty. 6 "[G]rading luck
did not balance itself out over time and repeated courses. Rather, at least at
this school, and at least during the eight studied years, luck-of-the-draw
grading differences produced dramatic and perhaps life-changing conse-
quences for a large number of individual students. 47
In sum, the unfairness of grade disparities among faculty is a compel-
ling justification for the adoption of mandatory curves. Professor Steven
Nickles articulates the point superbly:
Law school policy which permits the standards to vary from
teacher to teacher causes its evaluation process to be grossly mis-
leading to the public and arbitrarily discriminatory to its students.
These consequences are contrary to the theories of justice and fair
play which the law school teaches as being obligatory in all affairs
of law and society. If legal education is to meet its cultural and
societal responsibilities owed to all of its constituent groups, it
must integrate these same precepts into its procedures for student
evaluation and eliminate chance, luck and logical scheming by
students as bases for academic success.
48
Other scholars have reached the same conclusion. 49 And such reasoning
has motivated the adoption of a mandatory curve at many law schools.5°
44. See Wangerin, supra note 8, at 99, 104, 113.
45. See supra note 24.
46. See Wangerin, supra note 8, 114-17.
47. Id. at 108-09.
48. Nickles, supra note 25, at 457-59 (citation omitted).
49. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 2, at 588 ("I start with the easiest point: the average grade should be
approximately the same for all courses."); Keating, supra note 9, at 185 ("Myth No. 9: Mandatory Medi-
ans And Other Such Restrictions on a Grader's Autonomy Are Undesirable and Unfair"); Downs &
Levit, supra note 9, at 857 (explaining that, with certain structural features, grade normalization policies
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B. Substantial Grade Disparities Distort the Process of Course Selection
by Students
Wide grade disparities detached from student merit are also problem-
atic because they distort the process of course selection by students. It is
well-established that students consider the grading philosophy of the instruc-
tor in registering for classes.5" And the greater the disparity in grading phi-
losophy, the greater the weight allocated to this factor by students. Indeed, a
recent graduate of my law school designed and administered a website for
the express purpose of aiding other students in selecting courses based on
the grading practices of the teacher.5 2
"begin to strike a balance between concerns for uniformity and equity"); Post, supra note 7, at 793
("Grading in law schools violates ethical norms and ranking in law schools without any attempt to insure
comparability must be some sort of ethical violation."); see also Wangerin, supra note 8, at 101-03, 117
(arguing for the adoption of a type of statistical normalization that would have roughly the same impact
as a mandatory curve); Fines, supra note 20, at 892 (observing that both "hard graders and easy graders
distort the competitive process" of rewards at a law school, causing unfairness in the distribution of job
opportunities and academic honors) (note that Fines is ultimately somewhat skeptical of mandatory
curves); Epstein, supra note 7 (advocating for a type of formal grade normalization).
50. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 825 ("In response to our survey question which asked why
law schools adopted grade normalization plans, many schools responded that they had noticed grading
disparities among professors."); id. at 821 (survey was conducted in 1996 and was sent to all 179 of the
law schools accredited by the ABA at that time); id. at 843 ("We asked schools the reasons why they
adopted grade normalization policies. Of the fifty-two schools answering the question, thirty-six (69%)
mentioned concerns of fairness, equality among sections, or fears of inequitable grading."); Feinman,
supra note 7, at 652 (observing that concerns about the fairness of grading disparities based on individual
professor grading philosophy "have led some schools to adopt measures to enhance the uniformity of the
grading system"). See, e.g., Mroch, supra note 9, at 55 (quoting the following language from one
school's grade policy: "While complete uniformity in grading is neither necessary nor expected, a sig-
nificant disparity is not only inequitable to the students, but also undermines a school's systems of stu-
dent rewards and sanctions"); see also UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW FACULTY RULES
AND POLICIES § IX.A., available at
http://www.law.uky.edulfiles/docs/studentslExcerpts-from_.Policies.pdf ("The average grade rule serves
the fundamental interest of fairness to students ...."); LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL OF LOS ANGELES
SUMMARY OF GRADING POLICIES, available at http://reg.lls.edu/gradesandrankings/jdgrades.html
(mandatory curve implemented to eliminate grade disparities which "undermine the reliability of student
grades and make comparisons difficult for employers and others") ("Normalization reduces arbitrariness
in grading and promotes uniform and fixed meaning."); supra notes 10 and 29 (quoting the St. John's
Faculty of Law Statement on Grade Normalization).
51. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 20, at 423 ("Upper-class [law] students, aware of the differ-
ences in professor grading, engage in 'forum shopping' to improve the vagaries in course selection and
improve the basis of their grades .... ); Keating, supra note 9, at 185 (same); Stake, supra note 2, at 585
(same); see also Hu, supra note 17, at 42 ("Grading disparity ... affects students' choice of courses.");
JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 172-93 (presenting statistical analysis indicating that professor grading phi-
losophy influences students when they are choosing (1) which instructors to take a particular course
from, (2) which courses to take within a particular department, and (3) which courses to take across
departments); GEORGE C. LEEF, DEGRADED CURRENCY: THE PROBLEM OF GRADE INFLATION 18
(American Council of Trustees and Alumni, 2003) ("Finally, grade inflation creates a strong incentive for
students to enroll in courses taught by professors who are known to be easy graders.").
52. See KEITH PIKE'S HANDY-DANDY LAW SCHOOL GPA CALCULATOR, www.lawgpa.com (set-
ting forth the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law grade distribu-
tions for Spring 2006 through Summer 2009 "[tlo help [students] estimate what you might get in your
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Given the importance of grades, it is perfectly rational for students to
grant significant weight to professor grading practices when choosing
courses. For example, I strongly suspect that a student usually has a better
chance of obtaining a job by taking classes where he earns high grades but
learns less, than by taking courses where he earns low grades but learns
more.53 Likewise, it is probably more advantageous to receive high grades in
classes a student finds boring than to receive average or low grades in
classes the student finds interesting.
It is axiomatic that faculty members do not want students choosing
courses based on the grading philosophy of the professor. We would rather
they select classes using other criteria, such as (1) substantive importance,
(2) student interest, (3) career relevancy, (4) skill development, (5) fit be-
tween the instructor's teaching style and the student's learning style, (6)
curricular balance, and (7) whether the topic is on the bar exam. By remov-
ing grading concerns from the decision-making process, mandatory curves
properly incentivize student course registration. And the grading policies of
many schools identify the prevention of "grade-seeking course selection" as
a basis for their curves.54
C. Other Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Curves
Four additional arguments in favor of mandatory curves are worth not-
ing briefly. First, grade disparities have incentive effects on students beyond
class selection. For example, because variances cause grades to convey in-
accurate information, students might be unduly encouraged or discouraged
about their performance. A student whose grades are too high may "gain a
false sense of confidence that he can do legal work without as much prepa-
ration as others."55 And a student whose grades are too low may give up on
studying or even drop out of school.5 6 In addition, professor grading prac-
tices can distort students' allocation of their limited studying time,57 causing
them to put less effort into "easy grade" classes and more into "hard grade"
classes.
class"). This student also sent e-mails over our student listserv detailing the grading practices of faculty
who awarded particularly low grades.
53. Of course, the student may not be as prepared for the job. But I believe most students would
accept that tradeoff, and rationally so.
54. See, e.g., KENTUCKY FACULTY RULES AND POLICIES, supra note 50, at § IX.A. ("The average
grade rule serves the fundamental interest of fairness to students and the secondary interest of encourag-
ing students to use sound bases for selecting courses."); LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL GRADING POLICIES,
supra note 50 (mandatory curve implemented to eliminate grade disparities, which has the effect of
minimizing "grade shopping").
55. Stake, supra note 2, at 585.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Second, while there is research indicating that students sometimes dis-
like mandatory curves,58 there is also evidence that students tend to prefer a
mandatory curve when the alternative is substantial grading variances based
on professor grading philosophy. 9 Students resent such grade disparities.60
And they "generally appreciate the reality that grade normalization is de-
signed to protect them from professors who use an inordinately low scale in
assigning grades, and from the professors who give very high grades to stu-
dents in other courses."'6' This is certainly true of the students at the Bowen
Law School, whose elected representatives voted unanimously in support of
the curve that I proposed to the faculty there.62
Third, grading disparities can cause dissension among faculty mem-
bers.63 This was certainly a problem at the Bowen Law School prior to the
adoption of the curve that I proposed.
Fourth, mandatory curves prevent undue grade inflation.' Grade vari-
ances put pressure on teachers to raise grades to match the practices of their
colleagues, which can result "in spiraling grade inflation., 65 As some of the
examples set forth in Part III demonstrate, this clearly was an issue at my
institution. For example, I teach Contracts I & II, Secured Transactions, and
Jurisprudence. Recently, the other Contracts teacher and the other Secured
Transaction teacher dramatically raised their grades. Out of a concern for
fairness to my students, I followed suit. Grades in Secured Transactions at
my school reached particularly, and unreasonably, high levels. Similarly,
while I am the only Jurisprudence professor, I recently raised the grades I
awarded in that course to match the grading practices of those who teach
58. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Human Nature as a New Guiding Philosophy for Legal Education
and the Profession, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 298 (2008).
59. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 832 n.36 ("Our experience at UMKC with students re-
garding grade normalization is that students ... much prefer a normalization among sections to the
specter of having as their professors those with lower grading standards."); Stake, supra note 2, at 591
(allowing a teacher to give consistently higher grades raises a perception of unfairness and "generate ill
will among students."); see also Post, supra note 7, at 796 (explaining that students at the author's school
engaged in a "massive protest" when two members of the faculty gave unusually low grades); id. at 803-
04 (discussing the effort by students at the author's law school to implement grade normalization policies
to address grade disparities and the effect such disparities "had on their ability to obtain gainful employ-
ment").
60. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 825; Stake, supra note 2, at 591; Post, supra note 7, at
796.
61. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 855.
62. Minutes from SBA Meeting Sunday, April 18, 2010, University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law (on file with the author).
63. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 9, at 185 (detailing the situation at one law school). Cf. Post,
supra note 7, at 800 ("Grade normalization places tremendous pressure on faculty, especially when it is
forced to debate publicly its own behavior.... A faculty is asked as faculty to consider the consequences
of their actions on the students they teach and to deliberate on the usefulness of self-regulation. Self-
regulation is not a pleasant process, particularly when there is implicit in the entire proceeding an under-
standing that the behavior of some of the faculty has made this self-regulation necessary.").
64. See Leef, supra note 51, at 19.
65. Stake, supra note 2, at 588.
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other electives. Prior to the adoption of a mandatory curve, I was awarding
grades in Secured Transactions and Jurisprudence in the 3.4 to 3.5 range.
V. OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY CURVES
Opponents of mandatory curves offer a number of criticisms. This sec-
tion addresses the most powerful and most popular critiques.
A. Objection One: "Mandatory Curves Prevent Teachers from Giving
Students the Grades They Deserve"
Probably the most common criticism of mandatory curves is that they
restrict professors from awarding the grades that students actually earned.66
This argument is really two distinct criticisms. First, mandatory curves pre-
vent grades from reflecting students' absolute performance. Second, curves
prevent grades from reflecting students' superior or inferior relative per-
formance. Both positions are fatally flawed.
The problem with the absolute performance argument is conceptual.
To establish that mandatory curves stop teachers from awarding the "cor-
rect" grade, there must be an independently valid or shared concept of desert
that consistently establishes when a student deserves an A, a B, or some
other grade. But no such concept exists. Professors have substantial dis-
agreements regarding the standards that should be used to assess student
performance. And, more specifically, we have different understandings of
what constitutes "A work," "B work," and "C work." These designations are
used in dramatically varying ways by (1) different academic fields, (2) dif-
ferent schools within the same field, (3) different professors within the same
school, (4) different professors within the same department, and (5) even
different professors who teach the same class.67 For example, in some pro-
grams, a C means satisfactory performance.68 In others, it denotes failing
66. See Post, supra note 7, at 806 ('"There is no such thing as a normal class or a normal distribu-
tion of students in a class. . . . Normalization fails to give students the grade they deserve."' (quoting
Response by Professor X to Author's Memorandum to Faculty soliciting comments on grade normaliza-
tion) (on file with Professor Post). This argument has been a constant refrain at my school.
67. See Wangerin, supra note 8, at 99 ("For years, statisticians and educational researchers have
explored the foregoing grading-differences problem in complex statistical studies of grading data. These
studies have universally demonstrated that different departments in the overall university grade differ-
ently."); id. at 100 n. I (identifying four studies described in the previous parenthetical); id. at 112 (find-
ing that "dramatic differences in the definitions of letter grades" existed within the law school that was
the subject of this study, and that the such differences existed "even with different sections of the very
same course" at the law school); Fines, supra note 20, at 882 ("However, grades have as many meanings
as the criteria with which we test .... In sum, there are too many variations in teaching and testing to be
able to say that grades have a fixed meaning outside the classroom."). For an excellent literature review
and a separate study of this issue, see JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 197-209.
68. See UALR BOWEN LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC RULES, supra note 3, at 12 (providing that a C+ =
2.5, a C = 2.25, a C- = 2.0, and that the GPA necessary to remain in good standing is 2.0).
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work. 69 Letter-grade designations clearly lack the objective content neces-
sary to settle such differences.7"
Of course, none of this means that grading is either arbitrary or wholly
subjective. There certainly is a great deal of objectivity in grading. In clear
cases, there is much agreement among professors about what constitutes
"excellent," "satisfactory," and "failing" work. The problem is that there is
not enough consensus to establish that a mandatory curve bars professors
from awarding students the grades they "deserve" in any absolute sense.
My contention here that the concept of "desert" or "merit" is too sub-
jective to support the claim that mandatory curves prevent professors from
giving students the grades they "objectively" earned is perfectly consistent
with my argument in Part IV.A., above, that grade disparities based on pro-
fessor grading philosophy rather than student merit are unfair. There is no-
where near enough objectivity in the concept of academic merit to support
the assertion that mandatory curves stop professors from awarding students
the correct, absolute grades. But there is more than enough objectivity in the
concept to justify the conclusion that grades based on professor grading phi-
losophy are unfair. That is because grading philosophy is clearly not an as-
pect of student merit. To make the point syllogistically: Fairness demands
that grades reflect merit. Professor grading philosophy is not a part of merit.
Therefore, awarding grades based on teacher grading philosophy is unfair.
The relative performance argument suffers from a different problem.
According to this position, sometimes the students in a class perform better
or worse than the average class. In these cases, a mandatory curve forces the
teacher to give grades that are either too high or too low.71 The weakness
with this argument is evidentiary: Professors lack the information required
in order to justifiably claim that their students "merited" or "deserved"
higher or lower grades than students in other classes. Professor Daniel
Keating's explanation of this point is illuminating and worth quoting in full:
69. See TENNESSEE TECH UNIVERSITY GRADUATE CATALOG, available at
http://www.tntech.edu/gcatalog/grading/ ("A grade of 'C' is considered a failing grade in the doctoral
program.") (emphasis added).
70. See Keating, supra note 9, at 178-79 (explaining that it is a "myth" the grades "A" or "B" or
"C" have some "absolute meaning ... wholly apart from where that grade places a student within a
particular class"); LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL GRADING POLICIES, supra note 50 (explaining that "grades
convey no information on a student's absolute performance, such as 'fair,' 'good' or 'excellent"'). One
might argue that faculty at a given law school should develop a common understanding of "A work," "B
work," and "C work," and that this will lead to consistency in grading. Given the differences among
faculty when it comes to assessment, this is not realistic. For a discussion of why that is, see infra Part
V.E.2.
71. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 652 ("For many reasons, students in one section of a course may
achieve at higher levels than students in another. Sections also may vary in their achievement from year
to year. Normalization does not permit the recognition of these differences."); see also Stake, supra note
2, at 590 ("Another argument for disparate averages is that the students are better in some classes.").
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The most common argument against the imposition of a manda-
tory mean was that perhaps the current differences in grade means
among professors were in fact justified by the differing perform-
ances of students in different classes. The simple response to this
is maybe so, but how in the world would anyone ever be in a posi-
tion to know that? There are really only two things that a profes-
sor grading a set of exams can determine about those exams with
any degree of certainty: the relative rank ordering of those exams
and the approximate raw-point distance apart of those exams from
one another. As to any other assessment of those exams, we sim-
ply lack sufficient information. Are we in a position to assert that
our exams are better overall than those being graded by another
professor who teaches a different course? Are we in a position to
assert that our exams are better overall than those being graded by
another professor who teaches the same course? If we are not in a
position to assert that our students' overall performance was bet-
ter or worse than the overall performance of some other class,
then why should we be able to distribute more (or less) grade-
wealth than some other professor distributes to his or her class ?72
The same point stands even if a professor could be reasonably certain
that this year's students performed better than last year's students (an
unlikely scenario).73 Such certainty would still not justify variations in
grades among professors:
The reason is that we would still lack at least two key pieces of in-
formation to make an informed judgment about how much total
grade-wealth to distribute to our class relative to those taught by
other faculty. First, we do not know how well students are per-
forming in other classes. It may be that the entire student body is
stronger or weaker, in which case the rise and fall that we are see-
ing in our classes' performances would similarly be reflected in
other professors' classes. Second, even if we know something
about the performance of students in classes we are not teaching,
we do not know how other faculty will choose to assess that per-
72. Keating, supra note 9, at 186 (emphasis added); accord LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL GRADING
POLICIES, supra note 50 (explaining that "[girades [only] indicate how well students perform in a class
compared to other students in that class").
73. Keating, supra note 9, at 186 ("We might believe that we are at least in a position to assess
how the performance of this class compares with that of classes from previous years in which we have
taught this course. I am personally dubious about the likely accuracy of even this sort of assessment,
given memory lapses, differences in the particular performance-measuring device we use from year to
year, and even differences in how well we taught the same course."); see also Stake, supra note 2, at
590-91 ("Substantial year-to-year variation in students is possible, but it is also possible, indeed likely,
for a teacher's test or grading to vary from year to year .... It is much more likely, however, that his
teaching, testing, or grading mood had changed.").
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formance. To put this point another way, we lack information not
only about the relative performance of our particular class com-
pared to others but also about the way in which that performance
is being assessed.74
Of course, we all understand how a faculty member might believe that
he can distinguish between the performances of his classes from year to
year, and thus that he is in a position to award higher grades in some years.
But even if this belief is true, it is ultimately insufficient. That is because it
"ignores the reality that when we give our own class more or less total
grade-wealth than that given by a colleague, we are making an implicit (if
unwitting) statement about the relative effort or performance of our group
compared to theirs. 75 However, professors lack the information necessary
to make such a judgment.7 6
One normative assumption underlying Keating's position is that
'grade-wealth" should be distributed evenly across courses in the absence of
evidence supporting an alternative distribution. Basic principles of equality
support this assumption. Suppose that ten people are placed on a desert is-
land with fifty items of food of equal nourishment value. Assume further
that no evidence is available as to the caloric and health needs of the ten
individuals, evidence that would assist in deciding how to allocate the food.
The only fact known is that each of the ten people on the island is in need of
food. Fairness demands that we divide the fifty items of food equally even if
it turns out (as it almost certainly would) that the ten individuals have differ-
ent caloric and health needs and thus that, given better information, an equal
division would not be the fairest. Grade wealth across classes is subject to
the same calculus. If we have no evidence regarding which classes of stu-
dents are performing better (or who needs more food)-if we know only
that each class of students is performing in some form and needs grades
(needs food)-but we still must divide up the grades (the food), then distrib-
uting the grades (the food) equally is the morally best approach. This ex-
plains why opponents of mandatory curves bear the burden of proof. The
moral presumption is equal division-of food or grades. Those against equal
74. Keating, supra note 9, at 186-87 (emphasis added); accord Stake, supra note 2, at 590 ("Few
would object to giving better students better grades, but again there is a problem of proof.").
75. Keating, supra note 9, at 187.
76. Id. There is no need to assume that the students in two different classes are substantially
equivalent when their incoming GPAs in prior law school work are not the same. And, as discussed in
Part VI.A.2., infra, that becomes a significant concern in courses with less than thirty students. As a
result, the mandatory curve I proposed to my faculty permits professors to give higher or lower grades in
smaller courses where the students' law school GPAs-"[t]he only objective and discernible information
that we have about the relative differences in the quality of various groups of students," Keating, supra
note 9, at 187-suggests that such grades are justified. See infra Appendix 2; see also Epstein, supra note
7, at 709 (noting that the prior law school records of the students in a course are the "best evidence" of
how the students will perform in the class).
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division on the desert island or at a law school must demonstrate that the
presumption fails by empirically establishing that need on the island or per-
formance in the classroom is not in fact equal.77
In sum, professors do not possess the information necessary to make
fair assessments of relative merit across classes. Unless a professor has a
firm basis for believing that his students performed better than the students
in another class taught by a different instructor, the professor is in no posi-
tion to assert that his students "deserve" or "earned" better grades than the
other students.
The information problem described above is also relevant in four other
ways. First, since the burden of proof falls on opponents of forced curves,
any weakness in my statistical analysis of the grade disparities in Part III
does not significantly undercut the case for mandatory curves. A mere lack
of evidence that professor grading philosophy plays a substantial role in
assigning marks does not justify unregulated grading practices. Instead, crit-
ics of forced curves must demonstrate that professors can consistently prof-
fer reliable evidence that their students performed better or worse than stu-
dents in other classes. The critics have not met this burden.
Second, some commentators contend that mandatory curves are prem-
ised on the unrealistic assumption that all students perform the same in
every class.78 This is not true. Mandatory curves are premised on the fact
that we do not know whether students are performing better in one class than
another, not on the view that students in fact never perform better in one
class than another.
Third, some schools permit grade normalization policies to be waived
in particular circumstances, such as where the professor believes the stu-
dents' performance in the course was particularly strong or weak.7 9 But such
a belief does not justify the awarding of higher or lower grades since the
professor does not know whether his students performed better or worse
than students in courses taught by other professors. Given this reasoning,
77. Downs and Levit present a somewhat similar argument:
So, if we can't prove that one randomly selected group of students is, in fact, better than
another, and if we can't prove whether the professor was any good or not, what can we do?
We can, and do, assume that the student groups are substantially equivalent, and that the
professors are all good teachers. The only things left are whether professors are good grad-
ers and are all using the same standard of measurement. Since we cannot control the prob-
lems inherent in scoring blue books, the focus needs to be on the standard of measurement.
Our sense is that, all other things being neutral, statistically equivalent student groups in
different sections should have grade means which are reasonably close together.
Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 831.
78. Krieger, supra note 58, at 299.
79. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 845, 847; Mroch, supra note 9, at 7 ("Many policies
specify that dean approval may override the grading policy.").
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there is no mechanism for requesting an exception to the mandatory curve in
the grading system I proposed at the Bowen Law School.8°
Fourth, it is often argued that some law school courses are either more
difficult or easier than others and that this justifies lower or higher grades in
those courses."1 Keating's analysis suggests the flaw with the first part of
this argument: We have nowhere near enough systematic, reliable evidence
about which law school subjects are more difficult or easier than others to
justify awarding higher or lower grades in particular classes.82 In addition,
the second part of the argument does not follow from the first; the mere fact
that a subject is more challenging does not justify lower grades. Rather, if a
course is more difficult, the teacher's expectations should be lower for grad-
ing purposes. To illustrate, I teach Jurisprudence, a course that, based on
anecdotal evidence, my students and I find to be one of the most demanding
at the law school. As best I can tell, my students' level of mastery of the
legal philosophy and constitutional theory I teach in that class always falls
well short of their level of mastery in Secured Transactions, my other upper-
level course. Nonetheless, under the prior grading system at Bowen, I gave
roughly the same grades in each subject. That stems from the following rea-
soning: Since Jurisprudence involves more difficult material, I do not expect
my students to grasp the topics at the same level I expect of my students in
Secured Transactions, which is a traditional doctrinal class. Frankly, holding
my students in both courses to the same standard of proficiency strikes me
as grossly unfair. And, in the absence of a mandatory curve, it would deter
even most philosophy majors from registering for Jurisprudence. The same
reasoning applies in reverse to courses that are allegedly easier than average.
Finally, there is another, critical response to the objection that manda-
tory curves prohibit professors from awarding students the grades they
earned: The harm caused by a mandatory curve is the lesser evil. Assume
away the conceptual and informational problems articulated above. As a
statistical matter, there should be very few classes of students who perform
substantially better or worse (for reasons having to do with academic merit)
than the average class. Thus, in only a small fraction of cases will a manda-
tory curve prevent professors from giving students the grades they earned.
Yes, it will occur now and then, even in large doctrinal classes with a ran-
dom sampling of students. But the odds of this happening, even in small
80. See also Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 847 (noting that waiver protocols based on a
teacher's subjective sense that the students in a class performed above or below average threaten to
swallow the rule).
81. See, e.g., Fines, supra note 20, at 891 ("Moreover, some subjects may be more intrinsically
difficult than others, so that student achievement will be lower.").
82. See also Nickles, supra note 25, at 455 n. 149 ("There is also little merit in the contention that a
wide divergence in grades is attributable to variances in the difficulty experienced by students in dealing
with the subject matter of respective courses. In fact, evidence suggests the divergence in grading bears
no relation to the profundity of the materials.").
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electives, are much lower than the odds of a student ending up in a class
with a professor who gives disproportionately high or low grades based on
that professor's individual grading philosophy.83 And thus, the relatively few
times a curve might force a teacher to award grades that are either too high
or too low constitute a small harm in comparison to the systematic and un-
fair grading disparities that can exist without a mandatory curve. 4 At the
Bowen Law School, instead of a class or two suffering every few years pur-
suant to a mandatory curve, we were burdened with a system in which large
numbers of students were unjustly harmed every semester. And the same is
true at other law schools.85 "Obviously we cannot entirely eliminate inequity
in our sorting processes. 86 What we can do, however, is adopt grading sys-
tems that minimize unfairness. Mandatory curves best accomplish that end.
B. Objection Two: "Grade Disparities Do Not Justify Mandatory Curves
Because Many Disparities Are Between Courses That Are 'Apples'
and 'Oranges'
One of my colleagues at the Bowen Law School offered an objection to
mandatory curves that is related to the contention that curves stop professors
from awarding students the grades they deserve. Her argument is that many
of the courses in the law school curriculum-including one course that she
teaches and one that I teach-are so different that comparing grades in the
courses is like "comparing apples to oranges." From this, she concluded that
the grade disparity data I presented does not justify a mandatory curve. A
number of critics at our law school and elsewhere have expressed sympathy
for my colleague's argument. But this argument is clearly invalid. Rather
than undercutting the relevancy of my grading data, the fact that two courses
are "apples and oranges" compellingly establishes the importance of the
data and the need for a mandatory curve.
83. See Stake, supra note 2, at 617 (explaining that, for large classes, a teacher's above- or below-
average grades are far more likely the result of a defective assessment instrument than of an abnormal
class population; the risk of having a group of non-average students is greater in small courses, but still
smaller than the risk of a defective assessment); Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 453 (indicating that a
student's risk, in an unrestrained system, of having a professor with undesirable grading tendencies is
much greater than the student's risk, under grade normalization, of enrolling in a course with unusually
talented students); see also Wangerin, supra note 8, at 103 (The statistics-based normalization system
proposed by the author "will produce distorted grading information in the relatively rare instances where
the random assignment of individual students to different groups produces groups of significantly differ-
ent overall ability. Conversely, the letter-grade process will produce distorted grading information in the
relatively common instances where the random assignment of individuals to different groups produces
groups of roughly comparable overall ability.").
84. Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 454 ("We should be ready to accept the remote danger that a
class of top students might be hurt in order to eliminate the more likely injustice of some courses system-
atically giving higher grades than others.").
85. See, e.g., Wangerin, supra note 8, at 108-17 (detailing the results of a study of one law
school's grading practices).
86. Fines, supra note 20, at 895.
[Vol. 34
IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY CURVES
First, even if two classes are in fact so different that they cannot be
compared, the courses are both graded using the official law school scale.
This means that grades in the two classes operate in exactly the same way.
For example, they have the same impact on class rank-i.e., high grades
raise class rank and low grades reduce class rank-and they appear the same
on transcripts. In other words, even if my colleague is grading apples and I
am grading oranges (as she contends), all of the grades we award are used in
identical ways for purposes of reward distribution at the law school. Second,
recall Keating's information argument-professor's lack the evidence nec-
essary to justify giving higher or lower grades to their students than are
awarded in other courses taught by different teachers. Now, bring these two
points together. Because my colleague contends that she is assessing or-
anges in her course and I am assessing apples in mine, she not only lacks
any evidentiary basis to believe that her students are performing better than
mine, she is also acknowledging that there is a conceptual problem in com-
paring our students. She is implying that even if we conducted the necessary
empirical investigation, the differences between our two classes are so great
that any data we uncovered would not enable us to make fruitful compari-
sons. This means that my colleague is conceding that it is impossible in
principle to compare our courses in a useful way. If this is true, what possi-
ble justification could my colleague have for awarding her students higher
grades than mine? What could legitimize giving one set of students higher
grades than another set of students on the same scale when we are unable to
compare the two groups of students for purposes of applying the scale? In
sum, my colleague's "apples and oranges" argument, if it is correct, estab-
lishes that no opponent of a mandatory curve could ever proffer evidence
justifying awarding higher grades in one course than another when the
classes are "apples and oranges." And without such evidence, no teacher
should be allowed to award higher or lower grades to his or her students.
C. Objection Three: "Mandatory Curves Prevent the Best Teachers from
Awarding Grades That Reflect Their Superior Teaching"
Some opponents of mandatory curves contend that such policies pre-
vent grades from reflecting differences in the quality of teaching.87 Indeed,
one of my colleagues at Bowen argued that some of the grade disparities at
our school were caused by variations in the quality of teaching rather than
by differences in grading philosophy. According to my colleague, the reason
Professor A gave higher grades than Professor B was that Professor A's
students performed better because A is a superior teacher.
87. See Stake, supra note 2, at 589 ("I have been asked to address the argument that we should
allow teachers to give higher or lower grades because some teachers teach better.").
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This criticism is essentially another version of the first objection-that
mandatory curves prevent professors from awarding students the grades they
earned. As such, it is flawed for the same reason: We lack the evidence that
would justify allowing some teachers to award higher marks.
It is extremely difficult to identify better and worse teachers.88 But even
if we could, higher grades would only be justified if the students receiving
the better teaching verifiably performed better than other students. To elabo-
rate, the link between teaching quality and the amount learned, on the one
hand, and grades, on the other hand, is limited. Grades are clearly about
more than what students learned. If a student enters a course knowing the
subject and learns nothing, the student will still receive an A if she performs
at the top of the class. Consider another example. Suppose that Professors X
and Y both teach Contracts. X is the better teacher. As a result, X's students
learned more than Y's in the course. But Y's students were much more tal-
ented and so they displayed greater mastery of Contracts on their finals than
X's students. Who deserves the higher grades? Virtually all professors
would say Y's students. Accordingly, unless an instructor can proffer evi-
dence that his students outperformed students in another course, the instruc-
tor has no basis to award the students higher marks, even if he could prove
that he is a better teacher.89 And as discussed in Part V.A., above, evidence
of superior performance by the students will generally not be available.9°
Beyond the lack of information, there is a second problem with the
"teaching quality" objection to mandatory curves: Superior teaching has
little to do with student merit. To illustrate, assume X's students verifiably
perform better than Y's students because X is the superior teacher. Assume
further that the students in both classes were randomly assigned to each be-
cause we are dealing with a first-year, required course. How is it fair to pun-
ish Y's students with lower grades simply because they were assigned to a
course with a worse instructor? If X is permitted to award higher marks, X's
students will receive a windfall because of sheer luck.91
88. Stake, supra note 2, at 590; see also Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 847 ("'[l]t is only natural
for us to believe that, compared to most of our colleagues, we can inspire a greater effort from our stu-
dents than those same students would put out in other classes .... The problem with this logic, aside from
the human tendency to self-delusion, is that we cannot all be right."') (quoting a response to a survey of
law schools on grading practices).
89. Cf Stake, supra note 2, at 590 ("Unless a teacher can produce decent evidence of better learn-
ing on the part of her students, we should hesitate to accept such a contention as sufficient to warrant
higher grading.").
90. As explained in note 76, supra, evidence of superior or inferior performance will exist in
smaller classes filled with students whose GPAs, taken together, are higher or lower than the average
GPA at the law school.
91. See Stake, supra note 2, at 590 (concluding that "it would be unfair to the students to allow
poor teaching to result in low grades in addition to weaker training than that of their luckier school-
mates"). Or, suppose Professor Z does a good teaching job one year and a bad teaching job the next. Why
should the lucky students in Z's class the first year receive higher grades than the unlucky students in Z's
class the next year?
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Alternatively, suppose Professor J teaches a very popular and important
bar course, such as Secured Transactions, but is only an average teacher.
Professor K teaches a relatively unpopular elective, such as Jurisprudence,
but is an excellent teacher. How is it fair to impose lower grades on J's stu-
dents simply because they are interested in the more popular topic or are
concerned about the bar exam?
Focusing on the first example, one might reply that since X's students
developed greater mastery of Contracts, awarding similar grades to the stu-
dents from X's and Y's classes will misinform consumers of transcript in-
formation. A prospective employer, for example, might be misled into be-
lieving students in each class are at comparable levels of proficiency in the
subject. But any unfairness flowing from such misinformation pales in com-
parison to the unfairness that results from awarding grades based on factors
having nothing to do with student merit-e.g., luck of the draw in course
registration. Our first duty as law professors is to our students, not to future
employers. 92
A related reply is that perhaps X's and Y's students will themselves be
confused about their degree of competency in Contracts. This is a legitimate
concern, to be sure. However, once again, the unfairness of assessing stu-
dents on grounds that are beyond their control is the greater harm.93 Admit-
tedly, that is a moral claim. But I am reasonably certain that the vast major-
ity of students would agree with me.94
My analysis in the previous two paragraphs is largely unchanged in the
context of Professor J's Secured Transactions course and Professor K's Ju-
risprudence course. Students generally do not have control over who teaches
which subjects. Thus, the students with a legitimate preference for Secured
Transactions over Jurisprudence have little choice but to take the class with
the inferior teacher. Punishing them with lower grades because Professor J
is a less-skilled instructor is unfair.
In sum, (1) we do not know who the superior teachers are; (2) even if
we did, that does not tell us which classes of students are actually perform-
92. Professor Stake makes an additional, related argument: "Law employers often want to know
not how much the student has learned in law school but rather how capable the student is of leaming ....
The student who learned less in the poorer teacher's course may be just as capable of learning as the
student who learned more in the better teacher's course, contrary to the implication of the inferior grade."
Id. Stake ultimately concludes that "allowing the grade averages to vary according to the quality of the
teaching might send the wrong signals to employers." Id.
93. Of course, grades are partly based on factors beyond students' control-e.g., students do not
get to choose their parents. Indeed, those skeptical of free will would say that grades are based entirely
on factors beyond the control of students. I do not believe that an extended digression into the nature of
"control" is warranted. What I will say is that reducing the extent to which grades are determined by
factors beyond students' control is a worthwhile aim, especially where the external factors are essentially
imposed by the law school.
94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that the Bowen Student Bar Association
voted unanimously in favor of the mandatory curve I proposed at the school).
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ing better; and (3) even if we knew which classes were performing at higher
levels because of superior teaching, it would be unfair to award higher
grades to the students in those classes.
D. Objection Four: "Mandatory Curves Infringe on Academic Freedom"
Another popular attack on mandatory curves is that they limit academic
freedom.95 Professors Downs and Levit persuasively argue against this posi-
tion, demonstrating that it is one of the weakest objections to forced curves.
First, they explain that academic freedom can be used to both criticize
and justify mandatory curves. "Academic freedom is a concept that is rooted
in the fear of suppression of ideas, and the victimization of those who ex-
press them."' 96 It serves to protect intellectual freedom in teaching and re-
search.97 But the concept is not monolithic; rather, academic freedom con-
tains three essential strands involving (1) the personal autonomy of profes-
sors, (2) freedom from manipulation by the government, and (3) institutional
autonomy.98 Any claim by instructors that an institutionally established
grading system limits their freedom puts the first and third branches of aca-
demic freedom at war;9 9 it raises a conflict between professor autonomy and
institutional autonomy. Since the concept of academic freedom lends sup-
port to both sides of the grade normalization issue, it does not provide a
strong basis to oppose a mandatory curve.
Second, and more importantly, "even considered on its own merits, the
idea that an institutionally imposed grading system violates the personal
autonomy strand of academic freedom is problematic." 1" By contending
that a mandatory curve limits the freedom of teachers, one is essentially
maintaining that "freedom of a particular grade distribution is tantamount to
freedom of thought.""'' But this position has little to support it.
Consider first what mandatory curves do not do. As Downs and Levit
explain, grade normalization places no restriction on a "professor's ability to
call the performance categories whatever he or she wants;" the system of
95. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 848; Post, supra note 7, at 807 (explaining that in one law
school's deliberation about grade normalization, "[t]he faculty began with an
assumption that we should balance 'academic freedom' against the students' demands for relief').
96. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 849.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. It should be noted that there are compelling understandings of academic freedom under
which personal autonomy is not relevant to the concept, or in which personal autonomy is a value merely
on instrumental grounds-i.e., as a tool designed to protect other, more central aspects of academic
freedom. See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009).
101. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 849.
[Vol. 34
IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY CURVES
grades is already set at every school by other policies.10 2 Nor do mandatory
curves limit a professor's freedom to "make relative judgments about the
merits of students' performances."' 03 In addition, mandatory curves have no
impact on instructors' authority over which substantive factors to consider
in awarding grades, such as analytic depth, concision, and case citation.
1°4
Finally, I would add, mandatory curves impose no limits on scholarly in-
quiry or teaching methodology and content. 0 5 All a mandatory curve does is
create "some relatively weak parameters on a professor's ability to place
more than a certain number of individuals in a given performance cate-
gory." 0 6 And even that limitation provides substantial discretion to the in-
structor under normalization policies that use means or medians rather than
ranges for each grade level. 0 7 "Professors may feel that their judgment as to
student competencies is being challenged. But is this a matter of academic
freedom? How are ideas being suppressed? The answer is-only very indi-
rectly, if at all."'
10 8
In short, (1) numerous restrictions on grading already exist;'09 (2) the
addition of a mandatory curve based on mean GPA is a mild, additional
restriction that still provides critical flexibility to professors; and therefore
(3) the imposition on academic freedom is, at most, minimal.
Professor Keating puts the point somewhat more bluntly: "What about
academic freedom? The response to this argument is that academic freedom
does not include making relative determinations, in the absence of necessary
information, about how much total grade-wealth that we can distribute to
our students compared to that given out by a colleague.""0 Under a manda-
tory mean system of grade normalization, professors retain the "freedom to
determine the only two facts about which we have reliable information con-
cerning our students' performance: their rank-order within the group being
assessed and their approximate distance from one another."'
102. Id. at 850.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 849 ("Grading does not involve freedom of religious or political thought; it has noth-
ing to do with limitations on scientific inquiry.").
106. Id. at 850.
107. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 850.
108. Id. Indeed, "[a] greater amount of 'academic freedom' was lost when law professors were told
they must give grades in the first place." Id. at 852.
109. See also id. at 851-52 (identifying various other restrictions on grading practices: professors
cannot (1) fail 95% of a class for not living "up to a Platonic ideal of a law student," (2) "sell grades to
the highest bidder," or (3) "exercise caprice in grading by throwing papers down the stairs").
110. Keating, supra note 9, at 187.
Ill. Id. at 187-88; see also Post, supra note 7, at 808 ("The connection between the two, academic
freedom and grading, is not immediately obvious to me.").
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Grade normalization is designed to insure the equitable treatment of
our students. "Sweeping claims of academic freedom fall when they run up
against legitimate concerns that students are not being treated fairly."
' 1 2
E. Objection Five: "Mandatory Curves are Incompatible with Criterion-
Referenced Grading"
An increasingly common attack on mandatory curves is that they are
not compatible with criterion-referenced grading. This argument was ad-
vanced in two influential, recently-written books: Educating Lawyers, better
known as the "Carnegie Report,""' 3 and Best Practices for Legal Education,
published by the Clinical Legal Education Association.114
"Criterion-referenced grading" means to "measure student performance
against an external objective standard.""' 5 A good example is awarding As
to all students who score 90% or better on an exam. Under such an ap-
proach, all students can, in theory, earn As, Bs, or lower, "depending on the
degree to which they demonstrate mastery of the criteria.""' 6 The perform-
ance of other students in the class is irrelevant because the students are as-
sessed pursuant to an absolute standard." 
7
"Norm-referenced grading" means to measure the performance of stu-
dents in relation to the other members of the class. 18 Under this approach,
students earn A's because they scored near the top of the class." 9 In other
words, norm referencing focuses on comparative assessment.12
0
112. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 85 1; see also Post, supra note 7, at 808 ("Why faculty exami-
nation preparation and grading practices should escape completely the process by which teaching is
evaluated, I have no idea. There is no other aspect of teaching which is as zealously guarded as the grad-
ing process.").
113. See CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 168-71.
114. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243-44.
115. Lynn M. Daggett, All of the Above: Computerized Exam Scoring of Multiple Choice Items
Helps to: (A) Show How Exam Items Worked Technically, (B) Maximize Exam Fairness, (C) Justly
Assign Letter Grades, and (D) Provide Feedback on Student Learning, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 391, 398
(2007).
116. Id. at 398-99; accord CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 170.
117. Daggett, supra note 115, at 399.
118. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243 ("Norm-referenced assessments are based on how stu-
dents perform in relation to other students in a course rather than how well they achieve the educational
objectives of the course.").
119. Daggett, supra note 115, at 399.
120. Criterion-referencing and norm referencing are actually not as different as this description
suggests. Critically, both forms of grading involve the usage of an external standard. When a teacher
assesses her students under a comparative grading system, the teacher is determining which students
reached superior levels of achievement pursuant to some independent metric---e.g., quality of legal
analysis, comprehension of the substantive law, issue spotting, or a combination of these types of skills.
As one commentator observes, that is the only way norm referencing can operate: "Student A is better
than student B at what?" Fines, supra note 20, at 891 (emphasis in original); accord Post, supra note 7,
at 788 ("Assessment is normative. Competency-in teaching or in lawyering--cannot be judged without
reference to some external standard."); Nickles, supra note 25, at 413-14 ("The grade serves to represent
a teacher's opinion of a student's absolute or comparative achievement in attaining some standard .... ")
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Mandatory curves require the use of some norm-referencing in grading
since even if every student in a course demonstrates complete mastery of the
subject, the forced curve will typically prevent the instructor from awarding
A's to all students. 121 Only the students who perform the best can receive the
highest grade.
The Carnegie Report and Best Practices advocate that individual pro-
fessors use criterion referencing in their classes. 122 Both works contend that,
in each course, assessment should be based on "detailed, explicit criteria that
identify the abilities students should be demonstrating ... and the bases on
which the instructor will distinguish among excellent, good, competent, or
incompetent performances."' 2' And the standards should be provided to stu-
dents early in the semester to guide their studies. 2 4 Using criterion referenc-
ing will help students understand what is expected of them and why they
receive particular grades. 25 In addition, the two books assert that criterion-
referenced grading provides students with greater incentives to achieve ex-
cellence because, unlike with norm referencing, (1) "the possibility of suc-
cess is not limited by the performance of their classmates,' '126 and (2) the
criteria enable students to identify where they stand. 27 Given the benefits of
criterion-referenced assessment, both works recommend that law schools
cease grading on a curve. 1
28
There are crucial flaws with the analysis proffered by the Carnegie
Report and Best Practices.
1. Response One: Criterion Referencing Is Substantially Compatible
with a Mandatory Curve
The first problem is with the assumption, implicit in each book, that a
mandatory curve is incompatible with criterion referencing. This assumption
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). At most, it is how the standard is used that separates the two forms
of grading. For example, if the two systems are used in their purest form, a criterion-referencer would
mark Student A's legal analysis in an essay question as "excellent," "good," or "average," whereas a
norm-referencer would mark Student A's analysis as "better" or "worse" than B's.
121. Daggett, supra note 115, at 399.
122. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243-45; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 168-70; ac-
cord Krieger, supra note 58, at 301-03.
123. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 244 (citing Sophie Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve
Teaching by Using Rubrics-Explicit Grading Criteria, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 6-15).
124. Id. at 245; Krieger, supra note 58, at 301 ("The faculty member articulates the criteria that she
will use to evaluate a student's learning, with enough specificity to guide her students' study and prepara-
tion. Such a system demystifies the preparation process for students and allows each to obtain a grade
that objectively corresponds to her learning and testing performance.").
125. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 245.
126. Feinman, supra note 7, at 650.
127. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243-44.
128. See id. at 244; CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 168-70.
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is false. A mandatory curve does not prevent individual professors from
using primarily criterion-referenced assessment.
To illustrate, in my first-year courses (Contracts I & II), I use the type
of criterion referencing recommended by the Carnegie Report and Best
Practices. Before the mid-point of the first semester, I provide my students
with a model answer to an essay question. This model answer is my best
estimation (based on top papers I have received and various other factors) of
what constitutes outstanding work for a first-year law student. I also give the
students a ten-page, single-spaced memorandum with twenty-eight tips on
taking exams in my courses. I then spend an hour of class time going over
the model answer, the tips memo, and exam preparation (including outlin-
ing). As part of that class, I explain to students both the points-based meth-
odology I use to score tests and what A, B, and C exams typically accom-
plish, using examples from the model answer and excerpts of the tips memo
to illustrate. By the end of this process, the students have a basic grasp of the
criteria I use in assessing their answers to essay questions. I then follow-up
later in the term with two more model answers to practice essay questions
(the first of which I also review in class) in order to solidify the students'
understanding of my expectations. I also regularly note in class how my
exam criteria relate to the legal skills and substantive topics they are learn-
ing. As for the short-answer portions of my tests, the questions I ask are
always similar to the hypotheticals we cover in virtually every class session.
The students are thus more than ready for the non-essay aspects of the final.
In short, going into the fall exam, the students know what their essays
need to look like and roughly how many short-answer questions they must
answer correctly to reach high levels of achievement. Moreover, because my
tests are open book, the students may bring the model answers with them to
the final to serve as guides in crafting their own essays.
Early in the spring semester, I spend an hour of class reviewing the fall
exam. After this, any student who wishes to go over their first-semester test
with me personally-so they can better prepare for the spring test-is free to
do so. Roughly half the students schedule such a meeting. Using their an-
swers, the top paper, the model answers I covered in class, and the exam tips
memo, I am always able to show the students precisely what they did well,
the mistakes they made, and how their grade would have changed had they
corrected particular mistakes. I also review another practice essay question
late in the spring term to illustrate how the students should approach the
mild differences between the fall and spring finals.'29
129. I use a similar process in Secured Transactions, though it is less extensive because the students
are in their second or third year. I cover only one model answer and the tips memo rather than three
model answers. Note that in an ideal world, I would use formative and summative assessments beyond
the final exam-e.g., a mid-term exam-particularly in Contracts I, as recommended by both the Carne-
gie Report and Best Practices. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 245-53, 255-60; CARNEGIE
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What is the result of this process? Every semester, the raw scores of my
Contracts students fall approximately into a bell curve. Every semester.'
30
Despite my adoption of much of the criterion-referencing approach, only a
few students are able to match the level of accomplishment reflected in the
model answers.' 3' The raw scores of the rest of the exams distribute them-
selves nicely into a bell curve, falling various degrees short of the model
answers. 32 What this means is that criterion-referenced grading, at least as I
practice it, is fully compatible with a mandatory curve.
Other law professors have relayed similar experiences. According to
Professor Lynn Daggett, "in fifteen years of full-time law school teaching I
have had only one large class in which the grade curve requirements pre-
vented me from assigning course grades that reflected levels of mastery as
well as class rank.' ' 33 And Professor Deborah Post observes that "I have
always found that the distribution of raw scores among students clusters
around a midpoint and tapers off at both ends."'
134
Given modem statistics, these results should not be surprising. "[T]he
central limit theorem posits that in a large group, performance approximates
a bell curve, in which case typical law school grade curve requirements will
likely not prevent course grades from reflecting each student's level of mas-
tery as well as each one's standing in comparison to the group."'' 35 A manda-
tory curve is thus substantially consistent with criterion referencing, con-
trary to the position of the Carnegie Report and Best Practices books.
36
Of course, in smaller classes, the students' performances are less likely
to organize themselves into a bell shape. 137 But that is one of the reasons I
recommend forced curves that operate using course means rather than a re-
REPORT, supra note 9, at 165-67, 171. I hope one day to incorporate additional assessment into my
courses.
130. I have taught Contracts I eight times and Contracts II nine times.
131. On average, one or two students do so each fall in Contracts I, and between two and four stu-
dents do so each spring in Contracts I.
132. Note that this has been the result whether my test was too difficult, too long, both, or just right
(by my estimation). When the test is both too long and too difficult, however, the top of the bell curve
tends to be pushed somewhat to the left (i.e., the back). "Shockingly," I have never written a test that was
either too short or too easy.
133. See, e.g., Daggett, supra note 115, at 400.
134. Post, supra note 7, at 806.
135. Daggett, supra note 115, at 399-400; see also Post, supra note 7, at 805 n.107 (discussing the
normal, bell-shaped curve that reflects the distribution of "an enormous range of data").
136. For another source that makes this same mistake, see Feinman, supra note 7, at 652 ("Indeed,
the use of normalization entails a decision by the law school that criterion-referencing cannot be used in
any course (or at least that it must be subordinated to norm-referencing). Accordingly, normalization
limits the ability of individual professors to evaluate students on the basis of their performance relative to
objective standards.").
137. See Daggett, supra note 115, at 399 n.21 ("According to the central limit theorem, law school
exam scores will approximate a bell curve the larger the group being measured."); Downs & Levit, supra
note 9, at 846 ("Students in small samples are less likely to be distributed evenly.").
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quired distribution of the available grades. 38 Mean systems provide teachers
with the flexibility necessary to allocate their marks in accordance with ob-
jective achievement levels even in classes that do not fit a normal distribu-
tion. 13
9
Best Practices contends that a bell curve in student performance re-
flects a failure of instruction. 4 ' "[I]f our teaching is effective and successful,
all students should learn what we want them to learn and earn high marks on
assessment."'' Certainly, when the teaching and admission practices of law
schools are successful, virtually all of our students should learn enough to
become competent lawyers. As explained above, however, performance will
vary significantly among the students, typically reflecting a bell curve.
Therefore, bell-curve, grade distributions are no indictment of law school
assessment. And mandatory curves, especially those that use means or me-
dians rather than a required distribution, are, at most, a mild limit on crite-
rion referencing. 42
138. For more on my decision to base my curve proposal on course means, see infra Part VI.A. 1.
139. This concern extends beyond individual, small classes. Professor Jeffery Stake has argued that
law school student bodies might in general not reflect a normal, bell curve distribution in aptitude and
work ethic. See Stake, supra note 2, at 599-600. Under Stake's analysis, the distribution of legal ability
at most schools will look like the front half of a bell curve, with many schools also having a thinned out
right tail. Id. at 599. In other words, students will be congregated towards the bottom of the distribution,
while the top of the distribution will frequently have a smaller number of superior performers. Once
again, this is not a problem with forced curves that operates using means or medians rather than a strict
distribution.
140. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 244.
141. Id.
142. One of the reasons the Carnegie Report goes wrong in arguing that a mandatory curve is in-
compatible with criterion referencing is that the authors misunderstand the point of a curve:
Underlying these two approaches to grading-on the curve and criterion-referenced-are
two rarely stated but fundamentally opposed philosophies about the purpose of assessment
in professional education. Those who champion grading on the curve assume that legal
education largely serves a sorting function. The intent is to identify the best and the bright-
est in legal theory, analysis and scholarship.... On the other hand, the implicit pedagogical
philosophy underlying criterion-referenced assessment is that the fundamental purpose of
professional education is not sorting but producing as many individuals proficient in legal
reasoning and competent practice as possible.
CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 168. This is nonsense. As explained previously, the principal justification for
grading on a curve is basic fairness. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.A. I am
aware of no scholar or school that has expressly or implicitly justified a mandatory curve on "sorting"
grounds. Those of us who support formal grade normalization are just as interested as the Carnegie
Report authors in "producing as many individuals proficient in legal reasoning and competent practice as
possible." CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 168. We simply believe, with ample justification, that a mandatory
curve is necessary to fairly allocate the rewards that flow from becoming a competent legal practitioner.
The Carnegie Report also contends that "[g]rading on the curve is often coupled with a tacit belief that
there is little possibility of doing much more than sorting in the first place, since there is little possibility
of raising the performance of all or most students." Id. Again, this is nonsense. Grading on a curve says
nothing about the possibility of raising student performance. It is principally about allocating law school
rewards on the basis of student merit rather than professor grading philosophy.
Perhaps I am being unfair in my interpretation of the Carnegie Report. Perhaps the quotations
above are only criticisms of grading on a curve by individual professors rather than of institutional man-
datory curve policies, If that is the case, then the Carnegie Report authors and I have some common
ground. I believe professors should use something akin to the type of criterion-referenced grading that I
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What about those instructors (and I have encountered a few) who con-
tend that they are unable to distinguish among the performances of their
students because every student satisfies the grading criteria? Frankly, I think
what this really says is that the assessment tools these teachers are using are
insufficiently challenging. If a law professor cannot distinguish among the
performances of the students in a given class for purposes of applying a
mandatory curve, that professor needs to reconsider the assessment practices
being employed.
Best Practices also criticizes norm referencing because it does not as-
sist students in understanding "the degree to which they achieved the educa-
tional objectives of the course.', 143 But in practice, mandatory curves do not
require that professors use rigid norm-referenced assessment. Moreover,
even if pure criterion referencing-criterion-referenced grading unrestricted
by grade normalization-does provide students with somewhat greater
guidance than the mixture of norm- and criterion-referenced grading that
must be used when a mandatory curve is in place, a forced curve is still the
lesser evil. Any loss of guidance the students suffer under a mandatory
curve is greatly outweighed, morally, by the unfairness caused by grade
disparities that result in the absence of grade normalization. And, once
again, I believe that students would come close to universally agreeing with
me on this point.'44 Finally, it is questionable whether pure criterion refer-
encing would in fact provide more guidance than criterion referencing sub-
ject to a mandatory curve. Grading is not as objective and predictable as the
authors of the Best Practices book suggest. Even with detailed criterion-
referencing standards, significant levels of subjectivity are unavoidable in
assessing skills and topics as complicated as legal analysis, legal writing,
legal research, contracts, property, torts, criminal law, and civil procedure.
This subjectivity, combined with the inherent difficulty of most legal topics,
will always make it hard for law students to know how far they have pro-
gressed and what is necessary going forward to obtain a particular grade.
2. Criterion Referencing is Neither Practical Nor Ideal at an
Institutional Level
Pure criterion-referenced assessment-again, criterion referencing un-
restricted by a mandatory curve-is only fair to students if all professors at a
law school use the same grading standards and apply those standards consis-
practice. But criterion referencing is only fair when it is subject to the parameters of an institutional
mandatory curve. And so, norm referencing must continue to play a role in law school assessment.
143. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243 (further noting that this "can have a negative effect on
student motivation and learning"); see also Krieger, supra note 58, at 302 (concluding that criterion-
referenced grading "provides increased transparency").
144. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that the Bowen Student Bar Association
voted unanimously in favor of the mandatory curve I proposed at the school).
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tently throughout the institution. In other words, all teachers must adopt and
consistently apply the same grading philosophy. This raises two problems
for advocates of pure criterion referencing. First, it is very unlikely that the
entire faculty at a law school will both agree to the same grading standards
and apply those standards consistently. As a result, a mandatory curve is
necessary to control for the impact of different expectations among profes-
sors. Second, even if an institutional grading philosophy and consistent ap-
plication of that philosophy were possible, they would likely require an un-
healthy degree of uniformity in teaching, curricular, and assessment prac-
tices at the school.
Beginning with the issue of fairness, one of the claimed benefits of cri-
terion-referenced assessment is that grades produced using that system re-
flect absolute levels of achievement. But this is only true if all professors at
a single institution consistently apply the same grading standards-i.e., they
share the same grading philosophy. If professors use varying standards or
apply the same standards in dissimilar ways, course marks no longer accu-
rately convey absolute levels of achievement. Instead, grades reflect some
combination of student performance and the different grading philosophies.
For example, assume Professor A gives more high grades in Contracts than
Professor B does in the same course because A applies a more generous
understanding of what constitutes excellent work (i.e., Professor A has dif-
ferent substantive expectations). Or suppose Professor A believes that a
higher percentage of excellent students deserve A's (i.e., Professor A has a
different grading style). In reviewing transcripts of students from this law
school, an outside observer, operating on the understanding that both A and
B use criterion referencing, will conclude that the students in A's course
reached higher levels of mastery in Contracts than the students in B's class.
But this conclusion is unjustified. In reality, the grade disparities reflect the
different grading philosophies of the two Contracts instructors. Thus, when
professors use different standards, pure criterion referencing conveys mis-
leading information about student performance, which is unfair to the stu-
dents and confusing to consumers of transcript information.
145
The unfairness actually goes further. Most law schools calculate GPA
and use it for class rank purposes. The students in Professor A's Contracts
course will have a class rank advantage over Professor B's students because
the two professors use different grading standards. This, of course, is also
145. My thanks to Professor Matthew Silverstein of New York University in Abu Dhabi for helping
me develop this argument. In elaborating on the issue, Professor Silverstein offered the following: "Ab-
solute grading only makes sense when each grade is taken in isolation. When you're looking at a stu-
dent's transcript-or several students' transcripts-absolute grading obscures far more than it reveals."
E-mail from Matthew Silverstein to Author (April 16, 2010, 6:45 PM CST) (on file with the author). See
also Stake, supra note 2, at 587 ("Employers and other readers of law school transcripts do not have the
information or the time they would need to figure out what grades mean for individual teachers.").
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unfair to B's students. And it once again conveys inaccurate data to those
who rely upon transcripts. 46
Here is another way to think about the issue: Norm referencing is inevi-
table. Students' grades are going to be viewed and used comparatively. Pro-
spective employers compare grades on student transcripts. And grades are
used to calculate GPA and class rank, which are critical factors in the distri-
bution of law school rewards. 47 For these comparisons to be valid, either
professors must use and apply consistently the same grading standards, or a
mandatory curve is needed to assure that grades do not reflect differences in
professor grading philosophy.
Implicitly acknowledging this choice, the Carnegie Report recom-
mends the development and consistent implementation of institutional grad-
ing criteria.148 Reaching the required level of uniformity in grading philoso-
phy, however, is simply not practical.'49 Consider first what is necessary.
Agreement over purely formal grading standards would not work. For ex-
ample, faculty could not simply set 90% as the cutoff for A grades. We first
need to agree on what constitutes 100%. And that requires consensus on
substantive, rather than formal, standards. What is 100% in Secured Trans-
actions? How is it similar to and different from 100% in Contracts? In Ju-
risprudence? In a clinical course? Likewise, faculty agreeing that all "excel-
lent" work shall receive an A would be insufficient without consensus on
the substantive issue of what constitutes "excellent" work. Put simply, mere
agreement over grading style is not enough; faculty must also reach a com-
mon understanding over grading standards that set the degree of substantive
expectation. 50 And then, of course, we must apply the substantive standards
consistently throughout the law school. In short, to establish institutional
grading criteria as recommended by the Carnegie Report, a law faculty must
(1) reach consensus on grading style, (2) reach consensus on substantive
expectations, and (3) be able to apply consistently across the school the
146. See Post, supra note 7, at 793 (concluding that ranking students without insuring the compara-
bility of grades they receive causes the ranking to "convey misinformation to the public and to the vari-
ous constituencies that care about grades.").
147. See Stake, supra note 2, at 586 ("[G]rades will often be read comparatively. And even if no one
reads an individual teacher's grades comparatively, those grades will in all likelihood be combined into a
GPA which will be used to make comparisons between
students.").
148. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 170-71; see also Krieger, supra note 58, at 303
("Most faculties should be able to reach consensus regarding grading practices, perhaps with the adoption
of criterion-referenced grading ... ").
149. Cf CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 170 ("Perhaps the most serious criticism leveled at
criterion-referenced assessment is the difficulty in getting faculty to agree on standards of performance.
One professor's A is another's B, or even C.").
150. There is one type of formal agreement that is an exception: A faculty could agree to a set
distribution of grades for every class--e.g., the top ten percent of students shall receive an A. But that, of
course, is simply a mandatory curve.
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grading standards that reflect those two agreements. The barriers to accom-
plishing all of this are substantial.
Let me begin, however, by granting that law faculty can resolve their
disagreements over grading style--element (1). At schools like mine, there
is little question that teachers apply contrasting grading scales; we differ in
how we label various levels of student performance. Some instructors be-
lieve A's should be reserved for very few students. Others are more gener-
ous with high grades. Some teachers think Cs should be used frequently to
signal to students that they need to perform better. Others feel that C is gen-
erally too low of a grade. I think that a law faculty can probably overcome
these types of disagreements. More specifically, I believe faculties are able
to reach consensus on whether As, Bs, and Cs should reflect "excellent,
good, and satisfactory" work, respectively, or "good, satisfactory, and fail-
ing" work. After all, we generally can reach consensus on what level to set
mandatory curves-e.g., C+ mean, B mean, or B+ mean. As explained in
the previous paragraph, however, agreements over grading style do little
good if professors differ over the degree of substantive competency neces-
sary for performance to be considered "excellent," "good," "satisfactory," or
"failing." In other words, the real challenge is reaching consensus over sub-
stantive expectations--element (2), and translating that agreement into stan-
dards that can be consistently applied--element (3).
Numerous factors complicate our reaching consensus on substantive
expectations. First, professors teach different types of courses, including
doctrinal classes, skills classes, seminars, and clinics. Second, courses that
fall into the same category often emphasize different skills. For example,
Secured Transactions focuses on understanding and applying a system of
numerous, relatively clear rules that fit together in complicated ways. Con-
tracts and Sales Transactions involve a smaller number of more ambiguous
rules that fit together in a more straightforward manner. Torts and Constitu-
tional Law emphasize particularly ambiguous rules that, many would argue,
frequently do not fit together at all. Third, even in comparable courses,
teachers place varying weight on different skills, such as rule application,
comprehension of legal texts, advocacy, and legal writing. Fourth, profes-
sors emphasize different subjects in their classes. To illustrate, some doc-
trinal teachers focus almost exclusively on legal reasoning. Others supple-
ment such reasoning with moderate to heavy doses of public policy, strate-
gic planning, and/or theory. Fifth, law professors assess mastery of legal
skills and topics in different ways. In doctrinal classes, alone, we vary over
whether to administer closed-book or open-book tests, take-home or in-class
exams, essay questions or multiple-choice and short-answer questions (or a
combination), testing on many subjects or just a few, and assessing many
skills or a limited number, inter alia. In addition, some of us administer a
single final exam. Others augment the summative assessment with class
participation, papers, quizzes, or group projects. Sixth, teachers employ
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varying grading methods, such as point systems or holistic/gestalt grading.51
Seventh, some instructors assess only the level of competency, while others
weigh additional factors, such as effort or improvement. 52 Many of these
seven differences are reflected in the studies that have concluded that when
professors grade the same essay exams, they vary significantly in their as-
sessments, including over the rank ordering of the answers.153 The dis-
agreements over rank ordering are especially pertinent because they estab-
lish that the professors valued different skills or valued the same skills in
disparate ways.154
Professors have crucial disagreements over what constitutes excellent,
good, satisfactory, and failing work, as illustrated by the grade disparities at
the Bowen Law School and other institutions. What the previous paragraph
shows is that these disagreements implicate multiple differences in (a) the
types of courses we teach, (b) the skills and subjects we emphasize in those
courses, and (c) the assessment practices we use. This means that law pro-
fessors do not just vary quantitatively in our degree of substantive expecta-
tion; we also vary qualitatively in ways that makes it difficult to even com-
pare our differing quantitative standards. Given all of these variations, how
realistic is it to believe that we can craft substantive grading standards for A,
B, and C work (and the multiple flavors of each grade-e.g., B+ and B-)
that can be consistently applied across the entire law school curriculum?
Can we construct criteria that will properly equate A- work in Secured
Transactions, taught by a professor who focuses almost exclusively on the
law and gives a largely short-answer, objective test, with A- work in Consti-
tutional Law, taught by a professor who heavily emphasizes theory and pol-
icy, and administers an essay exam? What about with A- performance in a
seminar where the reading consists entirely of secondary sources and the
final grade is determined by a paper and class discussion? What about with
A- performance in a negotiation and transactional skills course with twenty
graded exercises? I submit the answer is rather clearly "no." '55 Indeed, I
151. Stake, supra note 2, at 586 (observing that in grading, some law professors "add up points"
while others "use a gestalt method, holistic and sometimes intuitional, assigning a final letter grade
without having assigned numerical scores at any stage of the process").
152. See Fines, supra note 20, at 882 ("Different instructors produce grades in different ways, taking
into account different criteria, including comparison to peers, comparison to evaluative criteria, effort,
growth, or behavioral compliance.").
153. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 826-27 (collecting and summarizing several studies);
Henderson, supra note 20, at 410-11 (same); but cf CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 170 (observing
that "a long history of assessment research on rank orderings supports the notion that faculty will agree
on performance rankings to some reasonable degree").
154. Cf Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 827 (observing that the differences among professors
grading the same essays could reflect that the professors use different grading scales, value different
abilities in distinct ways, or a combination of each).
155. See Keating, supra note 9, at 179 (explaining that law school assessment is not like testing
multiplication tables in a third-grade math class where all teachers agree on the absolute standard of
performance and how to measure it) ("Even if the faculty could agree on which skills were necessary for
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think it would be difficult to craft such standards even between two Con-
tracts professors who use the same book, emphasize the same basic skills,
cover largely the same topics, and administer substantially similar tests.
The Carnegie Report counters that criterion referencing is used in other
education programs, particularly medical school.156 But the authors say little
to establish that assessment is substantively comparable in the areas of
medicine and law.'57 And their contention that "in other fields, such as
medical education, there is no evidence that using criterion-referenced grad-
ing instead of grading on the curve harms either student learning or faculty
morale"'58 misses the point. The principal problem with pure criterion refer-
encing is the lack of fairness that results from the application of different
substantive criteria and grading styles, not the impact on student learning
and faculty morale.
Similarly unpersuasive is the Carnegie Report's observation that
"[pirofessional test developers now routinely achieve impressive levels of
rater agreement on standards of performance in many different contexts,
from standards for high school graduation to standards for professional li-
censure in a wide variety of occupations."' 59 The differences between high
school graduation standards and law school performance standards are too
obvious to merit comment. And the existence of national, standardized li-
censure tests establishes little since such tests typically measure only basic
or minimum competence. In law school, we are measuring much more-
namely, multiple degrees of achievement above basic proficiency. Indeed,
Best Practices expressly admits that criterion-referenced assessment gener-
ally operates using a pass/fail scale. 6° That makes it less appropriate in con-
texts where the focus is on gradations of success rather than merely basic
competency.
minimum competence, we could probably not agree on how to objectively assess them. And even if we
could agree on how to assess them, there would be no way to ensure that different graders would be
consistent in applying those assessments."); Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 853 ("The idea that grades
reflect a specific standard of performance is troubling on a number of levels.... Specifically with respect
to grading, the idea of absolute measures of performance is simply not realistic."); see also Fines, supra
note 20, at 882 ("Faculty can develop criteria against which student achievement can be measured. This
is by no means an easy task-some may say impossible."); Richard Kamber, Understanding Grade
Inflation, in GRADE INFLATION: ACADEMIC STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 45, 63 (Lester H. Hunt
ed., 2008) ("[Mlost disciplines are unable to agree upon measurable standards of objective mastery
beyond basic comprehension, rote knowledge, and threshold skills. The notion of 'grades as an objective
measure of mastery' has limited application in postsecondary education.").
156. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 170; see also id. at 168 ("Other forms of graduate and
professional education are more likely to use what is known as criterion-referenced grading-that is, an
absolute standard of performance determines who will receive A's and who will receive other grades.").
157. Id. at 168-76.
158. Id. at 170.
159. Id.
160. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 244 (quoting ALISON BONE, NATIONAL CENTRE FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION, ENSURING SUCCESSFUL ASSESSMENT (Roger Burridge & Tracey Vamava eds., 1999)).
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Moreover, even the bar exam, the principal licensing tool in the field of
law, does not operate using pure criterion referencing. The Multistate Bar
Exam (or "MBE"), the multiple choice portion of the test, is scaled using a
type of grade normalization.' 6' Many states further scale the essay portions
of their tests using MBE scores. 62 It is also worth noting that states vary
significantly in their minimum passing scores. 163 And then there are the nu-
merous, powerful criticisms of the bar exam.164 All of this strongly suggests
that agreement over general assessment standards on anything beyond
minimum competency is highly unlikely in the legal field. If law profession-
als struggle to reach consensus on basic licensure requirements, how realis-
tic is agreement on multiple levels of performance? 6 '
The adoption of school-wide, substantive assessment standards would
be significantly more realistic if professors did not vary so greatly in (a) the
types of classes we teach, (b) the skills and subjects we stress, and (c) our
assessment practices. Importantly, greater uniformity in these areas may be
coming. Curriculum reform and the increasing focus on outcome assessment
could eliminate some of the qualitative differences that make agreement on
grading philosophy so unlikely.'66 But any significant reduction in the diver-
sity of our curricular, teaching, and assessment approaches would be peda-
gogically harmful. Variations across these dimensions reflect the fact that
instructors emphasize different aspects of legal practice in their classes. Stu-
dents thus learn a more diverse set of skills and subjects, and receive more
comprehensive and multi-faceted assessment. If, for example, all law pro-
fessors adopted the same testing protocols in doctrinal classes, much of the
latter benefit would be lost. Additionally, the qualitative and quantitative
161. Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar Exam: A Look at
Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 75 (2007) ("The MBE raw score, based on the
number of questions answered correctly out of two hundred items, is converted into a scaled score so that
every test indicates the same relative proficiencies.") (emphasis added).
162. Gary S. Rosin, Unpacking the Bar: Of Cut Scores and Competence, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 68
(2008).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Denise Riebe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting Students on Board to Pass
Their Bar Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 272-82 (2007) (setting forth multiple criticisms of the bar
exam); Society of American Law Teachers, Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUc. 446, 446-52
(2002) (same); Trujillo, supra note 161, at 77-85 (same).
165. One of my Bowen colleagues has pressed me to admit that few law schools have tried to de-
velop substantive grading standards of the type necessary to implement institutional criterion referencing.
See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 170 (observing that "actual data on the contention that
faculty cannot agree on standards of performance is less well established"). That may be so, but it is
entirely possible that one reason the trend in legal education has been in favor of adopting grade normali-
zation is that most law professors recognize the futility of attempting to construct school-wide grading
criteria.
166. Aida M. Alaka, Learning Styles: What Difference do the Differences Make?, 5 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 133, 134 (2011) ("At the national level, the Standards Review Committee of the American Bar
Association has been promulgating new standards that focus on learning outcomes assessment meas-
ures."); id. at 135-37 (briefly summarizing contemporary legal education curriculum reform).
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differences in professor expectations prepare students for the similar varia-
tion they will face in their legal careers. Our students will practice in front of
numerous judges, under the tutelage of many supervisors, and in service to
countless clients. These judges, supervisors, and clients will employ a wide
variety of standards in assessing the work product produced by our gradu-
ates. Law students need training for this diversity of expectations. Of course,
on fairness grounds, it is critical that each professor communicate her par-
ticular standards to students as clearly as possible. But as long as students
receive the proper notice, the diversity in our curricular, teaching, and as-
sessment practices is pedagogically invaluable.
167
In sum, the establishment of an institutional grading philosophy
grounded in criterion referencing, and the consistent application of the stan-
dards that reflect that philosophy, are neither realistic goals nor aims worth
achieving. Despite the aspirations of the Carnegie Report and Best Prac-
tices, comparative assessment of our students is inevitable at an institutional
level. We can conduct these comparisons fairly, using a mandatory curve, or
we can perform these comparisons unfairly, allowing differences in substan-
tive expectations and professor grading style to play critical roles in reward
distribution. The preferable approach is clear.
F. Objection Six: "Mandatory Curves Induce Excessive Competition
Among Students"
Another oft-stated argument against mandatory curves is that they in-
duce excessive competition among students. 168 Such competition damages
the learning environment, inhibiting student progress on course objectives.
This is the strongest attack against mandatory curves. It raises a critical con-
cern about the possible impacts of forced curves on the core educational
mission of law schools. However, the argument ultimately fails as an in-
dictment of grade normalization, principally because unfair grade disparities
likely create a more corrosive learning environment than does a mandatory
curve. In addition, even if forced curves do increase overall competition, the
unfairness of grade disparities flowing from differences in professor grading
philosophy is the more pressing concern.
The contention that mandatory curves increase competitiveness focuses
on the norm referencing inevitable under any curve. Norm-referenced grad-
ing measures students against one another. This leads to more competition
167. Best Practices argues that it "should not matter... whether one teacher or another is conduct-
ing the assessment." BEST PRACTICES, supra note 9, at 243. This is not only deeply unrealistic, see supra
notes 151-155 and accompanying text, but, as argued in this paragraph, ultimately undesirable. Variation
in law school assessment is a positive, not a negative.
168. See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 165 ("Equally aversive to students was the com-
petitive atmosphere engendered by the widespread practice in legal education of grading on the curve.").
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because the students are contending directly for grades.169 The competition
is exacerbated by the grading limits imposed by the curve itself. Such limits
create a "zero-sum game in which students who do well benefit by the per-
formance of those who do poorly.'
170
The competition resulting from a mandatory curve, in turn, compro-
mises the educational objectives of the law school. "Educational psycholo-
gists have consistently demonstrated that competitive learning gives the
poorest results in educational attainment."'.' It does so by reducing student
effort and motivation, and increasing student anxiety. 172 The competitive
structure also "can lead to a variety of behaviors designed to gain unfair
advantage: ranging from subtle undermining of peers by discouraging active
learning or hoarding resources to outright cheating and plagiarism."'7 Man-
datory curves are intended to bring fairness to grading. But if they funda-
mentally disrupt learning, perhaps the benefits are not worth the price.
The most important response to this criticism is that significant grade
disparities probably do more to create an overly competitive and disruptive
learning environment than mandatory curves. Bowen Law School is illustra-
tive. The students there were consumed with the grade disparities prior to
our adoption of a mandatory curve. They regularly complained to the faculty
and administration. They focused heavily on professor grading practices in
registering for courses (and publicly advised their classmates to do the
same). And they brought the issue to the attention of our recent reaccredita-
tion team.
In addition, rivalries between the students in the day and night pro-
grams, between sections of various classes, and between other groups of
students were a regular feature of the school once the grade disparities be-
came significant. For example, in 2009, on our student listserv, the day and
night students had a large-scale "flame war" over grading issues. Students
169. See Fines, supra note 20, at 899 ("One of the aspects of grading that is most detrimental to
teaching and learning is the practice of required grade curves.... If students are measured against each
other on a competitive scale, rather than against an objective norm, competitive learning strategies will
predominate."); CARNEGIE, supra note 9, at 166 ("Students report ... that the intensely competitive
atmosphere militates against a cooperative learning environment.").
170. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 855 (describing the argument, though disagreeing with it); see
also Feinman, supra note 7, at 650 ("A ranking system that emphasizes the differences in student
achievement, and a system in which students are presumed and permitted to succeed only at the expense
of other students, is more likely to engender a competitive rather than a cooperative atmosphere .... ").
171. Fines, supra note 20, at 901 (citing David W. Johnson et al., Effects of Cooperative, Competi-
tive, and Individualistic Goal Structures on Achievement: A Meta-Analysis, 89 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
47, 53 (1981) (concluding that sixty-five studies found cooperative learning superior to competitive
learning, eight studies found competitive learning superior, and thirty-six studies found no distinction
between the two types of learning)).
172. Id. at 902; see also Krieger, supra note 58, at 297-98 ("As a zero-sum system, a mandatory
curve also creates anxiety and undermines the security and relatedness needs."). The competitive envi-
ronment may also have greater negative impacts on female students and students of color. See Fines,
supra note 20, at 902-05.
173. Fines, supra note 20, at 907.
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from both programs wrote multiple emails that, to put it mildly, were highly
insulting to the opposing program.' 1 This type of public eruption was a de-
pressingly common occurrence at our school under the old grading sys-
tem.
175
One of the most telling examples of the harm caused by the grade dis-
parities at Bowen took place in my Contracts course. In the fall of 2008, the
grade disparities between Bowen's two sections of first-year students were
particularly egregious. The mean grades in Torts and Contracts in the day
program were 3.269 and 3.128, respectively. In the night program, they
were 2.625 and 2.825. Needless to say, the students in our night division
were furious. I taught in the night program that year. At the start of the
spring class session in which I planned to review the fall exam, the first
question I received from a student was about the grade disparities. From
there, it became clear that the class had no interest in talking about the final
itself. They did not want to hear about the degree to which they met my ex-
pectations, what top papers did to earn their grades, or how they could have
performed better. The students had no interest in any of the objective learn-
ing criteria I established for the course. Instead, they were interested in one
issue: Why were there such dramatic grade disparities? They blamed the
school, the Torts professor in the night division, and me for their grades.
The final itself got about seven minutes of substantive attention out of a
fifty-five minute session. Contrast this with my experiences as a student at a
law school with a recommended curve that effectively operated as a manda-
tory curve. I never encountered anything at that school which I could attrib-
ute to the curve that was remotely as disruptive to the learning environment
as what happened in my Contracts class at the Bowen Law School in the
spring of 2009.
Given all of these events, I think that the institution of a mandatory
curve at my institution will almost certainly lessen the tensions on campus
and substantially reduce competitiveness among the students. I suspect the
same is true for other law schools suffering from significant grade dispari-
ties. Students resent variations in grades. 176 And with good reason. They
realize that their career paths are being determined by professor grading
philosophy rather than merit. It should thus come as no surprise that vari-
ances in faculty grading practices have disruptive impacts.
As for the hoarding, cheating, plagiarism, and other forms of bad be-
havior allegedly caused by mandatory curves, my school appears to have
174. Copies of every e-mail are on file with the author.
175. A similar e-mail exchange took place in 2006 over variances in the grades in our "Law Skills"
course, a required legal skills class taught in small sections by adjuncts. Copies of these e-mails are on
file with the author.
176. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 825; Stake, supra note 2, at 591; see also Post, supra note
7, at 796 & n.75 (discussing "a massive protest" by students over grade disparities at one law school).
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suffered from these problems every bit as much as other schools despite our
lack of any formal grade normalization policies. I am thus skeptical of the
notion that these negative behaviors are substantially attributable to manda-
tory curves.'77 Indeed, given the numerous other features of law school and
the legal marketplace that likely facilitate excessive competition, I suspect
that mandatory curves are, at most, merely one cause of such competition
among many. The mere assigning of grades leads to competition because
grades are the principal currency in the attainment of most law school re-
wards. Class rank also causes competition because it is fundamentally both a
norm-referencing metric and zero-sum in operation. 7 ' Competition is likely
also stimulated by the fact that many professors grade on a curve even in the
absence of formal grade normalization policies. Professors Downs and Levit
elaborate on this last point, observing that the argument that mandatory
curves impose zero-sum incentives on students "assumes unlimited grade
wealth in the absence of a grade normalization policy, which certainly does
not appear to be the case at most schools."' 7 9 Moreover, as explained in the
previous part, forced curves are largely compatible with criterion-referenced
assessment, limiting the amount of competition-inducing norm referencing
that is necessary under a curve. In sum, the implementation of a mandatory
curve should not significantly alter the incentives for competition at schools
that do not yet have one in place.
Perhaps forced curves do cause some uptick in overall competitiveness.
If so, that is a price well worth paying for the fairness that results from their
implementation. As explained above, the harm caused by grading disparities
is substantial. 8° I believe that students would generally agree that this dam-
age is significantly greater than any injuries caused by a small rise in com-
petition on campus.' 8' I share this moral view. In addition, there are color-
able arguments that increased competition is actually beneficial. First, while
a preponderance of the research suggests that cooperative learning environ-
ments are superior, the evidence is mixed; some studies have concluded that
competitive learning is more effective. 82 Second, a competitive learning
177. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 856 & n.69 (explaining that, in the authors' experience,
students have not behaved badly in response to grade normalization systems).
178. See Keating, supra note 9, at 190 ("The fact is, however, any grading system is a zero-sum
game to the extent that higher grades in one class necessarily deflate the currency on which overall class
ranks will be based. In other words, when the absolute grade numbers of a student's classmates go up, the
student's own relative class rank will go down."). Some commentators have argued we should eliminate
public dissemination of class rank in order to reduce competition. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 58, at
300; see also Post, supra note 7, at 793 ("Ranking in the first year of law school is premature."). While I
have some sympathy for this idea, particularly since it seemed to work at the law school I attended, it
seems unlikely that many schools are willing to follow this path.
179. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 855-56.
180. See supra Part IV.
181. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that the Bowen Student Bar Association
voted unanimously in favor of the mandatory curve I proposed at the school).
182. See supra note 171.
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environment might better prepare law students for the operation of the mar-
ketplace. 183 Even if one finds these two arguments unpersuasive, they are at
least plausible. However, there are no colorable arguments in support of
grade disparities flowing from differences in professor grading philosophy.
Such grade variances are wholly unjustified. This too supports the conclu-
sion that increased competition caused by mandatory curves is the lesser
evil.
G. Objection Seven: "Mandatory Curves Induce Excessive Apathy in Law
Students"
Some critics contend that mandatory curves are a principal source of
law student apathy, particularly in the second and third years of school."8
There are three problems with this objection.'85 First, even if the claim is
true, it is difficult to give it much weight without a comparison to the apathy
caused by significant grade disparities. If the latter is a greater cause of stu-
dent disengagement, then mandatory curves are once again the lesser evil.
Second, there are numerous possible sources of student apathy, includ-
ing (1) confrontational versions of the Socratic method, (2) "hide-the-ball"
teaching practices that are sometimes employed, (3) the focus on doctrinal
courses throughout all of law school, (4) the single summative assessment
and the related lack of professor feedback, (5) the large size of many law
school classes, (6) the disproportionate weight accorded to first-year grades,
and (7) part-time jobs during the semester, to name just a few. We do not
know how much apathy is attributable specifically to mandatory curves.
Without greater clarity on this point, the unfairness of grade disparities is the
more pressing concern.
Third, the explanations offered for why curves reduce student motiva-
tion are typically unpersuasive. For example, one commentator asserted that
mandatory curves make it more difficult for students who performed poorly
in the first year to improve their class rank, thus decreasing the incentive to
183. See Downs & Levitt, supra note 9, at 854 ("One gets ahead in the employment arena not by
having a fixed quantity of good stuff, but by demonstrating more good stuff than other workers. In short,
the world operates on a curve."); Fines, supra note 20, at 904 ("One response to this critique may be that
we are simply preparing students for the world of law as it is. If students cannot operate in a competition
atmosphere, they will not be able to perform well as lawyers because the practice of law is competi-
tive.").
184. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 9, at 163 ("The danger of using inter-student competition as
a primary motivation is that in a situation in which, by deliberate plan, all cannot excel, the school faces
an endemic problem of retaining student interest and effort after the first cut, which is decisive, is made
at the end of the first year."); id. at 165-66 (explaining that some students claim that curves reduce their
motivation to study).
185. It is also somewhat ironic that opponents contend that mandatory curves cause both excessive
competition and disengagement.
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study. 8 6 But mandatory curves do not reduce the prospects for raising one's
class rank as a second or third-year student. If anything, curves have the
opposite impact. At least with a mandatory curve, there are limits to the
grade wealth that professors can allocate in their classes. Grades thus have
substantially the same value throughout law school. This means that slower
learners can turn around their performance and pass other students in the
second or third year. Without a curve, there is a danger of grade inflation in
upper level classes. This decreases the range of grades awarded in later
years, making it more difficult to overtake those with higher GPAs. To illus-
trate, if professors at a given law school award As, Bs, and Cs in the first
year, but only As and Bs in the second and third year, the relative value of
grades in upper level courses is lower, If Student X received mostly Cs in
the first year and Student Y received mostly As, X could not make up this
difference in just one year. X would need two years of As to Y's two years
of Bs to catch up. Of course, the likelihood of such performance reversals by
either Student X or Y is small. But the key point is that a mandatory curve
improves Xs chances of catching Y (if it requires the same range of grades
during each year of law school)." 7
A second explanation of apathy is that mandatory curves weaken per-
formance incentives because students can only improve their grades by
passing their classmates-classmates who are frequently perceived as being
more talented. This explanation is somewhat more plausible. It founders,
however, because students near the bottom of the class can improve their
performance and obtain higher grades under a mandatory curve. First, recall
that forced curves are largely compatible with criterion-referenced grad-
ing.'88 As a result, students that come closer to satisfying objective perform-
ance standards will receive better grades. Second, the norm referencing in-
herent in mandatory curves still leaves substantial room for students to im-
prove their grades. For example, students can outperform those close to, but
slightly ahead, of them. Indeed, students who performed poorly in the first
year merely because they are slower learners have reasonable prospects of
outperforming students who achieved much higher grades early on. Addi-
tionally, when students who struggled at the start of their legal education
objectively improve in later years, this may induce their professors to give
slightly lower grades to those near the top so the professors can award
higher grades to the improving students, as is permitted under more flexible
curves, like those structured around mean GPA.
Another commentator, Professor Larry Krieger, offers a more compel-
ling explanation for how mandatory curves might induce apathy. Professor
186. Henderson, supra note 20, at 415.
187. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 446 & n.3 (making this essential point in a slightly dif-
ferent context).
188. See supra Part V.E.1.
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Krieger observes that forced curves cause students to perceive their grades
as emanating from an external source of control rather than from their own
efforts.'89 "This experience . . . displaces the intrinsic motivations to learn
and become capable with compelled competition for relative worth."' 9 And
since performance generally improves as one moves from motivations that
are "external and controlled to internal and chosen," decreased effort is a
likely result of imposing mandatory curves.' 9'
Krieger's primary target is curves structured around rigid ranges for
each specific grade, rather than those built around means or medians. 92 But
since his argument could be used against the type of grade normalization I
support, a response is in order.
Assume that Professor Krieger is correct that mandatory curves cause
students to believe that their grades are emanating from an external source.
Grade disparities have the exact same effect. Recall the example of my Con-
tracts class in the fall of 2008.'93 My students placed blame for the grade
variances not on themselves and their efforts, but on the school and me.
Moreover, the students were correct in blaming us. This critically distin-
guishes student views of grade disparities from their views of forced curves.
Let me elaborate.
Student perception that a mandatory curve based on mean GPA is a
critical source of the grades they receive only loosely tracks reality. Recall
that mandatory curves are substantially compatible with criterion referenc-
ing. Thus, grades awarded under a curve generally reflect the professor's
assessment of student progress on course objectives. And law teachers can
explain this to students, hopefully reducing the mistaken perception that the
curve plays a major role in determining grades. On the other hand, when a
law school suffers from significant grade variances, students are justified in
blaming an external source for their marks. Why? Because if grade dispari-
ties exist, differences in teacher grading philosophy account for a substantial
portion of the grades students receive. This means that a crucial piece of
grades is determined by an external source entirely beyond the students'
control-the professors. When that is the case, there is nothing teachers can
tell students that will eliminate confusion about their marks because the stu-
dents are not actually confused; their perceptions are largely accurate. In
sum, if Professor Krieger is correct, both mandatory curves and grade dis-
parities cause students to believe their marks are emanating from an external
source, reducing the incentive to study. But only in the case of grade vari-
189. Krieger, supra note 58, at 298.
190. Id.
191. See id.; see also Fines, supra note 20, at 900 (noting that "extrinsic orientations tend to under-
mine learning" by, among other things, reducing student effort).
192. See Krieger, supra note 58, at 297.
193. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
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ances are the students correct, eliminating the option of educating them to
reduce misperceptions. Thus, unjustified grade disparities, once again, are
worse than mandatory curves.
H. Objection Eight: "Recommended Curves and Informal Grade Normali-
zation Practices Are Superior to Mandatory Curves"
The final objection to mandatory curves acknowledges that some form
of grade normalization is necessary, but concludes that other types are supe-
rior to forced curves.
One option is to make curves recommended rather than required. 94 The
principal justification for such an approach is greater flexibility. If a profes-
sor believes the students in a particular class performed in an especially su-
perior or inferior manner, the professor can reward the students accordingly.
However, as discussed in the section addressing the objection that curves
bar professors from giving students the grades they earned, it is not enough
for a teacher to believe his students performed better or worse than his stan-
dard class. Because grading is inevitably comparative, the professor must
have evidence that his students outperformed students in other courses
taught by different instructors. Such evidence will rarely, if ever, be avail-
able. A second problem with recommended curves is that they are less effec-
tive than mandatory approaches.195 Schools that adopt such a policy often
continue to suffer from unjustifiable grade disparities.1 96
Another option is the usage of informal normalization practices. The
most common such practices are (1) consultation among professors regard-
ing grades, and (2) the provision of historical grade distributions.197 For ex-
ample, some schools have written policies recommending that certain pro-
fessors, typically those teaching the same section of a course, consult with
each other about grades prior to submitting their final marks to the admini-
stration.'98 Other schools circulate the grade distribution for every course
after the grades become official.'99 My law school previously used the latter
194. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 839 (noting that some law schools make parts of their
curve policies recommended rather than mandatory); see also Krieger, supra note 58, at 303 (proposing
that "a faculty member with consistent or substantial variations from a normal distribution of grades, or
from a realistic grade range, could be required to support those variations and receive approval from the
administration or a designated committee").
195. See Post, supra note 7, at 778 (concluding that voluntary grade normalization "does nothing to
curb the excesses of faculty").
196. See id. at 798, 812 (explaining that the author's law school adopted a recommended curve and
that each semester afterwards, there were what the author considered "significant deviations from the
norm").
197. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 847.
198. Id. at 847-48.
199. Id. at 848; Kaufman, supra note 7, at 418 (noting that many schools "distribute information
about recent grading practices to the faculty").
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approach. Roughly two weeks after grades were submitted, the administra-
tion provided the faculty with a report listing the precise grades given in
every class that semester. A third approach is regular, faculty-wide discus-
sions of grading practices.200 Each of these mechanisms is inferior to a man-
datory curve.
The problem with the consulting approach (the first option) is that, at
best, it will only resolve disparities among sections of the same course.
While that type of variance is probably the most unfair, other grade dispari-
ties are also deeply problematic. And one-on-one consulting is simply not
practical across an entire faculty. The third option-full faculty discus-
sions-makes more sense if the goal is to eliminate grade disparities gener-
ally, not just those among sections of the same class. But if such a dialogue
actually results in consensus, there is no reason to avoid taking the next step
and instituting a mandatory curve that reflects the agreement. The only plau-
sible basis not to do so is the added flexibility found in an informal system
that allows teachers to deviate from the norm when they believe a particular
class is deserving. But as explained above with respect to recommended
curves, individual professors will virtually never have sufficient information
to justify such a deviation since they will have little evidence indicating that
their students performed better than students taught by other professors in
different classes.
As for the second option, circulating grade reports was an abject failure
at my law school. Virtually no one read the reports carefully. Perhaps the
grade reports have some influence at other institutions.20' But if so, once
again, there is no reason not to implement a mandatory curve that is consis-
tent with the general trend in grade distributions.2"
Recommended curves and some informal normalization practices are
premised on a need for greater flexibility in grading so that professors can
award grades consistent with variations in performance from year to year.
As I explained, this justification is unpersuasive. Nonetheless, the curve I
recommended at my school does provide some of the desired flexibility. My
proposal sets a mandatory mean range of 3.2 to 3.4, with a target of 3.3. The
primary purposes underlying such a range are (1) to provide flexibility in
setting grade distributions so they reflect differences in student achievement
within a given class, and (2) to prevent the curve from appearing unduly
restrictive to students and faculty. To the extent the range also allows teach-
200. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 848. For commentators supporting this third approach, see
Krieger, supra note 58, at 301, and Feinman, supra note 7, at 652.
201. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 848 ("The posting or circulating of grading information
may allow some informal grade normalization to occur among professors.").
202. Another concern with circulating grade distribution reports is that it probably takes time for this
practice to bring about the necessary degree of uniformity. Until then, the grading practices at a school
suffering from grade disparities will continue to unfairly impact the careers of the students.
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ers to moderately adjust their grades from year to year based on their subjec-
tive assessment of student performance, this small measure of discretion is
substantially consistent with the goal of eliminating unfair grading dispari-
ties.2
03
I. A Final Note on the Objections
No grading system is perfectly fair.2' And this obviously includes
mandatory curves. In Part V, I have contended that mandatory curves are the
lesser evil. To the extent they have flaws, the harms caused are substantially
smaller than the injustices that result from the alternatives.
The trend over the last thirty years has been in favor of adopting grade
normalization mechanisms.2 5 Moreover, a majority of schools now use a
mandatory curve for grade normalization in at least some courses.2 6 Many
scholars support this approach.0 7 And even those who are more skeptical
frequently acknowledge that such curves are the lesser evil when the alterna-
tive is significant grade disparities.2 8
In sum, all law schools should adopt mandatory curves.
2 9
203. For discussions of some potential concerns with a mandatory curve based on a mean GPA
range, see infra notes 220-226 and accompanying text.
204. Fines, supra note 20, at 895 ("Obviously we cannot entirely eliminate inequity in our sorting
processes.").
205. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 836 ("Apart from the self-selection effect of those re-
sponding, the cumulative data indicate a dramatic trend toward adoption of grade normalization policies:
9% of schools in 1976, 66% in 1993, and 84% in 1996."); Kaufman, supra note 7, at 417-18 (in this
1993 survey of 175 accredited law schools, of the 119 responding, 79 (66.4%) stated that some type of
curve was in place for at least some courses); id. at 423 ("The popularity of grading curves.., appears to
be increasing.").
206. Mroch, supra note 9, at 2-3 (in this 2005 AALS survey of grading practices at 188 ABA-
accredited law schools, 145 schools responded to the survey; of the respondents, 115 have a formal
grading policy; and of those 115, 81 reported that the policy is mandatory in at least some courses); id. at
6 ("For those schools with policies, the majority of policies were mandatory .. "); Fines, supra note 20,
at 888 (noting that most schools require faculty to grade according to a curve).
207. See, e.g., Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 821 ("[W]e conclude that there is a need for stan-
dardization of grades, particularly in first year, sectioned courses and upper level courses with multiple
sections."); Stake, supra note 2, at 583, 588-92 (defending the equalization of means as a grading princi-
ple); Keating, supra note 9, at 185-88 (defending mandatory means and similar forms of grade normali-
zation); Post, supra note 7; Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 446 (outlining the need for the standardiza-
tion of grades); Epstein, supra note 7, at 708 (same).
208. See, e.g., E-mail from Lawrence S. Krieger, Clinical Professor, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law,
to Author (Aug. 12, 2010, 2:06 PM CST) (on file with the author) ("If there are disparities that the ad-
ministration is unable or unwilling to address through direct intervention, then it is probably better to
have a system like mandatory curve that students perceive to be limiting and unnecessarily inflexible,
than one that students perceive to be arbitrary and dependent largely on allocation or selection of one's
professors."); Krieger, supra note 58, at 297-99, 302 (setting forth a variety of concerns with mandatory
curves).
209. Given the grade disparities that exist in other parts of the academy-see supra notes 17 and
67-I lean towards the view that all undergraduate and most graduate institutions should implement
mandatory curves as well.
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VI. THE STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF MANDATORY CURVES
This part addresses some critical issues regarding the structure and
scope of mandatory curves."
A. Structural Features of Mandatory Curves
1. Structuring Curves Around Mean GPA
Mandatory curves based on "mean GPA" are the best type of curve. To
calculate the mean GPA for a course, one simply adds the grade point values
of every final grade given, and then divides that sum by the number of stu-
dents in the class.21'
Curves using mean GPA require that instructors assign grades within a
reasonably tight range, but still provide flexibility in the precise distribution.
Under the system I proposed at my school, professors are restricted in that
the total value of the grades they award must fall between 3.2 and 3.4. Thus,
no teacher can give significantly higher or lower overall grades than any
other instructor. But professors can meet the GPA requirement in a variety
of ways-for example, (1) by distributing the grades in a bell curve with a
significant grouping around the grades 3.1 through 3.5, (2) by spreading the
grades more equally across all of the available marks, or (3) by assigning
grades in a "U-shape" via a large number of low and high marks.21 2
The benefits of using mean GPA are best illustrated by considering the
important deficiencies in the two, primary alternative types of curves. The
first alternative is "median GPA." The median GPA of a course is the grade
at which half the students have a higher mark and half the students have a
lower mark. Median GPA systems do not sufficiently restrict the distribution
of grades because they do not prevent a professor from giving significantly
higher or lower overall grades than other teachers. For example, assume two
instructors are teaching forty-student classes. Assume further that the man-
datory curve requires a median of 3.2 to 3.4, rather than a mean of 3.2 to
3.4. Under such a regime, the first professor could give nineteen 4.Os and
twenty-one 3.4s, while the second professor could give twenty-one 3.2s and
210. There are, of course, structural and scope issues beyond those discussed in this part, such as
whether to apply the same curve standards to both first-year and upper-level courses. See Downs &
Levit, supra note 9, at 839.
211. For example, assume that the forty students in a class received the following grades: 3 A+, 5 A,
6 A-, 11 B+, 9 B, 6 B-. Assume further that these grades have the following values: A+ = 4.3, A = 4.0,
A- = 3.7, B+ = 3.3, B = 3.0, B- = 2.7. To calculate the mean, one first determines the sum of the grade
point values of every final grade given: (A+: 3 x 4.3 = 12.9) + (A: 5 x 4.0 = 20) + (A-: 6 x 3.7 = 22.2) +
(B+: 11 x 3.3 = 36.3) + (B: 9 x 3.0 = 27) + (B-: 6 x 2.7= 16.2) = 134.6. Then, one divides the sum by the
total number of students: 134.6/40 = 3.365 mean GPA.
212. See Daggett, supra note 115, at 400.
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nineteen 2.7s. 213 The difference in mean GPAs between these two classes is
more than three times what is permitted under my curve.214 Of course, such
dramatic differences are unlikely. But the critical point still holds: Median-
based systems are much more susceptible to manipulation than mean-based
systems.215 Thus, median systems are significantly less likely to remedy
grade disparities of the type that exist at the Bowen Law School.216
The second alternative is the "grade range" approach, under which
ranges are set for each available mark-e.g., 4% to 6% of the students must
receive an A+, 8% to 12% an A, 14% to 18% an A-, 23% to 27% a B+, 28%
to 32% a B, and 12 to 16% a B-. Like mean-based systems (and unlike me-
dian-based systems), grade range systems do sufficiently control professor
discretion with respect to the overall value of grades given. However, grade-
range systems are generally less flexible than mean-based and median-based
systems. In other words, while median-based curves permit too much discre-
tion, grade-range curves do not provide enough. Most grade-range systems
are based on a normal distribution. But the students at a given school might
not be normally distributed in ability or work ethic.2 17 Moreover, smaller
classes are much less likely to consist of students who reflect a normal dis-
tribution.21 8 Mean-based systems do not cause any problems when student
performance in a given class does not reflect a bell curve.2 19
213. In each of these classes, the median falls within the range because when there are an even
number of marks, "the median is the midpoint between the two middle scores." Id. at 402 n.3 1.
214. Since my proposed curve sets a mandatory range of 3.2 to 3.4, the maximum permissible
difference between two required courses and between two electives with more than thirty students is 0.2.
But the difference between the two classes in my median-system example is 0.7225. For the high class,
the mean GPA is 3.685: (4.0 x 19 = 76) + (3.4 x 21 = 71.4) = 147.4; 147.4/40 = 3.685. For the low class,
the mean GPA is 2.9625: (3.2 x 21 = 67.2) + (2.7 x 19 = 51.3) = 118.5; 118.5/40 = 2.9625; 3.685 -
2.9625 = 0.7225. Note that a mandatory median of 3.3 would restrict professors more than a median of
3.2 to 3.4. But it would still fall well short of a mandatory mean of 3.2 to 3.4.
215. See Stake, supra note 155, at 588 n.Il ("[M]edians can be easier for a teacher to manipulate in
undesirable ways. One thing a teacher can do is shift the grades of some students above the median to
higher grades without shifting the median .... Another undesirable thing a teacher might do in response
to a forced median is just change the grades of a few students near the median, rather than shifting the
whole grading scale to meet the mandate. It is harder to shift the mean by changing the grades of only a
few students because the amount the mean changes is the total shift divided by the number of students.");
JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 241 (explaining that this type of manipulation actually happened at one law
school); see also Daggett, supra note 115, at 402 ("The mean is the best measure of central tendency
unless the distribution is skewed (meaning scores tended to be clustered disproportionately at the high or
low end of the range); in that case, the median is the best measure.").
216. See Keating, supra note 9, at 185 (explaining that mandatory median systems give professors
too much discretion and that the mandatory median at the author's law school failed to prevent problem-
atic "variations in the distribution of grade-wealth").
217. Stake, supra note 2, at 599-600 (explaining two reasons why students at many schools may not
reflect a normal distribution).
218. Henderson, supra note 20, at 421 (explaining that in samples with fewer than thirty to forty-
five students, "statisticians would conclude that the sample would be insufficient to produce a normal
distribution"); Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 846 ("Students in small samples are less likely to be
distributed evenly."); see also Stake, supra note 2, at 601 ("For a class of thirty students, however, forc-
ing the scores onto a curve will be troublesome because some of the intervals will contain very few
students."); Leslie M. Rose, Norm-Referenced Grading in the Age of Carnegie: Why Criteria-Referenced
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Of course, the flexibility in setting the grade distribution that is permit-
ted by a mandatory mean is also a potential weakness. For example, two
professors teaching the same course might consistently give two different
types of distributions.220 Grade-range systems are less susceptible to this
problem.22" ' Nonetheless, I believe that few professors will consistently adopt
extreme grade distribution practices that might significantly compromise the
goals of a mandatory curve. And the danger can be limited by including
language in the forced curve policy recommending that professors typically
award grades via a normal distribution.222
Another concern with my proposed curve is the inclusion of a mean
range-under my proposal, 3.2 to 3.4. As I explained previously, 223 the pri-
mary purposes underlying such a range are (1) flexibility in setting grade
distributions to reflect variations in student accomplishment within a given
class, 4 and (2) preventing the curve from appearing unduly restrictive to
students and faculty. But what if one professor consistently aims for the top
of the range, while another regularly aims for the bottom? 225 That is actually
a weakness for all but the most rigid normalization systems. Even the bulk
of grade-range systems permit enough flexibility such that two professors
teaching the same course could regularly provide their students with differ-
ent levels of grade wealth. Under my proposal, I address this issue by setting
Grading Is More Consistent with Current Trends in Legal Education and How Legal Writing Can Lead
the Way, 17 LEGAL WRrrING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 123, 154 (2011) ("In addition, minimal differ-
ences between the students may be exaggerated under certain norm-referenced systems, particularly
when a certain percentage of each grade is mandated.").
219. Despite these issues, it should be noted that grade range systems are actually the most common;
mean-based curves are the second most popular. See Mroch, supra note 9, at 3-4 (in this 2005 AALS
study of grading policies, 145 ABA-accredited schools out of 188 reported their data to AALS; 115 had
formal grading policies; of those 115, 72 schools used the grade range approach, 52 used the mean GPA
approach, 28 used the median GPA approach, and 8 used some other alternative); Downs & Levit, supra
note 9, at 838 (reporting similar results for a survey conducted in 1996).
There are grade-range systems with substantial flexibility. See, e.g., Mroch, supra note 9, at 13
(setting forth an example), but such systems do not sufficiently cabin the discretion of graders. See Stake,
supra note 2, at 601 (noting that greater flexibility in each grade range can lead to major variations in
mean grades). There is also some indication in the literature that grade-range systems have statistical
problems unless standard deviation calculations are used. See, e.g., id. (explaining this issue).
220. Fines, supra note 20, at 893; see also Henderson, supra note 20, at 419 ("A few law schools do
realize the essential unfairness of mandating means for the law school curriculum, but not mandating
standard deviations.").
221. See also Stake, supra note 2, at 592-99 (arguing that standard deviations should be equalized
across all courses).
222. See E-mail from Lawrence S. Krieger, Clinical Professor, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, to
Author (Aug. 23, 2010, 9:06 AM CST) (on file with the author). However, I included no such recom-
mendation in my proposal. See infra Appendix 2.
223. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
224. For example, in a doctrinal course, the range makes it easier for professors to assign grades that
reflect genuine differences in raw scores among the students.
225. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 420.
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3.3 as an aspirational target within the 3.2 to 3.4 range.226 Thus, consistently
awarding grades at the low or high end of the range is not compatible with a
good faith application of the system. My hope and belief is that professors
who consciously attempt to defeat the goals of a grade normalization
scheme will be rare.
A mandatory curve based on mean GPA provides the best balance. It
restricts professors sufficiently to avoid unjustified grade disparities and
provides the flexibility necessary in classes where students are not normally
distributed.227
2. Altered Standards for Smaller Courses
Under the curve I proposed at my school, all required courses are
strictly governed by the 3.2 to 3.4 GPA range. The same is true for electives
with thirty or more students. Electives with nine to twenty-nine students are
governed by the range, subject to the following proviso: If the mean GPA of
all students enrolled in the course-based on prior course work at the law
school-is lower than 3.2 or higher than 3.4, the permissible grade range for
the course expands to encompass the students' incoming mean GPA aver-
age, plus 0.1 GPA points if the incoming mean GPA average is greater than
3.4, and minus 0.1 GPA points if the incoming mean GPA average is lower
than 3.2. For example, if the combined GPA of the students enrolled in a
course is 3.5, then the GPA range for the course is 3.2 to 3.6. If the com-
bined GPA of the students enrolled in a course is 3.1, then the GPA range
for the course is 3.0 to 3.4. Electives with eight or fewer students are gov-
erned by the same rules as those with nine to twenty-nine students, except
the curve switches from mandatory to recommended.228
The reason behind the altered standard for smaller courses is statistical.
A mandatory curve must be adjusted when applied to classes in which the
pupils are not representative of the overall student population. Under the
Central Limit Theorem, the danger of this happening becomes statistically
226. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 831 ("Indeed, those schools which have a range, but no
target within the range, may permit significant differences in grading standards and results which are not
accounted for by chance."); see also id. at 838-39 (discussing law schools that use a combination of a
required range and an aspirational target).
227. See JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 243 ("In my opinion, carefully designed constraints on mean
course grades provide the most comprehensive solution to the problems associated with disparities in
grading practices."). There is also an important administrative argument in support of mean GPA sys-
tems. As discussed in Part VI.A.2., infra, the required GPA range shifts up or down in small classes
when the incoming GPA of the students is higher than 3.4 or lower than 3.2. It is easier to determine how
much the curve should be changed when the measure of student quality that is the basis for such a change
(mean GPA) and the standard that sets the parameters of the mandatory curve (mean GPA) are the same.
228. See infra Appendix 2.
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significant when the course enrollment falls under roughly thirty students.229
In other words, in classes with fewer than thirty members, there is a statisti-
cally significant likelihood that the registered students will be above or be-
low average when compared to the student body as a whole.130 Recognizing
this problem, many schools consider the number of students enrolled in de-
termining whether and how the curve applies to the course.23'
There are two principal ways to address the concern about representa-
tive samples. The first is to exempt courses with under thirty students from
the mandatory curve.232 However, this creates significant fairness problems.
Most law schools offer so many courses with an enrollment under thirty that
excluding such courses would severely weaken the curve's corrective effect
on the problem of grade disparities.233
For example, at the Bowen Law School, in the fall of 2010, we offered
forty-three elective courses open to second and third-year students-twenty-
one in the day program and twenty-two in the evening program. Of these
229. See, e.g., Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 835 ("The Central Limit Theorem suggests that as a
'rule of thumb' a sample of thirty is reasonably sufficient to reduce the probability that differences
among samples are accounted for by chance."); E-mail from Allen Kamp, Professor of Law, The John
Marshall Law School, to Author (Feb. 3, 2010, 7:37 PM CST) (on file with the author) ("[l]t is a rule of
thumb in statistics that you can't use a population of 30 or less ... because the 30 would not be represen-
tative of the general student population."); Stake, supra note 2, at 591 n.19 ("Thirty to thirty-five obser-
vations is a typical rule of thumb used in statistics to distinguish between large and small samples. But
the number of degrees of freedom and the nature of the sample are important too."); see also Daggett,
supra note 115, at 399 n.21 ("According to the central limit theorem, law school exam scores will ap-
proximate a bell curve the larger the group being measured."); Henderson, supra note 20, at 421
("[S]tatisticians typically assume that when the number of items sampled is greater than thirty to forty-
five, the samples from most populations would include a wide enough range of samples to approximate a
normal curve. Below this number, statisticians would conclude that the sample would be insufficient to
produce a normal distribution."). Interestingly, of the schools that exempt small courses from their curve
or apply a different standard to such classes, the mean class size used to distinguish a "small" course is
only twenty students. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 840.
230. See also Daggett, supra note 115, at 400 (observing that smaller classes are more likely to be
populated by a disproportionate number of top students); Stake, supra note 2, at 591 ("In the second and
third years better students may gravitate to some courses, and lesser students to others. If that happens,
forcing teachers to a single mean could easily increase miscommunication rather than decreasing it.").
Professor Stake offers the following example that helps to illustrate the point. At many law schools, the
course on federal jurisdiction gets disproportionately talented students. Strictly applying a mandatory
curve to that type of class is unfair since the students are likely to perform better than those in other
courses. Such application will deter average and weaker students from taking the class. These students
will rationally conclude that they are probably going to finish near the bottom of the course, which means
they will receive particularly low grades since the more talented students will earn the bulk of the high
and average grades. See Stake, supra note 2, at 591; see also Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 845 (offer-
ing additional examples).
231. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 840 ("Forty-six schools explicitly considered the size of the
course as either one or the only determinant of whether the policy applied; forty of these schools speci-
fied a particular number. . . . There seemed to be general recognition, expressed in various different
ways, that small enrollment or self-selected groups may not reflect the school as a whole.").
232. See id. at 846 (noting that some schools exempt courses with fewer than thirty, forty, or fifty
students).
233. For additional discussion of whether small courses should be exempt from mandatory curves,
see infra Part VI.B. 1.
IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY CURVES
classes only six in the day division and four in the evening division had
more than thirty students. If courses with less than thirty enrolled were ex-
empted from the curve, then the curve would have virtually no impact on the
unjustifiable grade disparities in upper-level courses at my law school; such
an exemption would eviscerate the corrective effect of the policy. Moreover,
it might actually discourage students from taking bar classes since those
electives tend to exceed thirty members. Students would focus on the
smaller classes excluded from the curve, since grades in those classes would
likely be higher than in courses subject to the policy. 234 For the same reason,
exempting courses with fewer than thirty members also disadvantages stu-
dents who are interested in the most popular topics.
The second method for dealing with the problem of unrepresentative
course registrants is to use the mean GPA of the students enrolled in the
course-based on their prior work at the law school-to shift or expand the
mandatory GPA range.235 As explained above, under my proposal, if the
students' incoming GPA is higher than 3.4-i.e., if the enrolled students are
above average performers-the instructor is permitted to give higher grades
reflecting the capacities of the students. Similarly, if the students' incoming
GPA is lower than 3.2-i.e., if the enrolled students are below average per-
formers-this approach provides similar flexibility. Note that because my
proposal advocates expanding the mandatory range rather than simply shift-
ing it, there is no mandate that professors give grades outside the 3.2 to 3.4
range. Above average students do not automatically get the benefit of their
prior superior performance. And below-average students are not locked into
lower grades based on their previous academic history. 6 The GPA range
expansion simply gives professors greater flexibility in assessing the output
of the students.
234. See Keating, supra note 9, at 190 ("Everyone knows that the absence of forced grade stan-
dardization in small classes would invariably lead to lots of grade-wealth-per-student being distributed in
these small classes, along with all of the attendant collective action problems that occur in an unregulated
grading environment.").
235. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 846 ("One solution to the problem of probable non-
random distribution of students is to set the grade normalization target mean or range of acceptable
means at a level which reflects the actual ability of the students in the course. This can be done by using
the mean of student grade averages of the class members compiled for all prior law school course
work.").
236. Professors Downs & Levit noted that some students at UMKC School of Law were strongly
opposed to a system that uses incoming GPA to shift the permissible mean up or down because "such a
system would allow the 'rich to get richer' while "[t]he weaker students would continue to pull them-
selves down by their prior performances." Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 846 n.56; see also Georga-
kopoulos, supra note 8, at 454 (contending that a mean-shifting system harms slow learners who perform
poorly early in their legal education). While Professor Epstein has offered a powerful rejoinder to this
concern, his argument centers on student course selection. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 709-10. When
issues of fairness and student motivation are considered, the expanded-range approach is superior to the
shifted-range approach.
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Note further that this approach does not allow an expansion of the GPA
range based on the subjective assessment of the professor, for all the reasons
discussed previously about the limited value of an individual professor's
personal belief that his students performed better or worse than average.237
Only objective, reliable data that the students are not representative can jus-
tify expanding the mean range, and the GPA of the course enrollees is the
only such data we have.238
Using the incoming mean GPA to shift or expand the permissible grade
range is preferable to excluding small courses from the curve because the
former avoids the unfairness that results from a complete exemption while
addressing the danger that courses with less than thirty students are not rep-
resentative of the full student body.239 This second approach has been de-
fended by multiple scholars24 ° and has been adopted by many law schools,
2 41
including at least one school that uses the approach of expanded rather than
shifted ranges.242
One objection to shifting or expanding the grade range based on prior
course work is that upper-level courses may not test precisely the same
skills and abilities as first-year classes. If that is so, then "[r]elying on past
grades to predict performance (and to control grade allocations in future
classes) is unfair to those students whose greater abilities are not tested or
revealed (or developed) until later in the education process. 243 While I
doubt that more than a few upper-level courses are sufficiently different
from the first-year curriculum to justify this concern, I cannot discount the
worry entirely. But even assuming that the objection has merit, the mean-
expanding system I recommend is clearly the lesser evil. There is little ques-
tion that more overall unfairness will result if a mandatory curve is applied
237. See supra Part V.A.
238. See supra note 76.
239. Keating, supra note 9 at 190 ("[A]pplying the forced standardization (particularly when ad-
justed to account for the past performance of those in each group) is still superior to a system of unregu-
lated grading for small classes.").
One small concern with the way I designed the mechanism is that if the combined GPA of the
students in a course is 3.39, the GPA range for the course is 3.2 to 3.4. But if the combined GPA is 3.41,
the GPA range for the course is 3.2 to 3.51. Of course, this is not ideal. I felt, however, that the type of
curve structure necessary to avoid a small unfairness like this would have unduly complicated my pro-
posal, reducing the prospects of its passage. Nonetheless, I do support a curve structure that would re-
solve this unfairness issue.
240. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7, at 709-10; Stake, supra note 2, at 589 ("The best way out of
this dilemma is to set the average grade for the regular students according to their GPAs in previous
course work.").
241. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 7, at 420 (detailing the policy at one school that uses "a fixed
class mean in larger classes but sets a population-specific mean for smaller classes" based on the "cumu-
lative grade point average to date of the students in the class."); FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OF LAW ACADEMIC RULES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES § 4.3, available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/current-students/rules/grading.pdf (same); LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL GRADING
POLICIES, supra note 50 (same).
242. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 846 (explaining the approach of that school).
243. Fines, supra note 20, at 895.
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in an unadjusted fashion to small courses than if my expansion system is
used. And there is essentially no doubt that exempting classes under thirty
students entirely will be worse than using the mean-expansion approach.
One other option for dealing with the statistical problems that arise in
applying mandatory curves to small classes deserves brief attention. Some
schools expand the mean range both up and down in all small classes.2"
Since smaller groups are statistically more variable, expanding the mean
range in this way makes some sense.245 The weakness of such an approach is
that it is not sufficiently targeted. All small courses are covered, including
those where there is little basis to believe the enrollees are not representative
of the broader student body. The approach I recommend is tailored to
course-specific student populations.
It should be noted that, under the Central Limit Theorem, a sample of
thirty is only considered appropriately representative when the sample is
selected randomly. Registration for elective classes is not random.246 Indeed,
registration for required courses is often not random. 247 There is thus a dan-
ger that a class with more than thirty students will be non-representative.
Applying the mean-shifting or mean-expansion system to all classes, regard-
less of size, would resolve this concern. At least one school has adopted that
approach. 48 Ultimately, my belief is that the danger of a course with more
than thirty students being unrepresentative is not sufficiently high to neces-
sitate applying the mean-expansion system to all electives, at least at law
schools like the one where I teach. Registration operates in a sufficiently
random fashion to make the Central Limit Theorem applicable for practical
purposes. Only in rare cases-such as the course on federal jurisdiction at
many law schools-will there be a genuine danger that a class with more
than thirty students is populated by an unrepresentative group.249
With that said, in an ideal world, I would have recommended that my
faculty apply the mean-expansion system to all non-first-year courses, re-
244. E.g., UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER STUDENT HANDBOOK 18 (2006), available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/student/Handbook.pdf (establishing a mandatory mean of 2.9 to 3.1 in large
courses and 2.8 to 3.2 in small classes).
245. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 709 (explaining that the author's school adopted the expanded
range approach because of the statistical variability concern).
246. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 845 ("Indeed, where students self-select, either their
course or section, the usual assumption of randomness is inappropriate.").
247. For example, at the law school I attended, Constitutional Law was a required second-year
course. But there were four sections, each taught by a different professor. Thus, students had some flexi-
bility in choosing their Constitutional Law instructor. Even first-year courses are sometimes not random.
At the Bowen Law School, we have two first-year sections-a day section and a night section. The
students are not randomly placed into one section or the other. Because admitted students tend to prefer
the day section, the students in that section frequently have stronger admission statistics than those in the
night section.
248. See Mroch, supra note 9, at 65; see also Keating, supra note 9, at 187 (explaining that the
author proposed this approach at his law school).
249. Federal Jurisdiction has never had more than thirty enrollees at Bowen.
2012]
UALR LAW REVIEW
gardless of size and regardless of whether the class was required or an elec-
tive. Applying the mechanism to every upper-level course with eight or
more students safeguards against the mandatory curve harming any non-
representative class populations. I did not make this recommendation at my
institution on political grounds. I feared it would cause too much opposition.
But I believe it is the optimum approach.
A note regarding courses with less than nine students is in order. While
the incoming-mean-GPA system works with courses between nine and thirty
students, I have some concerns about its efficacy in the smallest courses.
Small groups behave less predictably,25° creating a greater potential for sub-
stantial variations in student performance each year.2 1 Thus, additional
flexibility is warranted.252 However, over time, "any given teacher's mean in
such classes ought to fluctuate around the school average and not be biased
in one direction or the other., 253 Some grade normalization is thus justified
in very small courses, and that is why my proposal made the curve recom-
mended in classes with eight or fewer students,254 rather than not applying it
at all.
I chose the precise number--eight or fewer-for several reasons. To
begin with, it is clear that a curve cannot be applied effectively to tiny
courses-say, those with one, two, or three students-without having a
number of pernicious effects. For example, if the course has just one stu-
dent, that student's grade will essentially be set by the curve before the
course begins. With two or three students, the grades of each member will
be too heavily contingent upon the performance of others in the class. It is
difficult to determine at precisely what point these types of effects are no
longer a concern. My intuition is that it is around five or six. Eight thus pro-
vides some cushion.255
250. Stake, supra note 2, at 592.
251. Id. at 590 n. 16 ("Substantial year-to-year variation is likely only in very small classes, or when
admissions standards have changed."),
252. Id. at 592 ("[A] school's grading constraints might properly allow greater variation in the
average grade in small classes.").
253. Id. at 592.
254. See Mroch, supra note 9, at 21 (describing a school that changes the curve from mandatory to
recommended once enrollment falls below twelve students; note, however, that the recommendation is
very strong-"there should still be a reasonable distribution of grades unless there are very unusual
circumstances (e.g., only top students are enrolled)"); see also id. at 67 (describing a school that distin-
guishes between courses with more than twenty students, thirteen to twenty students, nine to twelve
students, and eight or fewer students); HOUSTON LAW CENTER STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note 244, at
18 (setting different mandatory standards for (1) first-year courses and upper-level courses with more
than twenty students, (2) "small classes" with eleven to twenty students, and (3) seminars, and a recom-
mended standard for (4) "very small classes" with ten or fewer students).
255. Cf E-mail from Professor Cyn Yamashiro, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles), to Annette R.
Appell and Melissa Swain (Feb. 20, 2010, 6:58 PM CST) (on file with the author) ("I believe that for a
credible curve using a workable standard deviation, you need at least 8 students.").
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On the other hand, I am firmly opposed to a number that is any higher
than eight. Grade disparities involving Bowen's smaller classes have been
deeply problematic. For example, seminar courses (i.e., paper classes) at my
institution are restricted to sixteen or fewer students, and most have between
twelve and sixteen enrolled. Professors in these classes regularly award
much higher grades than in other classes. Moreover, differences among the
seminars have been dramatic. 56 Our law school is not alone in suffering
from these types of problems with seminars.257 Setting the line at eight ad-
dresses this and similar situations.
B. The Scope of Mandatory Curves
For a mandatory curve to accomplish its purpose, the curve must apply
to virtually all courses. Limiting the scope of the curve "undermine[s] the
equity goal '2'58 because grade disparities will likely develop (1) among ex-
empted courses, and (2) between covered and exempted classes.259 These
disparities will also compromise the aim of motivating students to register
for courses on substantive grounds. Students will have an incentive to select
classes exempted from the policy in the hope of receiving higher grades.2 °
Indeed, according to a student at one law school whom I have spoken with,
third-year students at this person's institution regularly press second-year
students not to register for a course if adding members to the course will
subject it to the institution's grade normalization policies.
Nonetheless, arguments are frequently made that certain types of
classes should be exempt from mandatory curves. This subpart responds to
256. See supra Part III.
257. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 9, at 190-91 (Committee report recommending adoption of a
mandatory curve noted in part: "The Committee unanimously believes that seminars should be treated
the same as regular courses for grading purposes. The tremendous discrepancy between grades in semi-
nars and regular courses and among seminars is perceived as a grossly inequitable part of our current
system, and we agree.").
The reader may have noticed that the mandatory portion of my curve applies to required courses
with fewer than eight students. Such courses are rather rare in legal education. But there is one class at
Bowen that fits into this category-an upper-level, skills course with seven to eight students per section,
taught by adjuncts, known as "Law Skills II." The grade disparities in that class have been particularly
egregious. As a result, I concluded that any harm caused by applying the curve to Law Skills II would be
outweighed by the benefit of consistent grades across sections of the course.
258. Fines, supra note 20, at 893.
259. See Keating, supra note 9, at 190 ("Everyone knows that the absence of forced grade stan-
dardization in small classes would invariably lead to lots of grade-wealth-per-student being distributed in
these small classes, along with all of the attendant collective action problems that occur in an unregulated
grading environment.").
260. Fines, supra note 20, at 900 ("Competitive students may no longer be shopping for the 'easy
graders' but they are quite likely to shop for the courses to which the normalization policies do not apply
or to arrange their schedules with a percentage of pass/fail credits so as [to] maximize their investment in
and chances for beating the curve in their graded classes.").
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such contentions with respect to smaller classes and classes that do not fol-
low the "traditional" model of Socratic lecturing and a final exam.
1. Mandatory Curves Should Apply to Smaller Courses
Some believe that courses with a low enrollment should be excluded
from grade normalization entirely. Law Schools have taken varying posi-
tions on this issue.26 1 Some schools exempt courses that fall below a certain
enrollment level.262 Others apply a mandatory curve or other normalization
policies to all classes regardless of size.2 63 However, at many institutions in
the latter category, the curve operates under different parameters in smaller
courses. For example, some shift or expand the grade range based on the
incoming GPAs of the students,264 as I recommend. At other schools, the
permissible GPA range is wider in all small courses.265 And at still others,
the curve is automatically shifted up in smaller sections.266
There are two arguments typically offered by supporters of the view
that low enrollment courses ought to be entirely exempt from mandatory
curves or other grade normalization. The first focuses on the problem of
26261 asrepresentative samples.267 As explained above, once class size falls below
thirty pupils, there is a statistically significant danger that the enrolled stu-
261. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 836, 840 (In this 1996 survey, 97 of 116 schools respond-
ing had some type of grade normalization policy, and of the 97, 46 "explicitly considered the size of the
course as either one or the only determinant of whether the policy applied.").
262. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 840; Mroch, supra note 9, at 7; see, e.g., Grading & Ranking,
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SCHOOL OF LAW, available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/Students/Academics/Grading.aspx#itContent (exempting courses with
fifteen or fewer students).
263. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 840; Mroch, supra note 9, at 7; see, e.g., Academic Policies,
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, § I.H., available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/academics/policiesmarch20l .pdf (all courses, regardless of size, are
governed by the mandatory curve); PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ACADEMIC POLICY 14,
available at http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/content/
academicpolicystatement-post-8.1.09.pdf (same); Academic Regulations, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://www.law.ku.edu/academics/regulations.shtml (same).
264. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text; supra notes 241-242 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Law School Rules, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL, § 2.07, available at
http://www.law.wisc.edu/current/rules/chap2.html (In required courses and electives with more than
thirty students, the mean GPA must fall between 2.85 and 3.1; in electives with thirty or fewer students,
the mean GPA must fall between 2.7 and 3.3); HOUSTON LAW CENTER STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note
244, at 18 (establishing a mandatory mean of 2.9 to 3.1 in large courses and 2.8 to 3.2 in small classes).
266. See, e.g., PENN STATE UNIVERSITY DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW GRADING NORMS (on file
with the author) (mandatory mean of 2.9 to 3.1 on 4.0 scale in required courses, 2.9 to 3.2 in large elec-
tives, and 3.0 to 3.6 in seminars and small classes); Grading Guidelines, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
SCHOOL OF LAW, available at http://www.law.pitt.edu/students/policies/grading (recommended median
of B in large classes and B+ in small classes); Mroch, supra note 9, at 9, 13, 84 (listing the grading
policies of three schools that follow this approach).
267. See also Fines, supra note 20, at 893 ("The first rationale exempts small classes from a curve
because these classes do not provide a statistically significant sample-there is less likely to be a random
distribution of ability in these classes, so we cannot expect a curve to result.").
268. See supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
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dents will not be representative of the student body as a whole. This argu-
ment has little force when applied to curves like the one I proposed at my
school: In courses with under thirty students, the mean, incoming GPA of
the enrolled students may be used to expand the permissible grade range.
And in electives with fewer than nine students, the curve shifts from manda-
tory to recommended. These mechanisms substantially resolve the concern
that a small class might have an unrepresentative selection of students.
The second argument is that students perform better in smaller classes,
and thus professors should be free to award higher grades in those
courses. 269 In regard to the first part of this argument, there is much aca-
demic literature supporting the conclusion that lower student/teacher ratios
enhance student performance.2 70 However, the second step of this argument
does not follow from the first. The fact that smaller classes promote greater
achievement does not justify awarding higher grades in such classes. Stu-
dents perform better in small classes primarily because of the structure of
the class, 271 not for reasons relating to merit, such as aptitude or work ethic.
Thus, awarding higher grades in small classes is unfair.
To elaborate, a lower student-teacher ratio facilitates class discussion
and increases student-teacher interaction.272 It also creates more opportuni-
ties for assessment and feedback. Put more simply, smaller classes often
force students to work harder; thus, they learn more and perform better.
2 73
That is a significant benefit, to be sure. But it has little to do with student
merit. The students work harder and perform better because of the structure
of the class, not because they are better students than those in larger
courses. 
274
269. Fines, supra note 20, at 894 (describing this argument) ("This rationale accepts the legitimacy
of higher grades when instructional effectiveness is higher.").
270. See, e.g., DAVID W. GRISSMER ET AL., IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: WHAT STATE
NAEP TEST SCORES TELL Us at xxv-xxx (2000) (concluding that smaller class sizes correlate with
improved performance by students); ELIZABETH WORD ET AL., THE STATE OF TENNESSEE'S
STUDENT/TEACHER ACHIEVEMENT RATIO (STAR) PROJECT: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT 1985-1990
(1990) (finding a significant causal relationship between reducing class size and improved student per-
formance); id. at 17 (concluding that "[s]tudents in small classes have higher performance than regular
and regular/aide classes in all locations and at every grade level"); see also Note, Federal Funding for
Newcomer School: A Bipartisan Immigrant Education Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 799, 818 n.l Il
(2007) (collecting authorities). But see Fines, supra note 20, at 894 n.74 (noting that the research on this
subject "is complex and somewhat contradictory").
271. See generally National Center for Research on Early Childhood Education, Promoting Chil-
dren's School Readiness: Rethinking the Levers For Change, NCRECE IN FOCUS, Vol 1., Issue 1, at 1
(Feb. 2010), available at http://ncrece.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/NCRECEInFocus-vlnl.pdf (referring to smaller class size as a "structural
feature" that impacts learning).
272. See Riebe, supra note 164, at 333.
273. But see Keating, supra note 9, at 190 ("Some faculty will insist that students work harder in
smaller classes, but I fail to see how an individual professor is in a reliable position to assess this.").
274. Put in slightly different terms, if students perform better in smaller classes for reasons that are
separate from merit, the instructor ought to hold these students to a higher standard than those in larger
courses. The pupils in the small class should have to accomplish more to warrant the same grades. Ap-
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Consider the following example which helps to illustrate the unfairness
in allowing better grades in small courses. Suppose Professor X chooses to
teach a large, doctrinal, first-year course in sections that fall below the
school's size threshold for the applicability of grade normalization, while
Professor Y teaches the same course without sectioning. Should the students
in the sectioned class receive higher grades?275 By luck of the draw, they
were assigned to a class in which they will probably work harder and possi-
bly perform better. Do they deserve better marks because, by chance, they
ended up in X's class rather than Y's? Do Y's students deserve worse grades
because, simply by a roll of the dice, they ended up in the non-sectioned
class?
Here is another example. My law school has both a day program and a
night program. If we were to mark the cutoff for application of a curve at
any point above ten students, we would penalize the day students vis-A-vis
the night students because night courses generally have lower enrollments.
How would the day students at Bowen judge the fairness of such a system?
In essence, applying different standards in smaller classes creates un-
fairness when students do not have equal access to such classes.276 Without
similar access, a greater portion of grades is determined by "factors irrele-
vant to merit: ... flexibility in scheduling, . . . savvy in understanding the
enrollment process .... [and] luck in the course lottery., 277
Let me offer one, final example that illustrates the injustice in treating
smaller courses differently on any ground other than statistical necessity
when students lack comparable access to such classes. Suppose Professors Q
and R both teach the same large, first-year course with random enrollments.
Professor Q publishes the minimum number of articles necessary to remain
in good standing at the institution. Because of the time Q saves by writing
less, Q administers and grades five tests per semester, in addition to the fi-
nal. Q also uses the Socratic method extensively, calling on ten or more stu-
dents each class session. Professor R, who publishes more, has less time to
devote to grading, and thus gives only a final exam. R also uses the Socratic
method sparingly, preferring to lecture. Because of the professors' different
approaches to teaching and assessment, Q's students work substantially
harder than R's. If students deserve higher grades in small classes because
plying a mandatory curve to smaller courses effectively forces this result. My thanks to Professor Mat-
thew Silverstein of New York University in Abu Dhabi for helping me develop this point. See also
Keating, supra note 9, at 189-90 ("Yet it would seem odd to foster a system in which students' overall
class standing should be in part a function of how many small classes they take.").
275. See Fines, supra note 20, at 894 (offering a similar example).
276. Fines, supra note 20, at 894 (noting that the equity rationale for mandatory curves is undercut if
certain smaller classes are exempted from the curve, but access to these classes is not equally distrib-
uted); see also Stake, supra note 2, at 592 (contending that if small classes are exempt from a curve,
"[c]are should be taken... to make sure ... that all students take the same number of hours in any group
of courses.").
277. Fines, supra note 20, at 894.
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they work harder and thus likely perform better, then Q's students deserve
higher grades than R's students for the same reason. But that is grossly un-
fair. R's students are being punished simply because they were randomly
assigned to a professor with different priorities. Do Q's students deserve
compensation for their additional work? Maybe so. But they are being paid
with greater knowledge. That provides them with a critical advantage over
R's students. Q's students are not entitled to further reward in the form of
higher grades. Note also that the force of this example is largely unchanged
if an upper-level elective is substituted for the first-year course. As I ex-
plained in Part IV.A.,278 students frequently have little control over who
their instructor will be in second and third-year classes.
Critically, the unfairness of using alternative grading policies in smaller
courses is not eliminated by procedures that guarantee equal access to such
classes. To illustrate, suppose Student A is worried about the bar exam. Stu-
dent A thus takes all of the bar courses at her law school, courses which tend
to have large enrollments. Student B is not worried about the bar exam, and
focuses on seminars and other small classes. Should A receive lower overall
grades than B because A is apprehensive about the bar? No. B may have had
to work harder in his courses, and thus might have learned somewhat more
than A did in her classes. But A should not be punished for emphasizing bar
courses in her education-courses that many schools strongly encourage
their students to take.279
Likewise, suppose that Student C is interested in the most popular sub-
jects, subjects which are taught in classes with large enrollments. Student D
has more idiosyncratic tastes and thus focuses on courses with smaller num-
bers of students. Should C receive lower overall grades than D because C
would like to learn the most popular subjects? Again, the answer is "no."
Why punish a student with lower grades because that student happens to be
interested in the most popular topics?
Admittedly, one might counter that some students take large classes so
they can avoid work by getting "lost in the crowd." And if grades are the
same in large and small courses, students will have less incentive to register
for the latter because they typically must expend greater effort in small
classes. To the extent these are concerns, though, we should directly encour-
age students to enroll in small courses-perhaps by mandating that students
take a certain number of such classes-rather than by giving higher grades
in smaller courses. The latter strategy penalizes students with legitimate
278. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
279. Similar reasoning defeats the argument that "pure electives" should be excluded in general
because the enrollees tend to be more interested in the subject matter and thus work harder. See Stake,
supra note 2, at 589 (setting forth this argument). Why should student A be punished for taking courses
she is less interested in because of a desire to better prepare for the bar exam, or for her likely field of
practice?
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reasons for enrolling in large classes, such as the desire to fully prepare for
the bar exam or interest in the most popular topics.
One might also reply that because Students B and D learned more in
some of their courses than Students A and C did in theirs, awarding similar
grades to these individuals will present inaccurate information to readers of
transcripts. For example, a potential employer might mistakenly conclude
that these students reached comparable levels of mastery in their courses.
But this argument fails for the same reasons it did in the context of the "su-
perior teaching" objection to mandatory curves: Any unfairness that is
caused by misinformation of this type is small in comparison to the unfair-
ness in awarding grades based on factors having little to do with student
merit-including factors beyond the control of students, such as the popular-
ity of certain subjects.28° Once again, our first duty as law professors is to
our students, not future employers and other consumers of transcript infor-
mation."'
What about the student who chooses to register for small electives be-
cause he wants to work harder? Maybe this describes students A and C.
Shouldn't they receive some benefit for their choices? Isn't the decision to
enroll in smaller courses reflective of an aspect of merit-a strong work
ethic? Yes. But A and C are receiving compensation for their choices in the
form of greater knowledge. As with Professor Q's students from the preced-
ing example, they do not deserve additional reward in the form of better
grades. Note also that Students B and D are receiving a different benefit-B
is learning more about bar exam topics, and D is learning more about the
most popular subjects. In other words, A, B, C, and D are receiving rewards
commensurate with their registration choices, independent of grades. This is
280. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
281. The reader may have noticed that sometimes I consider misinformation on transcripts to be
grossly unfair, and other times I treat it as only a small injustice. There is no inconsistency here. A single
principle is driving my superficially different conclusions: Grades should be determined, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable, by student merit. On the one hand, when misinformation is the result of factors
that have nothing to do with merit, I believe the misinformation is deeply unfair. For example, if students
Y and Z are randomly assigned to professors with different grading philosophies, and there is no manda-
tory curve in place, then transcripts will inaccurately convey that Y and Z differed in achievement, when
the difference was really in the grading standards of the professors. On the other hand, when misinforma-
tion is the unintended byproduct of a grade normalization policy designed to preserve the role of student
merit in the awarding of grades, the unfairness caused by the misinformation is of lesser concern. For
example, if Y is assigned to a section with an inferior teacher, leading Y to perform worse than Z, a
mandatory curve that requires the professors to award Y and Z the same grade will inaccurately convey
that Y and Z were equivalent in achievement, disguising the fact that Z performed better. But in this case,
the unfairness of such miscommunication is outweighed by the unfairness that would result if Y received
a lower grade than Z because of a roll of the dice in the registration process. In other words, when stu-
dents perform worse for reasons beyond their control (e.g., registration in required courses) or for rea-
sons that reflect legitimate academic choices (e.g., enrolling in bar courses or interest in the most popular
topics), allowing transcripts to reflect the lesser performance will divorce transcript information from
merit to a significantly greater degree than when a mandatory curve requires that similar grades be
awarded to differing levels of performance.
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all that is needed to ensure equity. Adding grades to the calculus is not only
unnecessary, it is decidedly unfair.
Five other arguments against exempting small courses from mandatory
curves are worth mentioning briefly. First, excluding such classes can evis-
cerate the corrective effect of grade normalization. As explained above,282 at
a school like Bowen, if courses with fewer than thirty students are not gov-
erned by the curve, the curve will do virtually nothing to address the prob-
lem of grade disparities in upper-level classes. We simply have too few elec-
tives with more than thirty members.
Second, as also discussed above, 83 it is more difficult for students to
overcome poor performance in the first year if a law school applies its curve
to a smaller proportion of upper-level classes. The grade inflation in second
and third-year courses exempted from the curve makes it harder for students
to improve their class rank later in their legal educations.
284
Third, there is a crucial line-drawing problem. Members of the faculty
at the Bowen Law School have proposed that critical learning thresholds are
crossed when class size falls below four, eight, sixteen, twenty-five, sixty,
eighty, and ninety-five students. If we exempt "small" classes based on
"greater learning" rather than based on statistical sampling concerns, where
should the cutoff be?2
85
Fourth, there are administrative problems with exempting smaller
courses. For example, suppose a student takes several exempt courses dur-
ing his second year, enabling him to raise his GPA. If this student takes
courses during his third year in which the class curve is based on the incom-
ing GPAs of the students, this might bias the curve upwards in those
classes.286
Fifth, accepting for the sake of argument that it is justifiable to treat
smaller courses differently because students perform better in them, exclud-
ing these classes from the curve is the wrong remedy. The proper response
is to use a higher mean range in these classes-e.g., 3.2 to 3.5 or 3.3 to
3.5-rather than the 3.2 to 3.4 range that applies in larger courses.287 Such
an approach allows grades to reflect superior achievement in small courses
282. See supra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
284. Georgakopoulos, supra note 8, at 446 & n.3.
285. Cf generally Mroch, supra note 9 (identifying schools that have drawn the line at 55, 50, 45,
40, 35, 30, 25, 20, 15, 12, 10). But see Fines, supra note 20, at 894 n.74 ("The research on class size and
its impact on learning is complex and somewhat contradictory. However, the most recent, well docu-
mented and designed research, indicates that in classes smaller than thirty students, a number of positive
changes in both teacher and student attitudes and behaviors occur.").
286. See Stake, supra note 2, at 592 (also explaining that this last administrative problem can be
remedied by not including grades from previously completed exempt courses in determining the class
GPA for purposes of setting the curve).
287. Of course, if the students' incoming GPAs fall outside this range, the range should be shifted
further, as justified by the statistical concerns discussed in Part VI.A.2., supra.
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while preventing (1) grade disparities among small classes, and (2) dramatic
grade variations between smaller classes and larger classes. If students per-
form better in smaller courses, the most that superior performance entitles
them to is a higher curve. It does not justify unregulated grading.
In conclusion, smaller classes ought to be governed by mandatory
curves.
2. Mandatory Curves Should Apply to Seminars, Clinics, and Skills
Courses
Some assert that seminars, clinics, and skills courses should be exempt
from grade normalization. As with the size issue, law schools are divided
here.288 Under the curve I proposed at my school, "non-traditional" courses
are subject to the same rules.289 Thus, in my system, seminars, clinics and
skills classes are only treated differently if they fall below the pertinent size
thresholds. That is because all other bases for providing special treatment to
such courses-or an outright exemption-are unpersuasive.
Perhaps the most common justification offered for excluding non-
traditional classes is that the students' close working relationship with the
instructor improves student performance. 290 For example, professors provide
more feedback in these courses and students often redo assignments based
on that feedback. This contention is identical to the second argument offered
for excluding small classes from mandatory curves: Because students per-
form better, they should receive higher grades. 29' And it is unpersuasive for
288. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 836, 840 (in this 1996 survey, 76 of 116 schools respond-
ing had formal grade normalization policies, and of the 76, "twenty-seven . . . treated paper courses,
seminars, skills courses, or research and writing courses by a different standard or exempted them from
the policy altogether"; some implicitly exempted such courses under their "size" policies); see also
Kaufman, supra note 7, at 416 (this 1993 survey of law school grading practices found that 91% "of the
respondents grade seminars on the same basis as other courses"). See, e.g., Mroch, supra note 9, at 41
(according to the policy of one school, "[tihe fact that a course involves a paper, a project, skills training,
or a heavy workload does not justify a deviation from the 3.3 median"); compare UNIVERSITY OF
KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW FACULTY RULES AND POLICIES, supra note 50, at § IX.A. (curve applies to
"every course and seminar"), with Grading Policy, THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW, avail-
able at http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/Grading-PolicyandRanking.pdf (mandatory curve is not
applicable to "seminars and other classes in which the student's grade is based primarily on the student's
performance on graded skills-oriented tasks (including writing) other than a final examination"). Note
that rather than exempting "non-traditional" classes, some schools apply the types of mechanisms used
with smaller classes, such as higher or expanded mean ranges. See Fines, supra note 20, at 894.
289. See infra Appendix 2.
290. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 845 ("There may also be classes in which the grade is
determined by a paper, which involves a degree of interactive work between professor and student and
perhaps successive refinements, or by the demonstration in a skills course of certain competencies."); E-
mail from Professor Annette R. Appell, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, to Melissa
Swain (Feb. 20, 2010, 6:59 AM CST) (on file with the author) (offering the same point in the clinic
context).
291. See supra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
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all the same reasons.292 Most importantly, granting that students do superior
work in seminars, clinics, and skills courses (an assumption that can be chal-
lenged in many cases), the better performance is a byproduct of the structure
of these classes, not merit.2
93
This justification for exemption is not strengthened by the fact that
clinical faculty, as explained by one of my clinic colleagues, have an obliga-
tion to ensure that their clients receive "A work., 2 9 4 The quality of work
ultimately performed for the client is not the same as the quality of work
performed by the student receiving the grade. Indeed, as this same colleague
admitted, the teachers in our clinic often "fill the gaps" left by the students.
A student's grade should be based on the student's performance, not the
work product of the teacher.
I also dispute the assumption that students always do superior work in
non-traditional courses. Every seminar teacher at Bowen Law School who
has shared their opinion with me on the subject believes that our students
actually perform worse in these classes than they do in doctrinal subjects.
Yet the grades in our seminars are almost uniformly higher than in doctrinal
courses. There is plainly no justification for this result.
A second reason frequently pressed for exempting seminars, clinics,
and skills classes is that grading in these courses is too subjective for curv-
ing. But it is difficult to see how grading in seminars, clinics, and skills
classes is any more subjective than the "gestalt" grading system many pro-
fessors use for essay exams in doctrinal courses. Indeed, given the subjec-
tive nature of "point" grading systems, assessment in seminars, clinics, and
skills courses is arguably no more subjective than essay grading in any doc-
trinal class. Professors in non-traditional courses can assess the quality of
rough drafts, student responsiveness to constructive criticism, class partici-
pation, client interaction, the quality of final drafts, and other aspects of
class performance. Students almost certainly vary across these dimensions.
That provides sufficient basis for distinguishing the students and implement-
ing a mandatory curve.29
In addition, students generally perform a larger number of assignments
in seminars, clinics, and skills courses than they do in doctrinal classes.
Teachers awarding grades in the former thus have substantially more infor-
292. See supra notes 271-287 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 271-281 and accompanying text.
294. See also E-mail from Professor Annette R. Appell, supra note 290 ("Still, I am nervous about
putting clinics on a rigid curve because my feeling is that if I am doing my job, everyone would be doing
high level work within a much smaller grade range .... ).
295. See E-mail from Professor Cyn Yamashiro, supra note 255 ("I am of the opinion that [a] stu-
dent's performance can be credibly evaluated and should be. Moreover, while what we do as clinical
faculty is much different, that doesn't mean that there aren't meaningful ways of assigning empirical
values to [a] student's performance."). My seminar-teaching colleagues at the Bowen Law School have
generally expressed the same point with respect to those courses.
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mation to work with. This makes assessment more reliable in non-traditional
courses. 96 Law professor Vanessa Merton, the director of the immigration
clinic at Pace Law School, explains this point well:
Isn't it obvious that the lowest-credit, least demanding clinical
program imaginable still provides the professor with probably
1000 times as many data points for evaluation as an average class-
room course? . . . During a semester, clinical students probably
submit five or ten or fifteen times as much written work for feed-
back and review by clinical professors as is submitted in class-
room courses . . . . Most clinical professors spend at least two
hours per week interacting with each student, either individually
or in pairs or very small groups .... This is not even to consider
the vastly broader range of assessment topics that clinicians can
use for evaluation.297
The more information we have available for assessing the abilities and work
product of students, the easier it should be to grade them according to a
mandatory curve. Greater levels of data provide additional bases for distin-
guishing the performances of our pupils, enabling faculty to distribute marks
in accordance with grade normalization requirements, even when using cri-
terion referencing.
A third (and related) argument for exempting non-traditional courses is
that the work product is too varied to make comparisons fruitful.298 As a
result, professors cannot accurately distinguish between better and worse
student output. For example, seminar students often write on dramatically
different topics. Additionally, as one of my clinic colleagues pointed out,
clinic students sometimes have clients with quite different needs. One stu-
dent may have a contested trial, while another never goes to court. One stu-
dent may have to research a novel legal issue, while another performs inten-
sive factual discovery. Despite these variations in output, the argument from
"variety" is unpersuasive on multiple grounds.
First, I fail to see how it is more difficult to compare performances in
legal seminars and clinics than in courses covering English, Political Sci-
ence, Philosophy, and the countless other subjects where teachers have little
296. See Lynn M. Daggett, Teaching Torts by Integrating Ethical, Skills, Policy and Real-World
Issues, and Using Varied Pedagogical Techniques: Reflections on Using the Henderson, Pearson and
Siliciano Casebook, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 63, 74-75 (2001) ("Multiple exams in varied formats maxi-
mize the reliability and validity of grades.").
297. E-mail from Professor Vanessa H. Merton, Pace University Law School, to Melissa Swain
(Feb. 21, 2010, 12:58 AM CST) (on file with the author).
298. See, e.g., Fines, supra note 20, at 893 ("Even if there is a random distribution of ability, many
seminar classes allow such a degree of flexibility in the products by which students are measured (e.g.
seminar papers) that we do not trust our ability to adequately differentiate student ability in these set-
tings.").
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trouble making distinctions. Students in these fields often complete assign-
ments that are quite different in topic and structure.
Second, my colleagues at the Bowen Law School who teach seminars
and clinics do not seem to have any trouble distinguishing among the per-
formances of their students. Several have expressly admitted to me that this
is not difficult, and their actual grade distributions support the point. Indeed,
the fact that so many clinical faculty have defended awarding letter grades
rather than pass/fail marks299 concedes that they can differentiate between
gradations of student performance. The real problem at my school (and
many others) is that seminar and clinical professors make all of the distinc-
tions at higher levels, rather than awarding marks across a broader range.
Third, as explained in response to the "subjectivity" argument, students
often perform more assignments in non-traditional courses. The greater
number of data points available to teachers in these classes compensates for
the variety in work product.
Fourth, the argument from "variety" proves too much. If it were cor-
rect, then I could assign papers in Contracts instead of administering a final
exam and claim exemption from the curve because my students all wrote on
such different topics that I could not tell which ones were better or worse.
This makes no sense.
The "subjectivity" and "variety" arguments for excluding non-
traditional courses from mandatory curves are really arguments for eliminat-
ing grades entirely in these classes. If grading in a particular field is too sub-
jective, or if the work product is too varied to permit valid comparisons,
what basis could a teacher possibly have for giving the students grades at
all, other than perhaps "pass/fail?" Grading within a course is inevitably
comparative. If a teacher awards Student X an A and Student Y a B, the
teachers is necessarily stating that X performed better than Y. But giving X
a higher mark than Y is only justifiable when the professor can validly dis-
tinguish among the performances of the students. The arguments from sub-
jectivity and variety deny that such distinctions are possible. Therefore,
these objections to applying mandatory curves in seminars, clinics, and
skills courses are actually objections to the usage of standard grading prac-
tices in non-traditional classes. Under the proposal I made to the Bowen
Law School, pass/fail courses are (obviously) exempted from the mandatory
curve. If seminar, clinic, and skills course professors want an exemption
from grade normalization, they should request a shift to pass/fail grading.3°°
299. See, e.g., E-mail from Professor Vanessa H. Merton, supra note 297; E-mail from Professor
Cyn Yamashiro, supra note 255 (explaining that clinics should be graded rather than pass/fail because
student performance "can be credibly evaluated" and there are "meaningful ways of assigning empirical
values" to student performance).
300. My thanks to Professor Matthew Silverstein of New York University in Abu Dhabi for helping
me develop this argument. For a related perspective on this issue, see JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 236
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Finally, I want to relay some experiences I had in private practice that
support the proposition that clinic and seminar work can be assessed on a
curve. During my time as a senior associate at a mid-size law firm, I regu-
larly worked with junior associates-attorneys zero to three years out of law
school. Since I was more senior, the management of the firm frequently
asked me to review these associates. I spent countless hours working with
these younger lawyers on every dimension of litigation. I suspect that I re-
viewed substantially more of their work than most clinic faculty review of
their students since my working relationships with these junior associates
stretched beyond one year. Critically, when it came time to perform the re-
views, I had no difficulty distinguishing between the A-type junior associ-
ate, the B-type junior associate, and even the C-type junior associate. If I
had needed to grade the junior associates on a curve, I could easily have
done so, even though virtually every one I worked with had capacities com-
parable to the best students I have seen as a professor. Indeed, there were
times I was asked to grade them on curve-primarily when we had to make
staffing decisions with respect to a new case. And my perspective is not
unique. All of the partners that I worked closely with graded associates (in-
cluding me) on a curve to a degree.
In sum, seminars, clinics, and skills courses should generally be gov-
erned by the same grade normalization policies as other types of courses.
VII. CONCLUSION
According to professors Robert Downs and Nancy Levit, "[g]iven the
overwhelming importance of grades in determining professional success and
influencing personal esteem, . . . it is essential that law schools design grad-
ing systems that are scrupulously fair."3 °1 I agree with this sentiment. Unfor-
tunately, no grading system is perfect. Every approach will have benefits
and costs. Thus, I do not believe that what I propose in this article is ideal or
free of problems. That is impossible for any grading system.302 In the field of
law, as elsewhere, academic assessment will always be a mixture of science
and art. Therefore, the standard "scrupulously fair" is best thought of as an
aspiration rather than a mandate. But it is an aspiration worth pursuing.3 3
(explaining that a professor's inability to distinguish the quality of work among students in a class does
not justify the awarding of higher grades to the students, it only justifies awarding every student the same
grade; further arguing that, in such a class, since all students "performed at an average level" all of them
should be "given average grades").
301. Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 820.
302. Numerous commentators have expressed this point. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 2, at 618 ("As-
sessment of student performance is never perfect. Choosing the types of instruments for measuring
performance will always involve tradeoffs.").
303. Stake, supra note 2, at 587 ("I assume that grading is never perfect.... Subjectivity in grading
will never be eliminated .... We should take due care to prevent the errors we can eliminate and mini-
mize the cost of the errors we cannot eliminate."); Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 857 (given that law
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And there are powerful arguments that a mandatory curve satisfies the
greatest set of educational values.
APPENDIX 1
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL GRADE DISPARITIES AT THE
WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW USING THE WELCH T-TEST
Introductory Notes.
a. This appendix contains statistical analysis supporting my conclusion
that the grade disparities listed in Part III generally flow from professor
grading philosophy rather than from substantive differences in student per-
formance. Note that some of the disparities listed in Part I were not ana-
lyzed on grounds of administrative convenience, and two were eliminated as
bad data for purposes of the type of statistical analysis conducted.
b. In order to establish the statistical relationship between the mean
GPAs of the classes in each class pair, a variation of the standard two tailed
t-test known as a Welch t-test was performed. 3°4 The Welch variation of the
t-test was chosen because it has the ability to compare sample sizes with
unequal variations. The data used to perform the t-test included both the
mean GPA of each course and the grade distribution for each course (i.e.,
the number of As, Bs, Cs, Ds, and Fs in the class).
c. The t-test was used to determine the probability that there was a sig-
nificant statistical factor driving the mean GPAs of both classes in each
class pair. Like all t-tests, the Welch t-test is designed to disprove a null
hypothesis. In this case, the null hypothesis is "there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference between the means of the classes in question." To test the
null hypothesis with respect to a pair of classes, the mean GPA and grade
distribution for both classes were used as the inputs in the t-test. The t-test
returns a p value. If the p value is less than .05, then the null hypothesis has
been disproven, and there is a 95% likelihood that the variation in the means
of the two classes was not random or due to sampling error.
d. If the t-test shows that the variation in the means of two classes was
probably not random or due to sampling error, then there is some factor the
two classes do not have in common that is driving the variation, such as
professor grading philosophy, course material, student interest in the sub-
ject, or difference in student abilities that might results from selection bias in
the course registration process. An example of the latter would be students
that are above average in ability disproportionately registering for an elec-
tive course, such as Federal Jurisdiction.
schools teach "the idealism of the way the world should work[,] ... [wie should strive to make the [grad-
ing] system as just as we possibly can").
304. See SARAH BOSLAUGH & PAUL ANDREW WATTERS, STATISTICS IN A NUTSHELL 151-68 (Mary
Treseler, ed. 2008) (containing a thorough description of t-tests).
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e. The p value of each class comparison is included in this appendix.
As the results illustrate, in every class comparison, the null hypothesis was
disproven. There are only two factors each class pair do not have in com-
mon that should play any significant role in explaining variation in the
means-professor grading philosophy and student abilities. While there is
certainly some bias in the registration process at the William H. Bowen
School of Law, the sample size of individual classes is generally large
enough such that differences in student abilities in the courses in each class
comparison should be relatively rare, especially in required courses, and
most especially in the class pairs where the students are largely the same in
both courses. Accordingly, the bulk of the variation in the means in each
class pair is probably caused largely by differences in professor grading
philosophy.
f. Due to the large number of samples and their widely disparate na-
ture, the standard deviations and degrees of freedom that are customarily
included with t-test results are omitted. In addition, the actual t-test calcula-
tions for each class comparison and the grade distributions for each course
are not included. The t-test was performed using a spreadsheet that is on file
with the author.
g. All data in this appendix is derived from grade reports produced by
the Associate Dean's office at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law.
h. The grade point averages listed for each course are mean grade
point averages. The number of students in each class is set forth in parenthe-
ses. An asterisk (*) denotes a required course. A caret (A) denotes a compos-
ite grade point average derived from two sections of the course taught by the
same professor.
1. First-Year Courses-Variances In Sections of the Same Course
Spring 2010
Legal Writing II* (27) = 3.361 vs. Legal Writing II* ^ (34) = 2.206-P value = .00000576
Legal Writing II* ^ (28) 3.101 vs. Legal Writing II* ^ (34) = 2.206-P value = .000056
Legal Writing 1* (29) = 3.034 vs. Legal Writing II* ^ (34) = 2.206-P value = .0001
Legal Writing jj*^ (33) = 2.768 vs. Legal Writing II*A (34) = 2.206-P value = .008
Fall 2009
Legal Writing * (29) = 3.440 vs. Legal Writing 1* (32) = 2.859-P value = .005
Legal Writing * (29) = 3.440 vs. Legal Writing I*^ (34) = 2.772-P value =.001
Spring 2009
Contracts 11* (59) = 3.134 vs. Contracts II* (91) = 2.750-P value = .0000139
Legal Writing II* (30) = 3.629 vs. Legal Writing II* (30) = 2.908-P value = .0000121
Legal Writing 11* (30) = 3.629 vs. Legal Writing 1* ^ (32) = 2.754-P value = .000000675
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Fall 2008
Torts* (92) = 3.269 (20 As) vs. Torts* (60) = 2.625 (2 As) -P value = .0000000475
Contracts 1* (92) = 3.128 (19 As) vs. Contracts 1* (60) = 2.825 (4 As)-P value = .002
Fall 2007
Contracts I (D) = 3.160 vs. Contracts I (N) = 2.839-P value = .0058
Legal Writing 1* (30) = 3.442 vs. Legal Writing I*A (31) = 2.751-P value = .0002
Spring 2007
Criminal Law* (84) = 3.176 vs. Criminal Law* (42) = 2.845-P value = .028
Legal Writing II* (19) = 3.276 vs. Legal Writing II*A (41) = 2.801-P value = .0 108
2. Upper-Level Courses-Variances in Sections of the Same Course
Spring 2010
Legal Profession* (33) = 3.273 vs. Legal Profession* (41) = 2.701-P value = .0001
Fall 2009
Const. Law* (57) = 3.482 vs. Const. Law* (86) = 2.781-P value =.000000704
Fall 2007
Evidence* (25) = 3.580 vs. Evidence* (57) = 3.035-P value = .00000069
Spring 2007
Legal Profession* (19) = 3.342 vs. Legal Profession* (71) = 3.007-P value =.005
Fall 2006
Evidence (16) = 3.422 vs. Evidence (76) = 2.572-P value = .00000000329
3. First-Year Courses-Variances Across Courses
Spring 2010
Contracts II* ^ (56) = 3.222 vs. Civil Procedure H* (94) = 2.774-P value = .00000031
Fall 2009
Torts*A (160) = 3.1955 vs. Property I*A (100) = 2.544-P value = .0000000000031
Fall 2008
Torts* (92) = 3.269 (20 As) vs. Civil Procedure 1* (92) = 2.717-P value = .000000121
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Fall 2007
Contracts 1* (96) = 3.160 vs. Torts (59) = 2.636-P value = .0000267
Spring 2007
Criminal Law* (84) = 3.176 vs. Property 11* (82) = 2.759-P value = .0000733
4. Upper-Level Courses-Variances Across Bar Courses
Spring 2010
Secured Transactions (56) = 3.442 vs. Decedents' Estates (63) = 2.968-P value = .0002
Fall 2009
Secured Trans. (45) = 3.611 vs. Commercial Paper (40) = 2.944-P value = .000000383
Spring 2009
Secured Trans, (55) = 3.421 vs. Commercial Paper (52) = 2.860-P value = .000000512
Secured Trans, (55) = 3.421 vs. Business Associations (66) = 2.742-P value = .000000257
Fall 2008
Secured Trans. (40) = 3.488 vs. Commercial Paper (33) = 2.727-P value = .000000334
Conflicts of Law (20) = 3.463 vs. Evidence* (35) = 2.764-P value = .000000257
Spring 2008
Business Associations (87) = 3.338 v. Sales (17) = 2.471-P value = .0047
Fall 2007
Sales (12) = 3.625 vs. Commercial Paper (66) = 2.845-P value = .0000324
Evidence* (25) = 3.580 vs. Business Associations (18) = 2.917-P value = .0024
Spring 2007
Secured Transactions (28) = 3.436 vs. Family Law (34) = 2.868-P value = .0002
Fall 2006
Conflicts of Law (32) = 3.227 vs. Business Associations (48) = 2.729-P value = .0404
5. Upper-Level Courses-Variances Across Electives
Spring 2010
Law Office Management (15) = 4.000 vs. Administrative Law (17) = 2.941 -P value = .0002
Public Health Law (10) = 4.000 vs. Civil Liberties (8) = 2.719-P value = .00238
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Fall 2009
Disability Law (20) = 3.632 vs. Poverty Law (38) = 3.000-P value = .00000468
Spring 2009
Real Estate Transactions (60) = 3.429 vs. Oil & Gas Law (35) = 2.707-P value = .0000469
Fall 2008
Adv. Torts: Media Law (27) = 3.852 vs. Jurisprudence (28) = 3.259-P value = .00000411
Spring 2008
Real Estate Transactions. (32) = 3.758 vs. Construction Law (11) = 3.023-P value = .0039
Fall 2007
Local Government Law (28) = 3.759 vs. Health Law (21) = 2.583-P value = .000031
Administrative Law (49) = 3.597 vs. Juvenile Law (32) = 2.570-P value = .000000000343
Spring 2007
Land Use (23) = 3.727 vs. Introduction to International Law (39) = 2.974-P value = .0009
Gov. Reg. of Business (39) = 3.667 vs. Fed. Income Tax (28) = 2.889-P value = .000039
Fall 2006
Bankruptcy Law (21) = 3.475 vs. Federal Income Tax (36) = 2.951-P value = .006
Intellectual Property (28) = 3.438 vs. White Collar Crime (65) = 2.906--P value = .0008
6. Upper-Level Courses-Variances Across Seminars
Spring 2010
Fourth Amendment (18) = 4.000 vs. Family Mediation (16) = 3.367--P value = .0000714
Fall 2009
Mediation (12) = 3.917 vs. Capital Punishment (16) = 3.266-P value = .0009
Spring 2009
Race & Criminal Justice (16) = 3.953 vs. Animal Law (19) = 3.197-P value = .0001
Spring 2008
Mediation (12) = 3.932 vs. Bioethics (16) = 3.469-P value = .0001
Fall 2006
Capital Punishment (16) = 3.797 vs. Law & Social Science (9) = 3.306-P value = .0331
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APPENDIX 2
THE MANDATORY CURVE PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE WILLIAM H. BOWEN SCHOOL OF LAW
This appendix sets forth the critical features of the mandatory curve I
presented to the faculty of the law school where I teach." 5 The faculty
adopted my proposal in the spring of 2011 (effective Fall, 2011), with only a
few, relatively minor changes. The appendix explains the changes as well.
A. Summary of Grading Scale and Basic Curve Features
4.0=A
3.9
3.8
3.7 =A-
3.6
3.5
3.4 Top of Mandatory Mean Range
3.3 = B+ Target Mean
3.2 Bottom of Mandatory Mean Range
3.1
3.0=B
2.9
2.8
2.7 = B- Good Standing GPA
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3 = C+
2.2
2.1
2.0 = C Lowest Credit Grade
1.9=F
1.8=F
1.7=F
1.6=F
1.5 = F Lowest Possible Grade
305. The information in this appendix is taken from two memos that I wrote, one to the full faculty
and one to the law school curriculum committee, of which I am a member. A few, minor features of my
proposal are not included because they are highly specific to our law school.
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B. Detailed Description of Grading Scale and Curve Features
Grades to Be Awarded. Professors will not award letter grades. Rather, pro-
fessors will award numerical grades ranging from 4.0 to 1.5. In other words,
the following grades shall be used: 4.0, 3.9, 3.8, 3.7, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2,
3.1, 3.0, 2.9, 2.8, 2.7, 2.6, 2.5, 2.4, 2.3, 2.2, 2.1, 2.0, 1.9, 1.8, 1.7, 1.6, 1.5.
Letter grades are listed only so that faculty, students, and employers will
know the approximate letter value of each numerical grade.3 °6
Mandatory Mean in Required Courses. For all required courses, the mean
GPA of final grades for the course must fall between 3.2 and 3.4, with a
target GPA of 3.3-i.e., the target mean is a B+.
Note: The grades of students (i) who receive an incomplete, (ii) who do
not take the final exam or otherwise do not finish the course require-
ments, or (iii) whose exams or other course work were not graded for
any reason (e.g., academic dishonesty) are not included in calculating the
mean GPA for a course.
306. Washington University in St. Louis uses a system similar to this. See Explanation of Grading
System, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS SCHOOL OF LAW, available at
http://Iaw.wustl.edu/Registrar/pages.aspxid=2236 (permitting every grade from 70 to 100).
Originally, I recommended a traditional letter grading system. However, for a variety of reasons,
I amended the proposal to incorporate number grades.
My proposal increased the number of grade levels to 26 from 10 under the previously existing
grading system. See UALR BOWEN LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC RULES, supra note 3, at 12. This is incon-
sistent with the trend among law schools, which has been towards fewer grade levels. Downs & Levit,
supra note 9, at 842. Professors Downs and Levit suspect the reason for the trend is that
[wie [professors] may have a greater comfort level in deciding between an A and a B than
we do with smaller increments. Our more generalized concerns about teaching ability and
technique, test crafting and scoring, and so on, may influence our willingness to make fine
distinctions among students where we fear no real difference exists.
Id.
However, a grading system with a large number of available marks is superior to a system where
there are fewer grades. As explained by Professor Stake, under a "coarse system"-i.e., one with few
levels-errors are large. Stake, supra note 2, at 608. For example, under the previous system at the Bo-
wen Law School, if a professor misgraded an exam, causing the student to move up or down a grade
level, the grade was off by 0.25 or 0.5. A finer grading scale-i.e., one with many grade levels-
"increases the number of errors but reduces the size of the errors." Id. (emphasis added). Under a system
in which every grade value to the tenth of a point may be awarded, if a professor misgrades an exam, the
grade will be off by only 0.1 (except in very rare cases). Stake explains that "[b]oth the theory of declin-
ing marginal utility of income and the actual and common sales of insurance suggest that the harm from
putting large losses on a few persons is worse than the harm from placing small losses on many persons."
Id. at 609. He also observes that GPA and class rank calculations support the finer system: "It seems less
likely that errors in grading will average out when the errors are large and infrequent than when they are
small and common." Id. at 609 n.55. Stake thus concludes that a finer grading system is superior. Id. at
609; accord Epstein, supra note 7, at 707; Keating, supra note 9, at 181-82 (1998); William K.S. Wang,
The Injustice of Reducing the Number of Levels in a Grading System, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423-26 (2007).
307. B+ is typically valued at 3.3 or 3.33 on a 4.0 scale.
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Note: Mean GPA shall be calculated based upon the final grade for the
course, including mid-terms, class participation, and any other graded
assignments; it is not calculated using just the final exam, final paper, or
other final project, unless that is the only manner in which the students
are evaluated.
Mandatory Mean in Elective Courses with Thirty or More Students. For all
elective courses with thirty or more students, the mean GPA for the course
must fall between 3.2 and 3.4, with a target GPA of 3.3.
Mandatory Mean in Elective Courses with Nine to Twenty-Nine Students.
For all elective courses with nine to twenty-nine students, the mean GPA for
the course must fall between 3.2 and 3.4, with a target GPA of 3.3, subject
to the following proviso. If the mean GPA of all students enrolled in the
course-based on prior course work at the law school-is lower than 3.2 or
higher than 3.4, the permissible grade range for the course shall expand to
encompass the students' incoming mean GPA average, plus 0.1 GPA points
if the incoming mean GPA average is greater than 3.4, and minus 0.1 GPA
points if the incoming mean GPA average is lower than 3.2. For example, if
the combined GPA of the students enrolled in a course is 3.5, then the GPA
range for the course is 3.2 to 3.6. If the combined GPA of the students en-
rolled in a course is 3.1, then the GPA range for the course is 3.0 to 3.4.
Recommended Mean in Elective Courses with One to Eight Students. For all
elective courses with one to eight students, the mean GPA for the course
should fall between 3.2 and 3.4, with a target GPA of 3.3, subject to the
same proviso applicable in courses with nine to twenty-nine students.
Note: The rules applicable to elective courses with nine to twenty-nine
students also apply to elective courses with one to eight students. How-
ever, for classes in the latter category, the parameters set by the rules are
merely recommended rather than mandatory.
Multiple Sections of the Same Course. When a professor teaches multiple
sections of the same course and administers the same assessment tool (or
tools) in each section-e.g., the same final exam-the professor must apply
the mandatory curve across both sections as if the two sections together con-
stitute a single course." 8
308. While my proposal was pending before the law school's curriculum committee, we made one
change to this language, adding the following: "There are five courses excepted in part from this policy.
If the professor is teaching both the day and night sections of Property I, Property II, Civil Procedure I,
Civil Procedure u, or Legal Profession, the professor need not treat the day and night sections as if they
are a single course." The reason for the change was that the sections of these courses are not all filled
with students at the same stage of their legal education. For example, Property I is a first-year course in
our day program and a second-year course in our night program.
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Minimum Required GPA to Remain in Good Standing. To remain in good
standing, a student must maintain a GPA of at least 2.70-i.e., the student
must maintain a B- average.3°9
Grades Below 2.7. All grades below 2.7 reflect performance that falls below
minimum competency. However, students shall receive credit for the course
if they earn a 2.6 to 2.0. Grades from 1.9 to 1.5 constitute "failing grades."
The student will not receive credit for the course. If the course is required,
the student must retake the class.
Pass/Fail Courses. Courses taught on a pass/fail basis are exempt from the
mandatory and recommended means.
Enforcement Mechanism. If a professor turns in non-complying grades, the
grades are returned to the professor. The professor must then re-curve the
class. If the professor chooses not to comply, the Associate Dean for Aca-
demic Affairs shall act in his or her discretion to bring the grades into com-
pliance, such as by setting the curve based on the professor's raw scores.
Note: Turning in non-complying grades constitutes failure to turn in
grades for purposes of the Late Grade Policy.
Transcript and Website Notation.31° A short description of the law school
grading system and curve shall be conspicuously placed at the bottom of
each page of all official transcripts. The full grading system will be added to
the academic rules and thus will be available on the website. However, to
assist employers and others, the grading system shall be placed in a promi-
nent location on the website. A link to that location will be included in the
transcript notation.
Transcript Language: The law school uses number grades ranging from
4.0 to 1.5. Every grade to the tenth of a point within this range may be
awarded (i.e., 4.0, 3.9, 3.8, etc.). The equivalent letter values are as fol-
lows: A= 4.0, A- = 3.7, B+ = 3.3, B = 3.0, B- = 2.7, C+ = 2.3, C = 2.0,
and F = 1.9 to 1.5. The law school also utilizes a mandatory curve in all
courses with more than 8 students. Under the curve, the mean (or aver-
age) grade must fall between 3.2 and 3.4 with a target mean of 3.3. For
further information on the law school grading scale and mandatory
curve, please see www.ualr.edu/.
309. B- is typically valued at 2.7 or 2.67 on a 4.0 scale.
310. I added this provision while my proposal was pending before the law school's curriculum
committee. I had always intended to include something like this, but I did not work on the specifics until
well after writing my initial proposal.
2012]
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A slightly modified version of this proposal was adopted by the Bowen Law
School faculty (18 to 3) in April, 2011. The proposal was approved with
three changes. Two of the modifications were very minor. First, clinic
courses with more than eight students were shifted from the mandatory
curve to the recommended curve that applies to electives with eight or fewer
pupils. At present, there are no clinic courses at Bowen with more than eight
students graded on a non-pass/fail basis. So this change had no substantive
effect under our existing curriculum. Second, required courses with eight or
fewer students were shifted from the mandatory curve to the recommended
curve that applies to electives with eight or fewer pupils. Bowen currently
has only one course that fits into this category-a required skills course.
The third change was more significant. The scale was shifted downward-
the permissible grade range was moved from 3.2 to 3.4 with a target mean
of 3.3 down to 2.9 to 3.1 with a target mean of 3.0. As part of that change,
the good standing GPA was lowered from 2.7 to 2.3, the lowest credit grade
was dropped from 2.0 to 1.7, and the lowest possible grade was reduced
from 1.5 to 1.2. While this change was substantively important, I labeled the
change "relatively minor" in Part I and at the start of this appendix because,
for purposes of this article, it was minor. Unlike the first two alterations, this
change did not implicate the mandatory curve qua curve. It concerned the
level of grades we award as an institution, not disparities in grades among
our faculty or other policies significantly implicated by grade normaliza-
tion.3" In a subsequent article, I will be presenting the case for setting B-/2.7
as the good standing GPA and for setting the mean grade at roughly the
B+/3.3 level.
311. See Downs & Levit, supra note 9, at 854 ("Suggesting that grades fall within certain ranges
[(grade normalization)] is an entirely different matter than suggesting that higher grades be given [(grade
inflation)]."). Put differently, grade normalization is about equalizing the pot of grade wealth that each
teacher may allocate to his or her students; grade inflation and deflation are concerned with the size of
the pot of grade wealth each instructor is given.
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